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ANTIETAM

AND THE MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA CAMPAIGNS
OF 1862.



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FROM THE GOVERNMENT RECORDS—UNION AND
CONFEDERATE—MOSTLY UNKNOWN AND WHICH
HAVE NOW FIRST DISCLOSED THE TRUTH

APPROVED BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT

BY
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OF THE MILITARY ORDER OF THE LOYAL LEGION, AND
OF THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, N. Y.



NEW YORK
THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY
1912

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41.50
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DEDICATION

TO MY COMRADES OF THE ARMY OF THE POTO-
MAC; AND TO MY COMRADES OF OUR OTHER
ARMIES, IN THE WEST; TO THE SURVIVORS
OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, WHOM IN
IDLE HOURS WE LOVED, AND IN BUSY HOURS WE
FOUGHT; TO THE MEMORY OF LINCOLN, WHOSE
GREAT HEART WAS SO BORNE UPON; AND OF MC-
CLELLAN, WHO FELT THE SAME WEIGHT; AND OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, WHOSE BRAVE WORDS, "WHEN
TWO PARTIES MAKE A COMPACT, THERE RESULTS TO
EACH A POWER OF COMPELLING THE OTHER TO EXE-
CUTE IT," LED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF HEROES
TO BATTLE AND VICTORY; TO MILITARY STUDENTS,
AND TEACHERS OF THE ART OF WAR, HERE AND
ABROAD; TO THE CALM JUDGMENT OF THE AMERI-
CAN PEOPLE; AND TO VINDICATION OF THE
TRUTH OF HISTORY, THIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED.



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PREFACE

THIS work, while in narrative form for the public, is based entirely upon the official records of the United States Government, Union and Confederate; supported, when required, by the endorsement of eminent officers of the United States War Department and the Army, and by evidence taken at the time, but not then published, before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War; by reports of Cabinet officers of the Government; and by records contained in official Government publications, as, for example, General Upton's "Military Policy of the United States."

The facts relating to the Antietam and the Virginia and Maryland campaigns of 1862 are analogous to those in works that treat of Napoleon, of whom to-day no record has any value which has not appeared until nearly forty years after Waterloo, having theretofore been hidden, suppressed, or perverted. Since then thousands of volumes have appeared, and are still appearing, all of which make prior books a travesty on the truth of history. So,

too, with Antietam; only latter-day investigations disclose the truth.

Popular or political histories, prejudiced or purposely garbled newspaper accounts,—of which I have read and examined hundreds with the greatest care, and compared with official data,—I have been compelled to totally ignore, as the information was based on unofficial data, and was practically censored by other influences. The personal facts were doubtless often correct, but the inferences, probably from lack of actual knowledge or collateral circumstances quite unknown to the narrator, or from other reasons, were erroneous in nearly every case, as the subsequent records show. To quote from Max Müller, in his “Lectures on India,” before the University of Cambridge: “It is this power of discovering what is really important that distinguishes the true historian from the mere chronicler.”

The principal sources from which was obtained the material brought together in this book were, of course, the great series of works containing the original data, and known as the “War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.” This great work contains no comments, connections, explanations, or criticisms, but is confined to the literal reproduction of official data—chronologically arranged whenever possible—under the direction of eminent army officers and experts, detailed for that purpose, during twenty years of study, collection, and arrangement.

The first volume was issued in 1881, the last volume in 1900, and the General Index, of 1242 pages, in 1901. The principal part of this stupendous work, as stated on pages xiii and xiv of the Preface to the Index, was arranged as follows:

“Major (now Brigadier-General and Judge Advocate General) George B. Davis, Judge Advocate, United States Army, was appointed military member and president of the board thus authorized.”

The work consists of 128 parts, arranged in 70 volumes, comprising an aggregate of 135,579 pages, and a large folio atlas containing 1006 maps and sketches, all official.

The publication was authorized under Act of Congress in 1874. The first volume was issued in 1881, the last volume in 1900, and the general index in 1901. The cost of publication alone has been \$2,858,514, besides the pay of army and Confederate officers detailed or employed on this work, and other necessary and very large expenditures.

The whole constitutes the most complete and comprehensive record of actual war that has ever been put forth by any government, and is a mine which will constitute the storehouse and basis of all authentic history of this war for all time to come.

It may be well to note here, however, that the Supplemental Volume (LI), in two parts, was not issued until late in 1898 or in 1899. The importance of this note lies in the fact that a large por-

tion of this supplemental volume, relating to the events I describe, and which should have been embodied in Volume XIX, published in 1887, had been hidden or suppressed, so that the records were not available for public use until ten years or more later, when they appear only in a supplemental volume. This material comprises thousands of dispatches, reports, notes, orders, and other data of the highest importance, and all, so far as I know, entirely new to the public, and which never has been used in any history.

Every part, volume, and page of this great work has been studied, selected, arranged, and annotated in writing, in the preparation of this volume. From these records, examined and carefully annotated,—a work of years,—the narrative embodied in the following pages has been studied, compared, and arranged.

I have also cited in a number of cases the autograph letters of Major-General Emory Upton which are found in the biography of that great soldier, by General Peter S. Michie, published by Appleton & Co. in 1885.

General Michie, professor at the West Point Military Academy, was graduated from that institution in 1863, standing second in his class. Assigned to the engineer corps,—the highest grade,—he was immediately made assistant, and then chief engineer in the operations against Charleston, and

then chief engineer of the Army of the James, where I first came to know him personally. He was made Brigadier-General January 1, 1865, in 1867 was appointed on the staff of instruction at West Point, and in 1871 professor of natural and experimental philosophy. In 1871 Princeton University gave him the degree of Ph. D., and in 1873 Dartmouth the degree of M. A. He has served on Government commissions in Europe, and is the author of several important scientific works besides his "Life of General Upton."

Major-General James H. Wilson, of the Army, wrote a twenty-page introduction to Michie's "Life of Upton." General Wilson was the celebrated Western cavalry commander, in our army, of the War. He was graduated at West Point in 1860; was assigned to the corps of topographical engineers; served as chief topographical engineer of the Port Royal Expedition, then in the Department of the South; was an aide-de-camp to McClellan till October, 1862, and was at the battles of South Mountain and Antietam. He was appointed lieutenant-colonel of volunteers in November, 1862, and afterwards, in our Western Army, commanded a cavalry corps of fifteen thousand men. He was the author of several important works, among others his work on China, made from his own personal observations, and was the co-author, with Charles A. Dana, of the "Life of General Grant."

Of General Upton Wilson says: "I have constantly maintained, since the close of the War, that at that time Upton was as good an artillery officer as could be found in any country, the equal of any cavalry commander of his day, and, all things considered, was the best commander of a division of infantry in either the Union or Rebel army. He was incontestably the best tactician of either army, and this is true whether tested by battle or by the evolutions of the drill field and parade. In the service, it is not too much to add that he could scarcely have failed as a corps or an army commander had it been his good fortune to be called to such rank."

In an address delivered by the Secretary of War at the laying of the corner-stone of the Army War College at Washington, February 21, 1903, the Secretary spoke of General Upton in the following terms:

"Brevet Major-General Emory Upton, colonel of the Fourth Artillery, graduated from West Point in the year 1860, became, while almost a boy, one of the most distinguished officers of the Civil War. He commanded successively a battery of artillery, a regiment of infantry, a brigade of artillery, and a division of cavalry. Constantly in the field, he exhibited in camp and march and in scores of battles dauntless and brilliant courage, strict and successful discipline, and the highest qualities of command."

I cite the above—which could be greatly amplified—to show that in relying, as I have done, on the official statements and letters of General Upton, I am supported by an authority as competent and valid as any of those cited directly from the Official War Records, especially so since his great work, “The Military Policy of the United States,” from which I have freely quoted, has been officially published by the United States, “Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904.”

Of the Battle of Antietam, which constitutes the central axis, as it were, of the present work, and which battle purposely was so greatly minimized and depreciated by political officialdom at the time, President Roosevelt more than forty years afterward, at the dedication of the New Jersey Soldiers' Monument on that battle-field September 17, 1903, placed it in its full light and proper perspective in his own vivid and incisive way:

“We meet to-day upon one of the great battle-fields of the Civil War. No other battle of the Civil War lasting but one day shows as great a percentage of loss as that which occurred here upon the day on which Antietam was fought. Moreover, in its ultimate effects this battle was of momentous and even decisive importance.

“If the issue of Antietam had been other than it was, it is probable that at least two great European Powers would have recognized the independence of the Confederacy, so that you who fought here

forty-one years ago have the profound satisfaction of feeling that you played well your part in one of those great crises big with the fate of all mankind.

"The great American Republic would have become a memory of derision; and the failure of the experiment of self-government by a great people on a great scale would have delighted the heart of every foe of republican institutions."

It seems almost a coincidence that Napoleon, too, subjected to similar malign influences, had to wait for his vindication and fame till forty years after Waterloo, which now the whole world, including his opposing enemies, fully and grandly acclaims.

Based, as the following work is, strictly on official records, many of which were long suppressed, I can appeal with confidence to the United States War Department for its correctness, as has already been done.

Of a somewhat similar case, in American history, Parkman says: "Some of the results here reached are of a character which I regret, since they cannot be agreeable to persons for whom I have a very cordial regard. The conclusions drawn from the facts may be matter of opinion: but it will be remembered that the facts themselves can be overthrown only by overthrowing the evidence on which they rest, or bringing forward counter-evidence of equal or greater strength; and neither task will be found an easy one."

This work is a simple, straightforward, and dis-

passionate record of the truth, and its statistics, all new, and its stragetical movements, which to the civilian may appear dry reading, to the old soldiers will be bread and meat, for they understand them like the multiplication table, and have always longed to learn just what they were "up against."

THE AUTHOR.



ANTIETAM

AND THE MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA
CAMPAIGNS OF 1862

I

INTRODUCTORY—INACCURACY OF ALL THE CURRENT HISTORIES

IN order to fully understand the Maryland campaign of 1862 it is necessary to consider the events which immediately preceded, and of which this momentous chapter in the War of the Rebellion was the consequence.

Full significance, and the high importance of the military operations of this epoch have never, for many reasons, been found in the ordinary histories of this period. There is, indeed, no campaign of the war so little understood in its military and national aspects as this, which had for its central feature the battle of Antietam, but which bristles from end to end, at every point, with questions which never have been answered, and never could have been answered, until the Government, with a care and cost which must extort the heartfelt gratitude of every patriot and soldier, has placed in our

hands the whole original record, without blot or emendation, and without the possibility of question, and has made for us and for the historian of the future all these events so clear and startling that no student of war or of his country need longer doubt or hesitate. I will endeavor to briefly depict the facts. I cannot in this brief presentation cite all the authorities at length by page and date, but in a case of this kind every statement made must be reënforced by unimpeachable original authority, and these I have included in the text as references in corroboration of the various facts hitherto doubtful or ignored.

I trust that in presenting these facts entirely without prejudice, and in vindication of historic truth and of the noble army which did such glorious service in these campaigns, the writer may ask for that consideration which long and faithful study of the records contained in many volumes, and a personal participation in the events themselves, as well as a perfect familiarity from boyhood with the whole country covered by these operations, may appear to deserve. Forty-nine years is full long enough to enable the calm light of history to displace the temporary and partial views of the great events with which I shall so briefly undertake, in outline at least, to deal.

When General Emory Upton had written his great work, "The Military Policy of the United States," published by the United States Govern-

ment, up to the campaigns of 1862 he had found during all the preceding military operations of our country no especial difficulty; but he now encountered problems impossible of solution on any military principles. He found defeats and disasters, movements and discommodations, and a labyrinth of incompatibilities which could not be accounted for with the ordinary historical data at hand.

To Colonel DuPont, his classmate at West Point and life-long friend, he writes in 1879: "Tomorrow I shall finish the original draft of the campaign of 1862. Its volume is startling. Twice I destroyed all that I had finished, because it fell short of carrying conviction. . . . The McClellan question has run the manuscript up by nearly four hundred pages. The campaign of 1862, the most critical of the war, is hardly in shape for your painstaking revision. I fear I have made too many quotations, and yet nothing will be received as condemnatory of Stanton's interference unless substantiated by documentary proof." He continues: "The campaign of 1862 is very difficult. If I make it short, the reader may doubt my facts and conclusions. If too long, he may weary of the subject. If you want to know who was the cause of a three years' war after we created a disciplined army of six hundred thousand men, it was Stanton. But Stanton did not create the system—the system created Stanton."

In a letter to General,—afterwards President,—

Garfield, in 1879, he says: "When in 1862 General McClellan, after being relieved from command, rode the lines of his army, neither my regiment nor myself joined in the demonstrations of affection and applause which nearly everywhere greeted his appearance. . . . The son of an Abolitionist, an Abolitionist myself, both as a cadet and an officer, my sympathies were strongly on the side of the Administration in its effort to abolish slavery, and I could not therefore even indirectly participate in an ovation which might be construed as a censure on either the civil or military policy of the Government. With these views you will naturally infer that I have always been anti-McClellan, anti-Fitz-John Porter, and such is the fact.

"Up to a few months ago, when I began our military policy during the Rebellion, I believed that these officers, differing in policy from the Administration, had not done their whole duty to the country. But in the process of this investigation I have been compelled to change my mind. Like many millions of our people, my opinions were vague and shadowy; they had no foundation in fact.

"You will remember that from the 11th of March till the 11th of July, 1862, we had no general-in-chief. Our armies, numbering more than six hundred thousand men, were commanded by the President and the Secretary of War. Could I lay before you all the facts that have come under

my observation, I believe you would be convinced that the causes of a four instead of a one year's war can all be traced to this brief but disastrous period.

"It was during this time that the troops east of the Alleghanies were divided up into six independent commands. It was during the same period that the great army concentrated at Corinth, and which might have made a summer excursion to Vicksburg and Jackson, was dispersed from Memphis to Cumberland Gap, a distance of nearly three hundred miles. In both cases the result was the same. The Army of the Potomac was called back to the Potomac; the Army of the Ohio was called back to the Ohio. It may be added, as a further coincidence, that the commanders of the two armies, against whose protests the division of our forces was made, were relieved from their command."

It may be added further, that when Halleck was brought east as general-in-chief, in July, 1862, he came with a handicap known to Stanton, but unknown to the country, which General Pope used against him to force the removal of McClellan, saying, "The circumstances under which you came to Washington and I undertook the campaign in Virginia are well-known to one-half of Congress."

With this bomb-shell—to which I shall again refer—in the hands of Pope and Stanton, and ready to be exploded under him, Halleck became a

mere agency in carrying out the military projects of the civilians who had so long dominated and directed the operations of the army.

Says General Michie, the biographer of Upton: "The great War Secretary, Stanton, a man of imperious will, became the supreme and controlling spirit in every military movement, and in the conduct of military affairs, and to his interference all our military disasters of that year may be traced."

And we shall find that these disasters did not cease with the second Bull Run campaign, but that Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville are a part of the same, in the midst of which McClellan's interregnum, enforced by the personal orders and righteous wrath of the President, who took the bit between his teeth and rose to an almost unapproachable majesty in this great emergency, shines out like a glorious star.

Referring to this "War Department strategy," as General Upton designates it, he demonstrates that it was a clear usurpation, saying: "Neither by the Constitution nor the laws is the Secretary of War entitled to exercise command. Whenever he departs from the sphere of administration to control military operations he is nothing more or less than a usurper. The Constitution, laws, decisions of the Supreme Court, and of the Attorney-General, nowhere give him the authority to command."

In other words, the Secretary's duties were those of administration, and the President is made, by

the Constitution, the commander-in-chief, and the commander-in-chief has no more power to delegate his command than the President has to delegate his veto.

Just on the eve of McClellan's movement by water to the Peninsula, in March, 1862, his position as general-in-chief was taken away from him, and he commanded, henceforth, only the ground which his army covered and only the troops which covered it.

Says General Michie: "By thus assuming the direction of military affairs both the Secretary and the President became from this moment as much responsible for whatever of disaster might befall the army as if they had actually taken command in the field. No sooner had the commander of the army of the Potomac sailed for Fortress Monroe than the disintegration of the forces which he had relied upon for his purpose, and which had been promised him, began to take place."

II

THE PENINSULA

WE know the result. When the Army of the Potomac had reached the front of Richmond its line of supply was by the York River, on the left bank of the Chickahominy, while Richmond, the objective, was miles away on the right bank of the Chickahominy. This uncanny stream thus of necessity divided our army. As soon as the James River had become free, by the destruction of the Merrimac, and with the ascent of our war vessels to the Chickahominy and above, correct military principles required that our base should be changed to the James.

But this was forbidden by two circumstances. By Stanton's order of May 18 McClellan was directed to extend his right wing so as to effect a junction with McDowell's left wing advancing from Falmouth, and to establish this connection as soon as possible, by extending McClellan's right wing to the north of Richmond; and Stanton's orders to McDowell of June 8 directed that officer to move his command immediately in the direction

of Richmond, to coöperate with McClellan. Wrote McDowell, to McClellan: "For the third time I am ordered to join you, and this time I hope to get through." (See War Records, vol. xi.)

But he didn't, and McDowell was tied fast, and Stonewall Jackson was turned loose. Then came the heroic Seven Days' battles, when McClellan, having no hope from McDowell, but altogether the reverse, made that remarkable change of base to the James River, at almost precisely the spot where Grant, two years later, did the same, after sacrificing more men overland than his antagonist had with which to oppose him, and finally opened the door to Richmond and brought about the end of the war. McClellan's plan was outlined in his correspondence with Commodore Rodgers,—who commanded the fleet in the James River,—under dates June 24 and 25, and with Woodruff and Felton, June 20. (War Records, vol. xi, part 3, page 220.)

McClellan's plan, in brief, was to hold the Confederate army in front of his heavy works on the right bank of the Chickahominy and throw the bulk of his army across to, and over, the James River, attacking Richmond from the south and west. He had had all the roads through this wilderness already surveyed and mapped for this purpose (See "W. R." vol. xi; vol. xi, part 1, pp. 37, 152, 264, 270, 998; part 3, pp. 24, 226, 229, 236, 246, 250, 251, 255, 256, 258, 262, 265, 272.) Confirmatory

of the above is the statement of Lieutenant-General Dick Taylor (son of President Taylor), who commanded a division in Lee's army in the battles from Gaines' Mill to Malvern Hill, ("Destruction and Reconstruction," page 87), "The Confederate commanders knew no more about the topography of the country than they did about Central Africa. . . . McClellan was as superior to us in knowledge of our own land as were the Germans to the French in their late war." But the junction of Jackson with Lee—directly due to the authorities at Washington—and their combined attack on McClellan's right, at Gaines' Mill, disarranged these plans, and compelled him to do, in the midst of open battle, what he had intended to do in advance by secret movements.

And now we come to the question of forces engaged on each side, and this question will dominate the entire Maryland campaign as well. It is needless to say that the Confederate force was purposely minimized, and McClellan's exaggerated, in both cases, in all the War Department figures, at Washington.

The regimental organization in both armies was identical. The very day McClellan had landed on the Peninsula, and when about going into a long, exhaustive, and depleting campaign, Secretary Stanton issued his general order of the War Department April 3, 1862: "The recruiting service for volunteers will be discontinued in every State

from this date. The officers detailed on Volunteer Recruiting Service will join their regiments without delay. . . . The public property belonging to Volunteer Recruiting Service will be sold to the best possible advantage." (See Official Orders, War Department, 1862.)

As stated in Lee's letter of August 16, 1862, and Jefferson Davis's "History of the Confederacy," the Confederates immediately countered on this order, April 13, ten days afterward, by the first general conscription of "All white men resident of the Confederate States, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, and to continue those already in the field until three years from the date of their enlistment." Those under eighteen and over thirty-five were required to remain ninety days. And as a counter to the President's War Order No. 3, of March 11, just before the Peninsula campaign began, relieving General McClellan from the control of our armed forces as a whole, General R. E. Lee, by General Orders No. 14, dated Richmond, March 13 (only two days afterward), was "assigned to duty at the seat of government, and was charged (directly under the President) with the conduct of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy."

The above general conscription alone should have given the Confederate armies more than 800,000 men, in addition to the forces already in the field; the entire Union armies at this time, East and

West, did not number, even on paper, more than 600,000 men. (See General Michie's "Biography of Emory Upton," p. 459.) The results of this suicidal policy at Washington, and of this magnificent counter-stroke at Richmond, were soon apparent. In war, military principles as contrasted with political practices will win in every case.

It will be necessary for the purposes of this history to determine the actual numbers of the opposing forces during the Seven Days, as this will give us a standard of comparison for the succeeding campaigns.

It is well known that for purposes of comparison, the Union official figures are worthless, as our generals were obliged to report the "ration strength," while the Confederate forces reported only the "fighting strength."

The reports of a great many regimental and other organizations engaged in the Seven Days' battles, on both sides, give the number of their men taken into action. These came from all parts of each army, and are a fair index of the average strength, conforming also to the ratio of officers and the system of organization, which was alike in both armies. The average strength of the Confederate infantry was 542 officers and men for each regiment. For the Union army the average was 487 per regiment. (See vol. xi, "War Records.")

As the conscription had brought in its men

freely, during the previous two and one-half months, and recruiting had brought none at all to the Army of the Potomac, we may be sure that if there be any error it must be in underestimating the Confederates.

It may be well to pursue this question somewhat further. In vol. XI, part 3, p. 615, W. R., is given the "present" on June 23, 1862, of twenty-four Virginia regiments,—which (see Longstreet's letter on page 614, *ibid.*), are really present for duty in battle,—as "7000 are at times absent from their posts." Excluding these, the total is 11,380; but in the letter Longstreet sums up the whole (including officers) at 13,000. This gives an average regimental strength of 542. As the 6813 others are only "absent at times," the effective strength in battle would be considerably greater. On the same page the average battery strength of thirteen batteries is given as present for duty in battle 76 men, besides officers, per battery. The total per battery may be put at a minimum of 80.

Lee's published field return for July 20, 1862, gives as present for duty, exclusive of Jackson and Ewell, 69,732. This includes Holmes's division; but this division was present and engaged in the Seven Days' battles. (See volume xi, part 2, p. 906.) Lee, in his letter to Jackson of July 27 (see War Records, vol. xii, part 3, p. 918), gives the effective strength of Jackson and Ewell at 18,000

men. Adding officers in the proportion of Lee's army—1200—would make this force 19,200. The Confederate losses in the Seven Days, which are much underestimated in the returns, since there are large discrepancies in their own accounts (compare volume xi, part 2, pp. 973-984 with p. 502), were not less than 20,077.

Aggregating these items, we have a Confederate total taken into action in the Seven Days' battles of 108,899, which is less than the true aggregate.

Comparing Lee's field return of officers present for duty July 20, and adding the officers of Jackson and Ewell, 1200, we have a total of 5533 commissioned officers left in Lee's army *after* the Seven Days' battles.

McClellan's field return of July 10, after deducting Dix's command, which had remained at Fort Monroe and was not under McClellan's command, gives an aggregate of 3834 commissioned officers present for duty with McClellan's entire army *after* the Seven Days.

McClellan made no complaint of his army being under-officered.

Lee (see vol. xi, War Records, part 3, pp. 669 and 671), wrote urgently and repeatedly to the Richmond authorities about his shortage of officers. He says: "The want of officers of proper rank renders many regiments and companies inefficient; regiments being in some cases under the command of captains and many companies without their proper comple-

ment of officers." Again, later, he writes: "I am very anxious that the vacancies among the regimental officers should be filled as soon as possible," etc., etc.

As Lee's losses in the Seven Days' battles were at least one-third greater than those of McClellan, after making due allowance for this casualty deficiency of officers in Lee's army, we still see that his force after the battles must have been decidedly in excess of that of McClellan. So much so, in fact, that one might suppose that the Confederate strength in the Seven Days was really much greater than the estimated regimental strengths would aggregate, since Lee had one-third more officers after the battle than McClellan had, and was nevertheless urging the Richmond authorities that his shortage of officers rendered many of his organizations inefficient.

It is needless to repeat, of course, that the system of organization was the same in both armies.

At the end of July Lee sent to Jackson A. P. Hill's division and two Louisiana regiments, the latter to be brigaded with those already in Jackson's force. These numbered altogether thirty regiments. (See War Records, vol. xi, part 3, p. 648, and vol. xii, part 3, p. 918.) Lee says: "These troops will exceed 18,000 men." Adding their officers, we have 19,200 at least, and dividing by thirty we have an aggregate regimental strength of 640 each, officers and men.

It should be noted that the Confederates did not multiply new regiments as we did, but kept filling up their old regiments. Very few of the Confederate States show regimental numbers exceeding 50 or 60. The highest regimental number in Virginia was 61, and this number appears in the Seven Days. So also of Georgia and the other States. This system, of course, added enormously to the value and efficiency of these organizations.

Coming directly now to the numbers engaged on each side in the Seven Days' battles, we find, from the Confederate roster (vol. xi, part 2, pp. 483-489) that General Lee had under his direct command, and actually engaged in these battles, 182 regiments of infantry, 11 regiments of cavalry, and 87 batteries of field artillery,—besides the heavy guns in the works,—making a total battle-field strength of 110,802, which is a minimum.

McClellan had under his command at the same time 143 regiments of infantry, 6 regiments of cavalry, and 57 batteries of artillery, making a total battle-field strength of 81,797, which is a maximum.

The Confederates had an excess over the Army of the Potomac of 44 regiments of infantry, 5 regiments of cavalry, and 30 batteries of field artillery, making an aggregate excess in numbers of, at least, 29,000 men.

At the battle of Gaines' Mill, June 27, when the combined divisions of Stonewall Jackson, Ewell, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, and Longstreet, with Stuart's

cavalry, made a concerted attack on three sides, the Confederates had engaged 124 regiments of infantry, 8 regiments of cavalry, and 27 batteries of artillery; while the Union forces comprised only 49 regiments of infantry, 3 regiments of cavalry, and 21 batteries of artillery. (See casualty returns of opposing armies in vol. xi, W. R.)

The strength of the Confederates in this battle was nearly in the proportion of three to one, yet under McClellan's eye, and with Fitz-John Porter in immediate command, our troops inflicted far greater losses than they sustained, and at nightfall crossed the Chickahominy with all their force intact and ready for the battles yet to follow, which battles concluded with that astonishing and overwhelming victory over all Lee's army at Malvern Hill, which perhaps gave the highest example of what artillery can do when properly handled, to be found in all history, unless Antietam may furnish another instance.

The obvious course for the Union army, now, was to do as we did two years later, for the James and the York rivers, the Peninsula and the Appomattox, were all in our possession, and the vast defensive works in front of Petersburg and Richmond had been as yet barely begun. (See Confederate engineers' reports, W. R.)

McClellan, perfectly secure in his magnificent position at Harrison's Landing, with tidewater supplies open from every quarter, and with natural de-

fenses all around, and almost under the shadow of Malvern Hill, of unsavory memory to the Confederates, awaited support from Washington, as Grant did two years later, to complete his work.

The editors of Upton's United States Government publication, "The Military Policy," in a note, describe Harrison's Landing as one of the best on the James River. It was twenty-five miles below Richmond, with a high and open country between, and guarded by water on both flanks and in front. It was, in fact, immediately across the James River from, and less than four miles below, City Point; whence Grant carried on his final campaign, in 1864 and 1865. In fact, McClellan occupied both sides of the James River, as the War Records (vol. xi) show.

But other counsels prevailed.

Concerning the operations from Harrison's Landing, including General Sumner's report of the capture of Malvern Hill, August 5, see War Records, vol. xi, part 3, p. 356; of McClellan's urgent appeals for ferry-boats to cross the James River in force, August 3, see same volume and part, p. 351; of Averell's cavalry action south of the James, August 9, see same volume, part 2, pp. 946-948, and D. H. Hill's report of same, p. 948; and of other occupations of the southern side, pp. 949, 950. See also Fitz-John Porter's letter to McClellan of August 5, to push over to the Suffolk Railroad, destroying all bridges over the Blackwater River, etc., etc.

The protest of Commodore Wilkes to Secretary of the Navy Welles, of August 5, 1862, against the removal of the army from the front of Richmond to Washington is an important and elaborate statement of the facts, on the spot and at the time, and will be found at length in the War Records, vol. xi, part 2, pp. 356-358. He concludes: "I trust in God this direful act will not be carried out; our noble cause will be ruined if it is. General McClellan is confident as I am in the result, if left here, the capture of the Rebel capital, and of maintaining the honor, safety, and glory of the Union and its army."

III

THE ADVENT OF POPE

POPE had been brought to Washington and been given command of a new army, the Army of Virginia, made up of the scattered forces of Frémont, Banks, McDowell, and the garrisons at Washington, with comprehensive orders from the civilians at Washington to "operate in such manner as, while protecting Western Virginia and the national capital from danger or insult, it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome the Rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville, and render the most effective aid to relieve General McClellan and capture Richmond."

Surely it was a task worthy of those fabled ancient heroes, and we need not wonder that General Pope, in command of this "one army," should in his published address "To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia," tell them what manner of man he was. "Let us understand each other," he said. "I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the ad-

versary and beat him when he was found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in defensive attitude. I presume I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. Meantime, I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to hear so much in vogue among you. I hear constantly of 'taking strong positions and holding them,' of 'lines of retreat,' and of 'bases of supplies.' Let us discard such ideas."

But he might have been more modest; for an analysis of his returns from the official War Records, for the nine months up to April 8, 1862, while in the West, when his force was 25,000 men, shows that his entire losses were only 11 men killed and 35 wounded; while during the so-called siege of Corinth his entire losses aggregated only about 20 killed and 180 wounded and missing.

Those were the trophies which he brought East, besides Halleck's false despatch of June 4 (which, after the war, Pope repudiated), purporting that the latter was pushing the enemy with all his might and had already captured 10,000 prisoners, 15,000 stand of arms, etc., etc., and on which report Stanton telegraphed, "Your glorious despatch has just been re-

ceived, and I have sent it into every State. The whole land will soon ring with applause at the achievement of your gallant army and its able and victorious commander." And on which the President sent his message, "Your despatch of to-day to the Secretary of War received. Thanks for the good news it brings." And on which, also, as I shall show, later on, both Pope and Halleck came to Washington to command. Well might General Upton say, of Pope, that "he now labors under the imputation of not having understood his own plans." (See "Military Policy.")

When this despatch was sent, as General Pope afterward testified before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, he was lying sick in his own quarters, not four miles from Halleck, and Halleck knew it. No wonder General Halleck, who had been a canny lawyer in San Francisco, had caused "that portion of the despatches and reports concerning the operations around Corinth which bore upon this question to be cut out of the official books and brought with you" (as says General Pope in his letter to Halleck of July 5, 1865), "to Washington, leaving the official records mutilated and incomplete." We can see here already that Halleck did not intend that Pope, or the Washington authorities, should be able to prove that his glowing despatch of June 4 was not based on any report from Pope or from anyone else. But Pope proved

that it was not, nevertheless, but at a time when it was useless to the country.

These questions are all related to the Maryland campaign, and must be understood in order to correctly understand that campaign.

After the Seven Days' battles the armies lay confronting each other below Richmond. July 13 Jackson's force, with Ewell, which did not belong to Lee's own army, had been sent up to Louisa Court House, and to Gordonsville—but still within reach of Lee—toward the Valley, where it properly belonged.

Burnside's force was now coming up from North Carolina, and Lee anxiously watched to see whether it would come up the James River or go on to Aquia Creek, and to Pope. In the former case the Army of the Potomac was to be reinforced and Jackson and his other outlying troops were to be within call from Richmond; if the latter, then the Army of the Potomac was to be moved, also, to Aquia Creek and up the Rappahannock. Lee writes Jackson, July 27: "I want Pope to be suppressed; strike your blow, and be prepared to return to me when done, if necessary. I will endeavor to keep General McClellan quiet till it is over, if rapidly executed."

For this expedition he reinforced Jackson with A. P. Hill's division and one extra brigade, numbering, in all, thirty-three regiments, "which will exceed 18,000 men," said General Lee, giving an aver-

age regimental strength of about 580 officers and men. The bulk of Lee's army still lay in front of McClellan.

Burnside's force went in dribblets to Fredericksburg, but still Lee lingered. McClellan asked what was to be done with the army, and urged an immediate reply. August 3 came the order, which by its very terms precluded swift and open movements. Halleck's order stated that it was determined to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek, but that it was to be done in secret. "Its real object and withdrawal should be concealed even from your own officers. Your material and transportation should be removed first."

The work was pushed on with the greatest celerity, but it involved the removal of the sick and stores, and of the troops by land to Fortress Monroe.

Fitz-John Porter's 5th corps were sent ahead, and obtained transports and sailed at once. But as the reports show, transports were wanting at the time for the others, due to further blundering at Washington.

McClellan was accused of slowness; but General Upton has entirely vindicated him. Indeed, both the President's order appointing Pope and Halleck's letter to McClellan of August 7, stated that McClellan would have command of all the forces of both Pope and Burnside, as well as his own (see

War Records, vol. xi, part 3, p. 360; vol. xii, part 3, p. 435), so that the change offered a *larger* instead of a smaller field to McClellan.

And the charge of slowness is fully refuted by both General Pope and President Lincoln. (See vol. xi, War Records, part 3, p. 269.) Says President Lincoln: "We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops could have been gotten to you." Page 297, Pope writes, July 4: "If my command be embarked and sent to you by James River the enemy would be in Washington before it had half accomplished the journey." As the distance and difficulties are the same one way as back the same way, it will be seen that McClellan was twice as swift as Pope supposed he could be; for the bulk of Pope's army in the battles at the second Bull Run was from the Army of the Potomac, just returned from Richmond. (See General Upton's "Military Policy," p. 370.)

As soon as McClellan started for Fort Monroe, Lee started for the Rapidan. (See War Records, vol. xi, part 3, pp. 634, 647, 675-6, 676, 677, 680.) All that had been keeping Lee at Richmond was McClellan, and, as General Upton says, "The fact should not be overlooked that the misguided advisers of the President and the Confederate commander were aiming at the same object."

Had it been even possible for McClellan to have

started on the 3d or 4th of August, it would have been all the same, as General Upton demonstrates, since Lee would have started the next day, and would have caught Pope in a still worse position than he subsequently did. and further from relief. For Jackson and A. P. Hill had been sent up to Louisa Court House some weeks before, and had fought Pope at Cedar Mountain, away out near Culpeper. As McClellan's army would have had to march sixty miles to Fort Monroe, and from thirty to fifty more at least from Aquia Creek or Falmouth, making ninety or one hundred in all, besides the water transport, while Lee had at most only seventy to march, it offered Lee a fine chance to cut in behind Pope, drive him west to the mountains, and then turn on the detachments of the arriving Army of the Potomac and drive them back to Washington.

The troops from the Army of the Potomac came on as rapidly as possible. Colonel Ingalls, the chief quartermaster, reported to General Meigs, August 15: "Up to this moment the thing could not have been done faster." There were delays, from Fortress Monroe to Washington, but these were due to Washington and not to the army. Transports went helter-skelter, some were drafted away to New York, and there was a great storm. McClellan had nothing to do with all this—all he could do was to urge and strive.

August 12 Halleck ordered Burnside, then at Fal-

mouth, to divide his forces and send the bulk of them up the river to Pope. August 13 the movement began, by McClellan and Burnside, and the march of troops proceeded; "not an hour has been lost up to this time." (Colonel Ingalls.)

August 13 Lee first gave his orders to move Longstreet's whole force, together with Hood's, to the Rappahannock front, saying: "From every indication it appears [August 14] that McClellan's forces are being withdrawn and sent to reinforce Pope." Lee was now turned loose, and McClellan tied fast.

August 24 Lee reports the capture of a letter from Pope to Halleck, dated August 20, reporting his force for duty at 45,000, independent of Burnside, and not including any part of the Army of the Potomac. Meantime the movement of the latter army by water from the Peninsula continued.

McClellan thus came with his army directly into the territory occupied by General Pope. In the President's order, dated June 26, appointing Pope to the command of the Army of Virginia, it was stated that when the latter and the Army of the Potomac were in position to communicate and directly coöperate, the chief command "shall be governed, as in like cases, by the Rules and Articles of War." August 7 Halleck wrote McClellan: "As I told you when at your camp, it is my intention that you shall command all the troops in Virginia as soon as we can get them together; and with the army thus

concentrated I am certain that you can take Richmond." Halleck declared that he staked his reputation on it. So the charge that McClellan was actuated by personal motives to oppose the removal is not true; for he would command a much larger army, more directly under the eyes of the nation, and with results more theatrically effective, by coming north than by remaining in the Peninsula. But he would not be doing so much to end the war, and this he well knew.

Halleck, afterward, in endeavoring to soothe the ruffled feelings of General Pope, then an exile, as he called it, in Minnesota, wrote him October 10, 1862: "You complain that I acted unfriendly to you in giving the command to General McClellan. On the contrary, I advised against it. The facts do not sustain your assertion. As General McClellan's army arrived here by detachments, every man I could move was, against his protest, sent to your command. He claimed that when the two armies began to unite, he, as ranking officer, had a right to command both. His claim was not admitted, and he remained in command only of the defenses of Washington."

This statement contains three errors of fact: 1—McClellan did not protest against his organizations being sent forward; he objected to sending forward Franklin's corps in a rush without artillery, without horses, without wagons, without supplies, and without ammunition excepting what the men

had in their cartridge-boxes. And the corps was sent as soon as these supplies were received, even in part. Pleasonton's cavalry was detained on the Peninsula for want of transports, which had been sent elsewhere by orders from Washington. 2—McClellan did not claim the command specifically by rank, though he was the ranking general, but by the orders of the President and the letter of the general-in-chief, Halleck himself. 3—He did not "remain in command of the defenses in Washington" (as Halleck stated), for he had not been given the command of these at all. General Barnard, by special orders of the Secretary of War, No. 190, dated August 14, 1862, was "assigned to the command of the fortifications surrounding Washington." He retained this place until September 1, and only relinquished his command by a letter and order September 2, after Pope's defeat.

Pope's army was defeated and flying back to Washington. In the midst of this awful cataclysm McClellan, who had seen his forces ordered away from him until he had only his personal staff, about one hundred men, under his command, and had to send out to learn the countersign, was thus addressed by Halleck, September 1: "General Pope was ordered this morning to fall back to line of fortifications, and has been moving all day in this direction." But Pope was then acting under orders of General Lee, and not of General Halleck, and the President demanded that McClellan be sent for.

The whole story is told by Secretary Welles, of Lincoln's Cabinet, who did not especially love McClellan, but who did love truth and decency. I refer to his book, "Lincoln and Seward." He says: "But Pope was defeated, and the army, sadly demoralized, came retreating to the Potomac. The War Department, and especially Stanton and Halleck, became greatly alarmed." A paper was brought to Secretary Welles, in the handwriting of the Secretary of War, demanding McClellan's immediate dismissal. Four members of the Cabinet were ready to sign it, but Seward and Welles were not, on the ground that "the combination was improper and disrespectful to the President, who had selected his Cabinet to consult and advise with, not to conspire against him."

Secretary Welles adds that he had doubted the wisdom of recalling the Army of the Potomac from Richmond. "The object of bringing that army back to Washington," he says, "in order to start anew, march overland, and regain the abandoned position I did not understand, unless it was to get rid of McClellan; and if that was the object, it would have been much better to place another general at the head of the army while it was yet on the James."

A cabinet council was being held, September 1. Mr. Lincoln had not yet arrived when Stanton entered the room and said, with great excitement, that he had just learned from General Halleck that the

President had placed General McClellan in command of the forces in Washington. The President arrived; "and Stanton, with some feeling," says Secretary Welles, "remarked that no order to that effect had issued from the War Department. The President calmly, with some emphasis, said the order was his, and he would be responsible for it to the country."

Here spoke the real Lincoln, the great Lincoln, the Lincoln of history, and of a loving and glorifying country! And what a weight of suffering he bore! How pathetic his complaint, "I am so borne upon."

Not daring to remove McClellan from the Army of the Potomac, as that required the direct order of the President, it still had seemed possible to remove the Army of the Potomac from McClellan, for that was a detail of the "War Department strategy" which General Upton so graphically characterizes as being operated by the civilians in their offices.

And now this hope was gone, for Lincoln in his majesty and power had opened wide the arms of the "old commander" to receive the *disjecta membra* of three defeated armies, now pouring back into Alexandria and Washington.¹

¹See note pp. 309-310.

IV

THE SECOND MANASSAS

SUCH a defeat ought not to have occurred. The same critical examination of the forces at the second Manassas as I have applied to the Seven Days' battles will show us what forces General Pope, who was on the defensive, had under his command on the field of battle, and which regiments, as the casualty reports show, all suffered actual losses in battle, and not trifling losses either. These include the army corps of Sigel, Banks, and McDowell, Reynolds's division, Heintzleman's corps, Fitz John Porter's corps, Taylor's brigade of the sixth corps, and Burnside's Ninth army corps. These forces aggregated on the field of battle 167 regiments of infantry, 14 of cavalry, one regiment of heavy artillery, and 43 batteries.

The Confederate forces opposed numbered 134½ regiments of infantry, 14½ regiments of cavalry, and 61 batteries of artillery. But not all these were actively engaged; only 120 regiments of infantry reported losses. The disproportion *in favor* of Pope,

in this battle, was almost the same as the disproportion *against* McClellan in the Seven Days.

The crisis was now upon the country. McClellan, by the mandate of the President, was now in command of the forces as they poured back, and of the fortifications as they surrounded Washington; but all the rest of the country was open to the Confederate army.

Lincoln excused himself, says Secretary Welles, for appointing McClellan to command the fortifications, by saying "he was a defensive man, and could reorganize the army better than anyone else," which was true, for he had created it out of the ruins of the First Bull Run and the panic of the preceding summer. But he now cast a doubt on Welles's memory by appointing McClellan to do the most critical act in the whole history of the War of the Rebellion; that is to say, to take this "defeated and shattered army, this retreating and demoralized army," as the President called it, and reorganize it indeed; but reorganize it upon the march, with a victorious army sweeping across his front,—not yet organized,—north to Maryland and Pennsylvania, not with the Confederate force merely which had met and defeated Pope and driven him into Washington, but with all these and more than fifty new and fresh veteran regiments directly from Richmond added to the invading force. And all this must be done inside of two weeks, for in two weeks Lee's armies would have been in Pennsylvania and

marching up the Cumberland Valley, or else to York and the Susquehanna River, as they did a year later under almost similar circumstances, and with an army no larger, and no better, to break in a surge, scattered into bloody spray on the impregnable heights of Gettysburg, "the high-water mark of the Rebellion"; while now, with McClellan's remnants, he was to do all this, reinforced by twenty-nine regiments of raw recruits, who never had seen any enemy and never fired a shot, and with as many other hacked-up veteran regiments left behind, with many thousands of others also left behind, to still guard "from insult" that ever-imperiled capital. Napoleon well said that "to defend a capital you must make such war, and at such distance, that the capital cannot be attacked; if fully invested it is already lost." But civilians do not understand these things—they would keep out an invasion as they would keep out a freshet in a mill-race.

General Grant, in his "Memoirs," amusingly relates how Mr. Lincoln, when he (Grant) was about to take command of the armies in the spring of 1864, gave him a plan for a campaign of his own. "He pointed out," says Grant, "on the map two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these streams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listened respectfully, but did not

suggest that the same streams would protect Lee's flanks while he was shutting us up."

General Grant significantly adds: "I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to the Secretary of War or to General Halleck."

Wasn't this splendid? I have often envied, as it were, Grant's magnificent opportunity, which time and the trend of events had given him, so that he could act according to military principles and achieve military results in defiance of those malevolent civilian forces which had bound hard and fast the military hands and feet, and crushed the military mind, and blinded the military eye, during all those long, weary, hapless months while the nation groaned in spirit and the great heart of Lincoln was wrung with unutterable woe!

And now, for ten weeks, this great curtain of darkness was to be lifted from the tragedy of the spring and summer, and McClellan was to be sent forward to do that work for which he was the best fitted,—that swift marching and fierce attack which other interests had denied him, for alas! in those earlier days our people at home did not know that an army was an article of manufacture and not a mob organized on paper. Napoleon said that it took ten months' drill and several campaigns to make an army. McClellan made his in half the time. Grant never made an army; he never had to; they were made for him by others, as Sheridan's were. Sher-

man, Thomas, Buell, Meade, and McClellan, these made armies, for they were all with McClellan in 1861-1862, and they learned how to do it under McClellan. McClellan had learned it in Europe, where the Government had sent him, and improved on his teachers.

V

OPENING OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.

AND now the Maryland campaign opens, and what we have been considering will be found to be the key to these wonderful ten weeks, commencing in the suburbs of Washington and ending in front of Culpeper, with Longstreet's vain orders for a battle which was destined never to be fought, but which, if McClellan had fought it, would have led practically to the destruction of the Confederate armies, to the elimination at one blow of all Virginia from the Confederacy, and to the ending of the war in 1862.

As McClellan came in on the heels of Pope's worst defeat, he was destined to go out in the face, and on the eve, of his own greatest victory.

What was this Maryland invasion of Lee? Did it contemplate a rapid circling around from Point of Rocks to Williamsport, and then back up the Shenandoah Valley again? Who is so ignorant as to believe that Lee did not know better? When Lee entered Maryland he meant business; and what he did in 1863 showed what he meant to do in 1862

had McClellan permitted him. But we are not without positive evidence that Lee's invasion was an invasion of Pennsylvania, and not of Maryland; and that Maryland was crossed over simply because Pennsylvania lay beyond Maryland.

The evidence that the invasion was of Pennsylvania, and not of Maryland, is conclusive; but the same policy which sought to belittle the great work of the Army of the Potomac in this supreme crisis of the nation's life ignored this evidence, thereby belittling the Battle of Antietam and needlessly depriving its gallant and triumphant soldiers of their just meed of valor and success.

Lee reported to President Davis, on September 7, that "all divisions of the army have crossed the Potomac, unless it be General Walker's, from whom I have had no report since the 5th."

But, three days before, from his camp at Leesburg, Va., Lee wrote Davis, September 4: "Should the results of the expedition justify it, I propose to enter Pennsylvania, unless you should deem it inadvisable upon political or other grounds."

On the contrary, Davis heartily approved it, and immediately sent Lee the draft of a proclamation, with the place for the name of the State left blank, so as to be available in both Pennsylvania and Maryland, and using this language: "We are driven to protect our own country by transferring the seat of war to that of an enemy who pursues us with a relentless and apparently aimless hostility;

our fields have been laid waste, our people killed, many homes made desolate, and rapine and murder have ravaged our frontiers; the sacred right of self-defense demands that, if such a war is to continue, its consequences shall fall on those who persist in their refusal to make peace. The Confederate army therefore comes to occupy the territory of their enemies and to make it the theater of hostilities."

That was not Maryland, but Pennsylvania; Lee had many troops in his own army from Maryland, and many splendid officers.

September 9 Lee again wrote Davis, from his camp at Frederick, Md.: "I shall move in the direction I originally intended, toward Hagerstown and Chambersburg." And even after the battle of Antietam he wrote to General Loring, commanding in the Kanawha Valley, in Western Virginia: "Probably a combined movement into Pennsylvania may be concerted."

Doctor Lewis H. Steiner, a surgeon and inspector of the United States Sanitary Commission, who spent the whole five days of the Confederate occupation of Frederick among the Rebel soldiers and officers, says in his diary, under date September 8-9: "Their army is plainly intended for an advance into Pennsylvania, and they speak freely of their intention to treat Pennsylvania very differently from Maryland. I fear there will be great destruction of property as they move forward. Many a citizen will lose his all of this world's goods in this raid, for

devastation is meant to be the order or disorder of their march when they cross the border."

When Lee's army left Frederick, Longstreet's whole force moved directly northwest through the South Mountain to Hagerstown, near the Pennsylvania border. The army reached and held Hagerstown until the battle of South Mountain occurred and the passes were forced (thus imperiling Lee's detached commands, across the Potomac from Harper's Ferry), when Longstreet was suddenly halted and brought back to Rohrer'sville, and then deflected south to Antietam. The Confederate army within the next four days bade farewell to Pennsylvania for this year—as it did a year later—along the same reach of the Potomac River, after the battle of Gettysburg.

Following the affair at Chantilly and McClellan's reorganization of the routed fragments of Pope's army behind the defenses of Washington, of which he had been put in command by the President personally, as stated, the Confederate army turned its head to the north and concentrated around Leesburg. On the 5th, 6th and 7th of September it forded the Potomac River near Point of Rocks, the river being little more than knee deep.

As a personal reminiscence I may mention that from the rough look-out on the summit of Maryland Heights, opposite Harper's Ferry, which overlooked the country for many miles, for three days we could watch the long thread unwinding across

the river, and with glasses distinguish the guns, wagons, even the regiments, with their flashing battle-flags. It was a glorious, and albeit a peaceful, yet a terrible sight; it was the unfolding panorama of a great war, displayed as though it were on exhibition. The cavalry to which I belonged had retreated—under orders of Halleck dated September 2, 1862—from the Upper Shenandoah at and beyond Winchester, and had just reached Harper's Ferry, where, incredible as it may seem, it was sent over to assist in garrisoning the summit of Maryland Heights—the cavalry! with thousands of infantry in Harper's Ferry.

General Wool, in whose department Harper's Ferry then was, and who, together with Stanton and Halleck, was trying to take care of it, reports a despatch from Colonel Miles, commanding at Harper's Ferry, under date 11 A. M., September 7, stating that Lee's army "has crossed and is still crossing into Maryland, below Point of Rocks. I will send up to the observatory to look out for dust, and I will inform you." There was plenty of dust.

After crossing, the Confederate army moved directly up to Frederick, where it concentrated, September 9. Meantime, what was McClellan doing, for he was the only one at Washington apparently capable of doing anything for the country?

September 2, 1 P. M., McClellan writes the general-in-chief (and we can see what sort of a general-in-chief Halleck was willing to be) as follows:

"MY DEAR HALLECK: My ordnance officer informs me that General Ripley says that he has just received an order from the *Secretary of War* to ship everything from this arsenal to New York. I had sent to General Ripley to learn what small arms were here, so that I might be prepared to arm stragglers, &c. I do not think this order ought to be carried out so promptly. I do not despair of saving the capital. Better destroy all there is at the eleventh hour than to send them off now."

What had the Secretary of War to do with this sort of work, anyhow? But Halleck replied, not repudiating the order, but saying that "at least 50,000 or 60,000 arms will be kept, and a large number of pieces of artillery." Doubtless, had Lee reached as far as New York City, he would have found it thus made impregnable; and the way for him to reach New York City was for us to ship Washington's defenses thither and remove McClellan from any marching command, if not altogether.

But Lincoln again rose in his majesty and power. He sent for McClellan, and Secretary Seward was present, who told the story, afterward corroborated by Welles and McClellan. Lincoln begged McClellan to take the army. McClellan feared the cabal; but at length patriotism, sense of duty, loyalty, and love for the President—whom he never ceased to honor and believe in—prevailed, and he

took this, as it were, back-door responsibility, for there was no official order.

Halleck's order of September 2, "Major-General McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washington and of all the troops for the defense of the capital," was issued, and you will find no other official order.

Had McClellan failed, he would have been liable to court-martial for taking "the troops for the defense of the capital" a hundred miles away from the capital. Yet that was the only way to save Pennsylvania, to save the country, and to save the capital itself. But, as has been said, he fought this campaign with a rope about his neck.

Could Lincoln have saved him? Did he save him, afterward, when he confronted Longstreet at Culpeper, and when to lose him cost the country nearly everything then worth having?

Halleck's position was officially strong. September 3 he wrote General Pope: "Reorganization of an army for the field will be immediately made. *Till then*, General McClellan, as senior (he was senior still) and as commanding the defenses of Washington, must exercise general authority."

Till then?

From September 3 to September 7 McClellan was frequently directed as to the sending out of various forces from Washington; sending cavalry to Edward's Ferry; changing corps commanders; dispatching troops, Sumner, etc.; letting troops

move; moving McDowell's corps; danger of stripping Washington forts on the Virginia side; but nothing at all about McClellan himself moving. (War Records, vol. xii, part 3, pp. 787-791, 802-810, 811-812, 812-813; vol. xix, part 2, pp. 169 to 209, and McClellan's letter to Halleck, Sept. 8, p. 209. Also McClellan's letter to Lincoln, from Rockville, where he had just joined the army, Sept. 8, page 210.) September 8 he seems to have gotten away entirely, and writes to Halleck from near Rockville: "Franklin has reached Muddy Branch; Sykes, Sumner, and Banks near here. Burnside and Hooker move to-day to Brookville, Pleasonton will advance his cavalry to Barnesville, &c. We have cavalry at Poolesville. No enemy at Edward's Ferry; I think they are beyond the Monocacy. Couch will remain at Offutt's until I ascertain whether there is any large force at Dranesville, which I hope to know any moment."

McClellan was certainly in command. The orders have the genuine ring for the first time for many weeks, and the President telegraphed him in the evening, "How does it look now?"

We could answer, to-day, that it looked very well, very well indeed.

Yet all this, and all that McClellan did afterward, was done only on the private, personal, and verbal order of the President. Quoting from General Upton, in his "Military Policy," p. 376, who cites the "Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of

the War," vol. i, pp. 451-452: "To reinstate the deposed commander was to confess that the whole campaign was a failure; yet something had to be done. Bragg, in the West, had begun his march toward the Ohio River, while Lee, with renewed confidence, was crossing into Maryland. For two or three days the President consulted his advisers, but with no satisfactory results. At last, assuming all the responsibility, he took the general-in-chief with him, turned his back on the War Department, and, without disclosing his purpose, proceeded to the house of General McClellan, where, for the moment, he brought the long controversy to a close by saying, "General, you will take command of the forces in the field." . . . He at once, like a faithful and subordinate soldier, crossed the Potomac to make dispositions against attack. The moment he appeared, the acclamations of the troops could be heard for miles, throughout the whole extent of the long columns" (p. 377).

VI

REORGANIZATION ON THE MARCH

MCCLELLAN thus had three broken and disorganized armies consolidated in the field and under his command—the Army of Virginia, the Army of North Carolina, and the Army of the Potomac, excepting the 52,000 troops still left, September 10, in Washington for its further defense, and increased ten days later to more than 80,000. But these three disorganized armies were now being welded by McClellan, for all time, into that one glorious army of the Potomac, never more to be divided—for the shadow of Grant was already looming up, far away.

Halleck says in his report: “General McClellan was directed to pursue Lee with all the troops which were not required for the defense of Washington.”

This is true; but he was not so directed by Halleck, or by the Secretary of War, but by a greater one, and verbally only.

As an example of this War Department strategy, Harper’s Ferry, a key-point position, was not put under McClellan’s command till September 11,—while it was being invested,—and then only when

McClellan should be able to open communication with it. For this it was now too late, although McClellan repeatedly attempted to do so. Prior to this, the position was under the joint command, apparently, of Wool and Halleck; and General Wool had thus directed poor Miles on September 5: "You will not abandon *Harper's Ferry* without defending it to the last extremity."

This, poor Miles—who was afterward killed in Harper's Ferry—tried to do, for I was there. It could have been done only by throwing his whole force over to Maryland Heights, for Harper's Ferry was merely the bottom of a bowl, with Maryland Heights, Loudon Heights, and the Bolivar Virginia Heights surrounding it on every side. Now, however, on Maryland Heights already were the Confederate divisions of McLaws and Anderson, with sixteen brigades; on Loudon Heights Walker's division of two brigades, and on the Virginia Heights Stonewall Jackson's whole force, with A. P. Hill and Ewell. Had McClellan had possession of it in time no such nonsense would have occurred. Suppose Miles had used common sense,—for he was a good regular army officer,—and had retired to Maryland Heights; and Harper's Ferry had been raided—as it would have been—by Jackson, and all its stores destroyed: where would poor Miles have been in the coming day of judgment? So Harper's Ferry, Maryland Heights, and Loudon Heights were all lost before McClellan got within communi-

cating distance. He had absolutely no chance to save them.

Now a word about the topography of Harper's Ferry and its surroundings. Franklin and Couch have been blamed for not relieving Harper's Ferry when they were so near and were firing guns to let the garrison know that they were so near.

This was on Sunday, September 14, the day of the battle of South Mountain, through which mountain range, but further south, Crampton's Gap passes. With Turner's Gap—where the battle of South Mountain occurred—still in Confederate hands and being contested for; with Longstreet foot-free beyond it, so that any move down Pleasant Valley would have been into a *cul-de-sac*; with McLaws and Anderson stretched across the Valley and with Maryland Heights already two days in their possession, and overlooking Pleasant Valley for four miles, within easy cannon range; with Loudon Heights directly in Franklin's front across the river; with Walker in position there already, for two days, and with Longstreet's whole force moving down from its position at the head of Pleasant Valley, in Franklin's rear—it is a great mistake to suppose that any force marching down Pleasant Valley to the Potomac would reach or come near to Harper's Ferry. The South Mountain, coming down from Pennsylvania, crosses the Potomac at the east of Weverton, about four miles east of Harper's Ferry. It reappears beyond the Potomac as a series of scat-

tered hills, called the Short Hills, which disappear three or four miles south of the river.

The Blue Ridge, coming up from Virginia, crosses the Potomac immediately east of Harper's Ferry and west of Pleasant Valley, across the river, and continues on as the Maryland Heights, or Elk Ridge, for about eight miles north of the river, when this also disappears. It makes a sort of two-ply parallel arrangement, so that a force moving down Pleasant Valley—which is east of Maryland Heights—will find itself also east of Loudon Heights. The latter separate Harper's Ferry and the Shenandoah river from the north and south line of advance of such an advancing force. You could not even see Harper's Ferry—which lies behind the mountains—during all this march. To reach Harper's Ferry it would be necessary to go down the eastern side of Pleasant Valley,—which is about two and one-half miles wide,—for there is no access along the western side to the Potomac, and debouche on a shelf scooped out from the rocks, along the river, and just wide enough for a road, the railroad, and the canal. These triple passageways are bordered, along the river bank behind them, by a rocky precipice from twenty to thirty feet high, extending from Sandy Hook under the Maryland Heights up to Harper's Ferry. Then by marching up this narrow road along the river bank, and passing directly between the lofty Maryland Heights on the northern bank and the less lofty Loudon Heights on the

southern bank, you would finally come opposite Harper's Ferry. Here a single pontoon bridge only, under the guns on each side of the river, and hundreds of feet above, would have allowed you to cross the Potomac to Harper's Ferry—if you behaved yourself.

Between Maryland Heights and the Antietam Creek there is nothing but almost roadless mountains. South of the Potomac there are no passes in the Blue Ridge for miles, and Harper's Ferry, invested as it was, was as hopeless of relief from the north or east as if it were on the planet Mars. The miscalculation was not McClellan's—it was before McClellan.

The best maps to illustrate the topography of Harper's Ferry and its surroundings are "Harper's Ferry," sheet XLII, part 9, Atlas to Accompany the Official War Records, which also shows the precipice under which the only road of access passes from Sandy Hook, under Maryland Heights, across the river to the Ferry; No. 12, on sheet LXXXII, part 17, of said Atlas, which shows Maryland Heights, Loudon Heights, and Bolivar Heights, with the town of Harper's Ferry as in the bottom of a bowl, in the middle; and the Harper's Ferry battle-field map of the operations of this campaign, on sheet XXIX, part 6, of the same atlas. It will be clearly seen that, with the Confederates within easy cannon range on the precipitous Maryland Heights, any force approaching from the east or the northeast

would be compelled to advance by the flank for two miles or more along the front of a perfectly protected and strongly occupied mountain—a mountain totally inaccessible from the east even to a climber. Further, the advance would be in the face of heavy guns and infantry along the southern bank and on Loudon Heights across the river, and directly in front at less than a mile distance. Only a narrow roadway ran along the river from Sandy Hook,—hemmed in by a precipice on the north,—and fully exposed to rifle and cannon fire from the south across the river, with a single narrow pontoon at the Ferry as the only means of crossing the river, even if undefended. Therefore it can plainly be seen that the approach to Harper's Ferry was impossible for any relieving force approaching from that direction.

There were two men in the opposing armies who understood this topography; the one was General Lee, who had occupied Harper's Ferry during the John Brown troubles, and the other was General McClellan, who had worked this whole ground over when operating up the Potomac the preceding fall. I often think, when reading current history, that those are the only people who ever knew of that topography, even up to this day—and they are both dead.

So the advance of McClellan continued. There were troubles with the trains. They got balled up, and stalled, and blockaded, as we know. But

General Ingalls investigated the troubles, and found that they were all due to Pope's Army of Virginia transportation; the administration of the old Army of the Potomac went on like clock-work; and when McClellan started south at the beginning of November the administration of all parts went on like clock-work. He was a member of that firm which is styled, "We know how."

As showing how the army was reorganized on the march, General Crawford, writing September 8 from Rockville, Md., describes the condition of his brigade, which had suffered severely at Cedar Mountain. "No time or opportunity has been allowed," he says, "either to rest the men or to reorganize the companies and regiments, which have lost field and staff and company officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, and I am now in command of a brigade which, consisting nominally of four regiments, numbers at this moment, in the rank drawn up in the advance line to meet the enemy, but six hundred and twenty-nine effective men."

In consequence, the Fifth Connecticut was detached by McClellan September 9, and three new nine-months Pennsylvania regiments, just completed, were added, and in the ensuing actions these three regiments lost 327 men.

New regiments, in like manner, were incorporated with old brigades on the march in other cases; and General Humphreys, in his application, on

March 28, 1863, for a court of inquiry, details his experiences with his division composed altogether of new troops, 7000 in number. Halleck had threatened him with arrest, September 13, if he did not immediately join his division. He left Washington on the twelfth. He had no staff officers, one of his brigades had no rations, all its arms were unserviceable, and had to be exchanged en route, and Humphreys himself forced the exchange. The division had no ammunition wagons, and no supply train. It had only one ambulance to a regiment, and no shelter tents. It marched September 14, halted by orders at Frederick, left Frederick and marched all day and all night and most of the forenoon of next day, reaching the field of Antietam the morning of September 18, the day after the principal battle, after a continuous march of 23 miles.

Any one familiar with military matters and with the state of the army on the 2d and 3rd of September when streaming back to Washington, disorganized (as President Lincoln said), with the enormous losses of baggage and transportation of that ill-starred campaign, will know that the army which began fighting only ten days later, September 14, eighty miles away from Washington, *must* have been reorganized on the march, if much of it was not to fight as a mob. That army did as good work at South Mountain and Antietam as any American army ever did anywhere.

Lee's army encamped around Frederick until September 10 and 11, when Jackson and A. P. Hill marched by way of Martinsburg, Va., crossing the Potomac near Williamsport, and thence down the river to Harper's Ferry. Walker's division marched due south from Frederick, crossing the Potomac near Point of Rocks and occupying Loudon Heights, which commanded Harper's Ferry on the east. The divisions of McLaws and R. H. Anderson marched down Pleasant Valley to seize Maryland Heights and prevent attack from the north, while Longstreet, Hood, and D. H. Hill moved forward directly, Hill halting in Turner's Gap to prevent pursuit and Longstreet advancing to Hagerstown. The cavalry covered the rear. (See Dr. Steiner's diary.)

McClellan's advance entered Frederick late in the day of September 12 (see diary). On the 13th the army entered, and closed up, and passed through Frederick in pursuit, and next day was fought the successful battle of South Mountain. Franklin had been sent south, and the same day successfully engaged McLaws and forced Crampton's Gap. Maryland Heights being already in possession of the enemy, and Walker in front across the river, it was impossible to drive the enemy to the Potomac, as Longstreet had already sent a part of his force in behind Franklin to Keedysville, so as to close upon Franklin's rear should he advance further than the eastern gaps.

The next morning, Monday, September 15, Harper's Ferry was surrendered.

While at Frederick, on the afternoon of September 13, an order of Lee was picked up, which described Lee's contemplated movements. To determine if the order was genuine, at 3 P. M., September 13, McClellan immediately directed General Pleasonton, commanding the cavalry, "to ascertain whether this order of march has thus far been followed by the enemy." (War Records, vol. xix, part 1, pp. 47, 48, 209; part 2, pp. 281-282; and especially vol. II, part 1, for McClellan's order to Pleasonton of Sept. 13, 3 P. M. (page 829), "General McClellan desires you to ascertain whether this order of march has thus far been followed by the enemy," &c.) It was this information which determined his movements, or rather confirmed them; for before he reached Frederick, and before Lee's order was discovered, he had written Halleck from Clarksburg, fifteen miles southeast of Frederick, at 10 A. M., September 12: "My columns are pushing on rapidly to Frederick. I feel perfectly confident that the enemy has abandoned Frederick, moving in two directions, viz., on the *Hagerstown* and *Harper's Ferry* roads." This information was precisely correct, and was to the same effect as that embodied in Lee's orders, which more than twenty-four hours subsequently were picked up in Frederick and fell into McClellan's hands. The separation and divergence of these

separated parts of Lee's army along lines almost at right angles to each other constituted the entire key to the situation; and McClellan had this information, and from it divined the whole campaign a day before Lee's order was heard of; but not before it was being executed in all its details.

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VII

LEE'S LOST ORDER

I HAVE recently been asked a curious question by one who ought to have known better. It reveals the existence, even at this late day, of two theories entirely incompatible with each other. Both originated from Washington, and both were intended to exploit McClellan's alleged inactivity. His inactivity, whenever it at all existed, had, by a long course of dominating "War Department strategy"—as General Upton calls it—been forced upon McClellan against every fiber of his nature.

The question asked me was why, when Lee's orders revealing his whole course, and all his plans, had fallen into McClellan's hands he paid no attention to them, instead of circumventing them at once with his whole army, "as he could have done." Lee's order was dated September 9, and was directed to General D. H. Hill. A soldier found it wrapped around a bunch of cigars, and it came into McClellan's possession late on the 13th of September. When Hill received the order on the 9th, McClellan, who had just joined his army, was concentrating it at Brookville, Middlebrook, Darnestown, Seneca

Creek, and Rockville, near Washington. He had, in fact, just been put in command, while Lee had already cut across the Potomac directly south of Frederick, but twenty miles distant, and marched on that place. McClellan did not see the order until four days after it had been issued.

These "Special Orders, No. 191, September 9th, 1862," provided that Lee's army should resume its march the next day (the 10th), taking the Hagerstown Road from Frederick. Jackson, in the advance, would push on ahead, turn south, cross the Potomac, and march down the Virginia side and seal up Harper's Ferry. This was to be accomplished by the 11th, two days before Lee's order was found. Longstreet was to march to Boonsborough, on the Hagerstown Road, and there halt. The divisions of McLaws and Anderson, sixteen brigades, under McLaws, were to leave the column at Middletown, turn south, and by Friday morning (more than twenty-four hours before Lee's order was found) "possess himself of Maryland Heights." General Walker at the same time was to march south, back to the Potomac by the same road he had come up, cross the river into Virginia and take possession of Loudon Heights, on the Virginia side, just across the Shenandoah River from Harper's Ferry.

The reserve artillery, ordnance, supply trains, etc., were to *precede* D. H. Hill, whose division would form the rear guard of the army through the South Mountain, by Turner's Gap. Stuart's

cavalry was to cover the route of the army and bring up all stragglers.

Now we not only know from the reports of these officers that Lee's army did so move, but from the independent testimony of Surgeon Steiner of the Sanitary Commission (who was in Frederick), that "Wednesday, September tenth, at four o'clock this morning the Rebel army began to move from our town, Jackson's force taking the advance. The movement continued until 8 o'clock P. M., occupying sixteen hours." D. H. Hill's division could not get away on the 10th, but marched on the morning of September 11. Friday, September 12, Stuart's cavalry passed through Frederick, to the west, following Lee's army. Two companies were left in the town to observe the Union advance.

During the 12th, "cannonading was heard in the distance." The advance Union cavalry charged into town, and were met by a counter-charge of Stuart's men. The latter fell back, "carrying with them seven of our men as prisoners, and leaving many of their own men wounded on the ground." Then came a regiment of Ohio men, and then Burnside's corps of the Army of the Potomac. September 13, about nine o'clock, McClellan with his staff rode through the town and encamped with a large portion of his army on Dr. Steiner's own farm, west of Frederick. The writer says: "The nature of the camp and its arrangements prevented one forming any other conclusion than that it was a bivouac,

and only intended for temporary occupation. Some onward movement of the army was evidently already in contemplation." Now this was not earlier than noon, and while bivouacking here McClellan got hold of Lee's orders, on the 13th of September, between that hour and 3 P. M.

If Lee's orders had been carried out before this time,—already by two days,—Jackson, with his force and Ewell's and that of A. P. Hill, was investing Harper's Ferry on the southwest and west, on the Virginia side, Walker was investing it on the east, on the Virginia side, and McLaws and Anderson had captured Maryland Heights and were then investing it on the north and northeast.

All these events had so occurred. Jackson had crossed the Potomac, near Williamsport, on the 11th, into Virginia, and had left all of Lee's army and thirty miles of distance, and the Potomac river, between himself and McClellan; on the night of September 10 and the morning of the 11th Walker had crossed the Potomac at Point of Rocks, east of the South Mountains and opposite Harper's Ferry, into Virginia; September 11 McLaws, with his own and Anderson's divisions, had reached and occupied Pleasant Valley, beyond Maryland Heights, on the east, and between them and the South Mountains, and had sent Kershaw's and Barksdale's brigades up through Solomon's Gap, on the north, with other brigades in support, to move down the summit of the ridge toward Harper's Ferry and

carry Maryland Heights, immediately opposite and overhanging. Another brigade, with artillery, was sent up the South Mountain, on the east, across Pleasant Valley, to close the gaps, and the main force then, having invested Harper's Ferry securely, fronted north against McClellan's approach and guarded the eastern passes in the mountains. The next morning, the 13th, McLaws assaulted Maryland Heights, commanding Harper's Ferry, and, as his report says, after a very sharp and spirited engagement, through the dense woods and over a very broken surface, "carried the main ridge," and by 4 P. M. had possession of the entire heights overlooking by a thousand feet Pleasant Valley and Harper's Ferry. It will therefore be seen that by the time McClellan had obtained Lee's order all the movements embraced in that order had already been made one or more days before, and all the results provided for in that order had already been secured while Harper's Ferry was not in McClellan's command or control. McClellan was in bivouac west of Frederick, on the 13th, which was Saturday. When Surgeon Steiner saw him, "in the afternoon," not all of McClellan's army had yet arrived. The Twelfth corps did not pass through Frederick, Steiner says, till Sunday morning, September 14. General Humphreys's division did not reach Frederick till September 17, and on the 13th he was still at Washington, trying to beat the authorities into giving them muskets which could be fired.

So we find McClellan west of Frederick on the afternoon of Saturday, September 13, with Lee's orders in his possession. We can now settle the activity question very easily. The complete investment of Harper's Ferry was already accomplished. If Maryland Heights and Loudon Heights were held in force by the enemy, its fate was sealed. If the garrison had abandoned the town and planted itself on Maryland Heights, McLaws and Anderson could not have carried these heights from the north or from the east, the latter almost too precipitous for nearly a thousand feet of elevation, for an unarmed man even to climb. The former,—and the spine of the ridge itself,—was open only from Solomon's Gap, four miles up the range to the north, and could be held by a very moderate force for days against any enemy; could have been so held by Miles, had he been there.

The whole question, then, turned on whether Miles, at Harper's Ferry, had employed decent common-sense and got out of the bottom of the soup-tureen and up on to the rim—or had not. McClellan had no notion that the War Department strategists at Washington (for Harper's Ferry was then, and had been, out of McClellan's jurisdiction) could possibly have sent him the absurd order to hold on to the town of Harper's Ferry, with its pots and kettles and the old John Brown engine-house, to the last extremity, while the only possible means of holding anything at all lay outside the town,

across the river, and on the top of a lofty range of mountains easily accessible to him, but totally inaccessible, if so held, to the enemy. But Maryland Heights had already been captured and occupied before McClellan reached Frederick or saw Lee's order.

Turning to the orders in Supplemental Volume LI, of the Official Records, we find that September 11 McClellan ordered Burnside to push on to Frederick, if the enemy had marched toward Hagerstown. Sumner was ordered to Urbana, and on the 12th to Frederick, with Banks's corps to follow; Franklin to Buckeystown, there to await orders to move *either* on Harper's Ferry or Frederick; Porter to push forward with his reorganized Fifth corps; and Couch to follow Franklin. On the night of the 12th, at 11 P. M., Burnside was ordered to advance with his whole command *from* Frederick to the Catoctin Valley, opening the way to Pleasonton's cavalry, which was to scout up to Pennsylvania, and also to learn the condition of affairs at Harper's Ferry. Pleasonton was to co-operate with Burnside in his operation. "If the enemy has marched by the National road the Pass must be taken; but the attack upon it must only be made with a sufficiency of troops." September 13, Sumner was ordered to move punctually at seven next morning, ammunition wagons to move with the troops, ambulances in rear of all the troops, in order of corps. Franklin was ordered at 6.30 P. M., September 13, "to move south

at daybreak next morning by Jefferson and Burkittsville, upon the road to Rohrersville, and down into Pleasant Valley, to seize the passes, and cut off, destroy, or capture McLaws' command, and relieve Colonel Miles." Couch was ordered to join Franklin as soon as possible.

At the same time "a division of Burnside's command started several hours ago to support Pleasonton, and the whole of Burnside's command, including Hooker's corps, march this evening [13th] and early to-morrow morning, followed by the two corps of Sumner and Banks, and Sykes' division, upon Boonsborough, beyond Turner's Gap, to carry that position."

Franklin was ordered to attack "a half-hour *after* you hear severe firing at the pass on the Hagerstown pike, where the main body will attack." This was the scene of the Battle of South Mountain, on Sunday.

This latter direction, a high evidence of McClellan's sagacity and military genius, was also (as usual) tortured against him,—and received public credence because the public knew nothing of the topography of the country.

Anyone who consults the map of Harper's Ferry, sheet XLII, Atlas of Official War Records, or the admirable official maps in the great Government Atlas, of "Military Maps, Armies of the Potomac and James" (1867), will see at a glance why it was necessary for Franklin to await the attack at Tur-

ner's Gap above, after he had passed Rohrersville and moved down Pleasant Valley, which opened, as I have shown, not on Harper's Ferry at all, but on the Potomac east of the mountains behind which Harper's Ferry lay ensconced.

Lee's orders had now told McClellan what force it was which Franklin was moving against in his advance down Pleasant Valley. This valley was two miles wide, and girt on the east by the rugged South Mountains, one thousand feet high, and on the west by Maryland Heights, still more lofty. The railroad from Weverton to Rohrersville runs up this valley now, and the traveler can enjoy the wild and rugged scenery on each side.

McLaws and Anderson had ten brigades, comprising forty-two veteran regiments of infantry and nine batteries of artillery, of which force the sixteen regiments of McLaws had not drawn a trigger since the Seven Days before Richmond, two and a half months before.

Franklin's two divisions numbered six brigades, consisting of twenty-seven regiments of infantry and seven batteries of artillery; and Couch, not yet up, added three brigades, consisting of fifteen regiments and four batteries; the forces would then have been equal.

D. H. Hill's division and the Confederate cavalry were in Turner's Gap to bar the way to the west, and Longstreet between Turner's Gap and Boonsborough and up to Hagerstown and Pennsylvania.

At any time before McClellan had attacked and held fast the enemy at Turner's Gap (South Mountain) and fully occupied their attention, it was easily possible for a Confederate force (Longstreet's) to move down Pleasant Valley from the north, covered by D. H. Hill, and in rear of Franklin, shut him up in a *cul-de-sac* and crush him between Longstreet in his rear and McLaws in his front, each superior in force and position. It was a neat trap. McClellan did not direct Franklin to wait till the pass was carried, but only till the firing became heavy. After that, McClellan intended to take care of Hill and Longstreet himself, and also, after that, if either of these had ventured down Pleasant Valley in Franklin's rear, we would have had a sort of four-ply arrangement, for McClellan would have followed down and in turn shut these forces up between Franklin now in their front and himself in their rear.

As a matter of fact, Longstreet (see his Official Report) did march his whole force back nearly or quite into Turner's Gap, to D. H. Hill's support, in the afternoon. He could just as easily have deflected it down behind Franklin had he not been kept busy above, and afterward forced to retreat,—to save himself,—back part way to Hagerstown, and then to Sharpsburg for a final stand.

In fact, Lee wrote McLaws, then in Pleasant Valley, early on the morning of the 14th, and before he knew that Longstreet was needed at Turner's Gap:

"General Longstreet moves down this morning to occupy the Boonsborough Valley (which town is at the head of Pleasant Valley), so as to protect your flank from attacks from forces coming from Frederick until the operations at Harper's Ferry are completed." But Longstreet did not occupy that Boonsborough, or Upper Pleasant, Valley; as Tennyson says,

"He saw the snare, and he retired."

Had Miles held Maryland Heights in force, nothing could have saved McLaws' whole command, consisting of forty-two regiments and nine batteries. They could not have reached the Potomac, enfiladed by all the guns which would then, under Miles, have crowned Maryland Heights for three miles, and a strong infantry force in the only access thereto, Solomon's Gap, the well-protected Solomon's Gap, and, with Franklin and Couch driving them on. The Potomac being unfordable there by reason of its rocky bottom, there was no possible egress to the east; so that while Harper's Ferry might have been gutted by Jackson at night, all its men, all its artillery, and all its horses and wagons and movable property would have been saved, and the 20,000 men of McLaws and Anderson would have been inevitably taken, while the three Fates, Stanton, Wool, and Halleck, down at Washington and Baltimore, sat and span. And then Miles would have been court-martialed and shot, for abandoning

what he was ordered to hold "to the last extremity." Well, he was shot, anyhow, but that was in battle, before he surrendered.

What McClellan got out of Lee's order was notice that Lee had actually embarked on a side enterprise full of peril for himself, which would require five days to accomplish and wasn't worth a picayune to him afterward (for the prisoners he took at Harper's Ferry were in large part short-term men, and they were all paroled at once), excepting that it opened a back-door road which would have enabled him to reach McClellan's rear, and threaten or capture Washington, and which McClellan himself took care of very promptly. McClellan saw, therefore, that this loss of five days would enable him to attack Lee in Maryland, instead of following and fighting him up through Pennsylvania, and would preserve our own State from the desolation and horror of invasion, to which McClellan's subsequent removal subjected it the next year.

VIII

M'CLELLAN'S SWIFT ADVANCE

MCCLELLAN read Lee's order on the afternoon of September 13. That forenoon he had already ordered Pleasonton and Burnside to the Catoctin passes and the Catoctin Valley, seven miles on the way from Frederick to Boonsborough. That same evening and night he ordered his whole force, which was at or nearing Frederick, forward; ordered Franklin to Pleasant Valley, and Couch to follow, and on the 14th, next day, fought and won the battle of South Mountain and the battle of Crampton's Gap, and forced down McLaws, Hill, and Longstreet against the Potomac, with Walker and Jackson on the opposite side. McClellan's army now passed through Turner's Gap on the night of the 14th and morning of the 15th, brought its trains through the mountains, and on the 16th, in a fog, closed up on Sharpsburg. McClellan reconnoitered the ground, established his lines, planted his batteries, supplied his troops from his trains, and opened the battle of Antietam by a fierce infantry attack for position in the afternoon of the 16th, on the right, and a heavy bombardment from estab-

lished positions all along the line, the same positions, in fact, which the artillery occupied during the battle of the next day. Next morning at daybreak he attacked along his whole front, drove back Lee's left and center, and killed, wounded, scattered, and captured more than 25,000 of the enemy. Next day, while Couch and Humphreys were coming up, and while McClellan's nearly fifty heavy guns were able only to "fire blank cartridges to draw the enemy's fire from the infantry," (see vol. XIX, part I, page 436), and were waiting in a feverish suspense for the heavy ammunition which had been ordered and sent, and should have been there early in the morning, but did not (for reasons known at Washington; see Wilson's book, cited later) arrive till the afternoon; and while Lee's broken, dispirited, and defeated men in groups and squads, *men and officers* (see Lee's reports, cited later), were sneaking away across the river and flying far, far up the Shenandoah Valley, up beyond Winchester, many thousand of them throwing away their shoes, as General Jones reported, lest they be sent back into that hell again, the 18th passed. Lee in the silence of the night gathered his shattered and defeated remnants about him, and ere the morning star had arisen on that field the invaders found themselves driven off Northern soil, out of Maryland, and far away from Pennsylvania; and the greatest battle of the war had been fought, and the grandest victory of the war had been won. McClel-

lan, the patriot and victor, the savior of his country, now awaited his crown of martyrdom. All this was within less than ten days after the time when Lincoln ordered and McClellan took command.

And that is the story of Lee's lost order, and of what McClellan did about it; but not, alas! of what the War Department strategists did about it. That, as Kipling says, "is another story." Meade was pretty nearly served the same way after Gettysburg, and Grant, also, before Vicksburg.

IX

LEE'S PROJECTED TURNING MOVEMENT

WHEN Harper's Ferry had fallen, a new and most serious problem presented itself, and one which McClellan's orders show that he very fully appreciated, and met at once, but which the historians have strangely overlooked. I would like to say that much of the data relating to these events will be found *only* in the Supplemental Volume LI, published in 1897, 1898, and 1899, of the Official War Records, and not at all in Volume XIX, to which they properly belong. I shall refer again to these concealments, mutilations, or omissions, (much like those which Pope charged on Halleck), in examining McClellan's subsequent advance to Culpeper; but I cannot explain why they had been removed from their proper files in the War Department, and why they were not discovered until ten years afterward. Where, and by whom, were they suppressed and hidden?

Why did McClellan, early on the morning of September 15, and before Harper's Ferry had been surrendered, order Franklin, then in Pleasant Valley, to "push on with your whole command to Sharpsburg," and in the evening of the same day, when the

ominous silence at Harper's Ferry (see McClellan's Report) had told him that that place had surrendered, countermand this order and direct Franklin to "keep the enemy in your front without anything decisive until the Sharpsburg affair is settled"? McClellan's report says: "The cessation of the firing at Harper's Ferry indicated [on the morning of the 15th] the surrender of that place." And at once all three roads from the Confederate rear at Sharpsburg were opened for a great turning movement down along the Potomac, through Virginia to Harper's Ferry, and thence still down along the Potomac, and up through Maryland, directly to McClellan's rear, so as to plant Lee in the mountain passes, squarely on McClellan's communications, and bar the way between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, with Washington at his mercy.

And this is why, September 16, when a scout brought McClellan direct word of the surrender, McClellan cautioned Franklin again "to watch Knoxville and Berlin, so that no enemy can get in your rear." Franklin's rear was now on the Potomac; he was fronting north to McClellan.

Knoxville and Berlin are on the great Potomac River road, along its northern bank, which follows the railroad and canal down across the mountains to eastern Maryland, sending great arteries up through the State all along its course. No enemy could have gotten in Franklin's rear unless he had come down the river from Harper's Ferry. Had

an enemy, however, gotten there, he would not only have been in Franklin's rear, but in the rear of McClellan's whole army, with not a Union division between him and Washington, and planted directly across McClellan's communications and lines of supply. With the gaps of the South Mountain then closed by the enemy from the east in the rear of McClellan, with Maryland Heights in possession of the Confederates, and with a Confederate force anywhere between Frederick and the mountains to hold these gaps, McClellan's only supplies must have come down from Harrisburg, and his retirement north, into Pennsylvania, would have been inevitable, thus opening Washington and Baltimore to capture, and eastern Maryland and all Virginia to permanent Confederate occupation. These States would both have been lost for the time at least. Nay, the Northern Central railroad, from Harrisburg to Baltimore, would have also gone in the wreck.

Stonewall Jackson's route map for the Gettysburg campaign was prepared by that great soldier in the following winter, 1862, and shows the topography and roads of this region very well. It is sheet CXVI, part 24, of the Atlas to the Official Records. From Knoxville, just below Pleasant Valley, a splendid paved turnpike sweeps up from the Potomac through Petersville and Jefferson to Frederick City. I know this road, because while Lee occupied Frederick myself and a comrade were sent on a cavalry

scout to the hills just overlooking Frederick, and within rifle-shot of Lee's pickets, whence, from the gable window of a barn, we observed the whole Confederate army spread out before us, and indeed on the march. Had it not been that Walker's movement from and to Point of Rocks cut us off on the east, we could then have communicated directly with McClellan. We returned by night, running the gauntlet of Walker's men, then across the river, and reported at daybreak to Colonel Miles what we had discovered.

From Berlin, Knoxville, Weverton, and Sandy Hook, on the Potomac, fine roads also run up north through Catoctin Valley and Pleasant Valley, to Middletown, Burkittsville, Turner's Gap, Crampton's Gap, and Rohrersville. In fact, merely reversing the direction of the march, Walker could have marched back toward Frederick just as he marched down to Loudon Heights from Frederick; McLaws and Anderson could have marched up Pleasant Valley, or, east of the South Mountain, up the Catoctin Valley, just as they marched south to Maryland Heights from Frederick; and the same route that afterward took Jackson, A. P. Hill, Ewell, Walker, McLaws, and Anderson from Harper's Ferry up to Shepherdstown and Antietam, would have brought them down to and through Harper's Ferry from the Shepherdstown Ford. These routes were not only feasible, but they were actually marched over by the bulk of Lee's army

in this campaign, but only in the opposite direction.

From Boteler's Ford, below Shepherdstown, to Harper's Ferry, by the Virginia road, is 14 miles; from Harper's Ferry to Burkittsville, screened from McClellan's army behind Maryland Heights, is 12 miles further; and from Burkittsville to Turner's Gap, on McClellan's line of supply, is 10 miles more. This march would have closed from the rear every practical pass for McClellan from the Pennsylvania line, 40 miles above, far down into Virginia, and McClellan would have had to force the passage from the west against Lee's whole army on the east, instead of against one or two divisions. Lee's communications with Virginia would have been intact, nay, even improved (since he had come up from Leesburg), while McClellan's would have been severed, towards the east, from below the line of the Potomac River along the mountains nearly or quite up to Harrisburg, Penn., a distance of 150 miles.

Now, let us suppose that McClellan, without supplies or reconnaissance, on Monday, September 15, had rushed his whole force forward (had it been possible, which it was not) upon such parts of Lee's army as had fallen back to the heights at Sharpsburg, and this part of Lee's army, comprising the divisions of Longstreet, Hood, Jones, and D. H. Hill, with the cavalry and reserve artillery, as a for-

lorn hope, had withstood McClellan's attack for but a few hours even, and then been driven in more or less disorder across the river, which was barely knee deep; and suppose then that McClellan had pursued them rapidly across the river, leaving his trains scattered along from Middletown, and across the mountains, and leaving Sharpsburg directly in his rear, and across the Potomac. Simultaneously with this we may be sure that McLaws, Anderson, Walker, Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, comprising twenty-two brigades, one hundred regiments of infantry, besides the heavy artillery for the reduction of Harper's Ferry, would have rapidly marched down the river road to Knoxville, Sandy Hook, and Berlin, and thence up by a number of excellent roads to the north, sealing the whole South Mountain range on the east against McClellan's army. With Longstreet, Hood, D. H. Hill, Jones, and Lee's other fragments following Jackson down to the Potomac, and with Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights firmly held by the Confederates against pursuit, what would have been the certain fate of Washington, what the state of the army of the Potomac, and what the just fate of McClellan?

This was the great turning movement which Lee had so successfully used on Pope a month previously, and on Hooker at Chancellorsville, and again on the march to Gettysburg the next spring and summer; but it didn't work on McClellan; he wasn't that kind of a commander.

Yet this is what we are asked to believe it was McClellan's bounden duty to have done; and we are told that he was slow and negligent in not doing it.

Lee understood this problem perfectly well. He had no reason in the world excepting this to turn two-thirds of his army out of its way and spend priceless days in reducing Harper's Ferry, for Harper's Ferry would have done him no harm. It was utterly useless for any purpose of aggression. The next year he marched by it, on his way to Gettysburg, in disdain.

But it was necessary now for Lee to have the river road, and Harper's Ferry barred the river road right across its middle. Lee didn't want to besiege and capture Harper's Ferry. He says in his report: "It had been supposed that the advance upon Fredericktown would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the valley. This not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from those positions before concentrating the army west of the mountains." This line of communication through the valley was from east of the mountains, not from west of them, for Shepherdstown, Sharpsburg, and Williamsport are the actual gateways to the Shenandoah, which is a mere southern extension of the Cumberland Valley of Pennsylvania, and about twenty-five miles wide. Before Antietam Lee had sent his trains across the river,

where they would have been at hand and in proper position for the great turning movement described, and could have proceeded without the knowledge of our forces, which were on the north bank of the river and out of sight behind the mountains below the Antietam creek.

General Wool reported to Halleck, September 5: "Reliable persons say the Potomac can be forded at almost every point."

Captain Winslow, September 24, reported that his regiment, the Fifth New York, on Saturday, September 20, "crossed the river in line of battle at 10 A. M., and took up position on top of bluff." (See War Records, vol. XIX, part I, p. 367.)

So we need not feel surprised that at 7.30 P. M. on September 16, the very eve of the battle of Antietam, the following order was sent to Franklin: "General McClellan directs me to say that he still desires you to occupy Maryland Heights. If, however, this should prove impracticable, he thinks you had better leave a small force at your present position and join him with the remainder of your command."

In General Franklin's official report he says: "During the night of the 16th I received orders to move toward Keedysville in the morning [the 17th], with two divisions, and to dispatch General Couch's division to occupy Maryland Heights." Couch's splendid veteran division, of fifteen regi-

ments of infantry and four batteries, remained in Pleasant Valley facing the south, through the great battle, and at midnight, after the battle and when Lee, broken and shattered, had more than he could do to even take care of himself, Couch received the following order: "General McClellan desires you to march with your whole command to-morrow morning [September 18] in time to report with it to Major General Franklin as soon after daylight as you can possibly do so. Franklin is on the left of General Sumner."

Yet this, historians tell us, was one of McClellan's errors; although Couch's division alone stood between Lee's army, McClellan's army supply, and Washington.

But even afterward McClellan kept his eye on these open roads. September 18 he ordered Pleasonton to scout, with his cavalry, down each side of Elk Mountain (Maryland Heights) from Rohrer'sville to the Potomac. On the 19th he ordered Sumner to send Banks' whole corps "by way of Rohrer'sville and Brownsville toward Harper's Ferry, with instructions to occupy Maryland Heights."

McClellan was then satisfied; the door had been closed and barred, but the Washington authorities were not, for when his chief quartermaster asked that small supply steamers then at hand should be sent up the canal, Quartermaster General Meigs

(whose record it would repay anyone to look up) replied by "raising objections on the score of want of protection to the canal" between Washington and Harper's Ferry.

McClellan replied: "I do not require suggestions of this kind. I shall be responsible that full protection is afforded it."

X

THE EVE OF ANTIETAM

SEPTEMBER 16 was a day of fog. McClellan writes Franklin on that day: "I think the enemy has abandoned the position in front of us, but the fog is so dense that I have not yet been able to determine."

To Halleck, same date: "This morning a heavy fog has thus far prevented us from doing more than to ascertain that some of the enemy are still there. Do not know in what force. Will attack as soon as situation of enemy is developed. I learn Miles surrendered 8 A. M. yesterday, unconditionally. . . . Had he held the Maryland Heights he would inevitably have been saved. The time lost on account of the fog is being occupied in getting up supplies, for the want of which many of our men are suffering."

Same date, Seth Williams writes McClellan: "Lieutenant Shunk has gone back to hurry up ordnance supplies of ammunition, &c. He informed me that he had no supply of musket ammunition, but that there was plenty throughout the various division trains."

The afternoon of September 16 McClellan had completed the examination of the enemy's position and his arrangements for battle, and his troops were generally in their assigned position for attack at daybreak.

The Confederate line extended from a prominent hill abutting on the Potomac, a half mile south of Mercersville, down the line of bluffs on which Sharpsburg stands overlooking the Antietam Valley, which then was bent around in a sort of hook on the enemy's right, the hook following down behind the right bank of the Antietam Creek, but not entirely to the river. The Confederates' only available line of retreat was by way of Boteler's Ford, below Shepherdstown, where the river, from the wash of the dam above, was broad, sandy, and shallow, and was directly in the rear of the Confederate right. By this ford his troops coming up from Harper's Ferry crossed the river to take their places in the line of battle, and by it Lee's whole army retreated the night of the 18th. The Potomac was three hundred yards wide and three feet deep. (See General Griffin's Report, War Records, vol. XIX, part 1, p. 350.)

When Lee took position, September 15, in front of Sharpsburg, he had with him the infantry divisions of Hood, Longstreet, Jones, and D. H. Hill, with Stuart's cavalry, and nearly all his artillery, numbering eighty regiments, with forty batteries. Jackson and Walker came up from Harper's Ferry

and took position during the 16th. The divisions of McLaws and Anderson arrived early in the morning of the 17th, but A. P. Hill did not reach the field of battle until late in the afternoon of that day. Hill says the head of his column arrived at 2:30, but his brigade and regimental commanders fixed their arrival in the presence of the enemy variously at about 3, 3:40, and 4. (See reports.)

September 16 was not passed in quietness by McClellan. Lee says, in his report: "On the 16th the artillery fire became warmer, and continued throughout the day. The enemy crossed the Antietam beyond the reach of our batteries and menaced our left. . . . As evening approached, the enemy opened more vigorously with his artillery, and bore down heavily with his infantry upon Hood, but the attack was gallantly repelled."

McClellan's plan was, in his own words, and which are fully corroborated by the field orders and reports of that day, "to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and, if necessary, by Franklin's, and as soon as matters looked favorably there to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg; and having carried their position, to press along the crest toward our right, and whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our center with all the forces then disposable."

At daylight, the 17th, Hooker's First corps attacked the Confederate left; Mansfield's Twelfth corps was then ordered in and became engaged at 7 A. M. This was followed by Sumner's Second corps, which became engaged at nine o'clock.

By comparing the four maps, on sheets xxviii and xxix, part 6, Atlas to the Official War Records, the plan and execution can be clearly understood. The Confederate map shows the routes followed by the troops coming up from Harper's Ferry, and also the hooking backward of the Confederate right, opposite what has become known as the Burnside Bridge across the Antietam.

XI

M'CLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE—BURNSIDE

MCCLELLAN's tactical plan, in brief, was to throw a series of very heavy attacks on the Confederate left, extending down nearly one-half Lee's line, and thus draw heavily from Lee's right to sustain his overwhelmed left. When Lee's right had been thus denuded, Burnside, on McClellan's extreme left, and directly opposite Lee's deflected right, was to cross the Antietam Creek, by the different fords and by the bridge, and drive his attack along Lee's right rear, between the Confederate line and Boteler's Ford and the Potomac. When Lee had thus been cut off from his line of retreat, Fitz John Porter's Fifth corps, supported by such parts of Franklin's Sixth corps as were not engaged elsewhere, and by Pleasonton's cavalry, were to strike the Confederate center directly in front, crossing the Antietam in front of Sharpsburg. Pleasonton was already across. Had these operations been successfully carried out, Lee would have been forced north, along the Potomac, and by way of Mercersville up toward Falling Waters. By Burnside's movement, between Lee's rear and Boteler's Ford,

any belated troops coming up from Harper's Ferry would have been prevented from crossing, or even approaching, the river. As events transpired, A. P. Hill's division of twenty-three regiments of infantry,—two having been left at Harper's Ferry,—and seven batteries of artillery, would thus have been cut off, for they did not reach the field till late in the afternoon, and did not reach the ford till after 2 P. M.

Any military man will see at a glance that, even without any specific orders except to attack in force, Burnside's duty was plain. It was not a question of strategy or tactics; it was merely a headlong drive across the length of the creek in front, in the briefest time and irrespective of loss, and by every available ford, road, and passage, and the fate of Lee's army was sealed. But Burnside undertook to fight a strategical and tactical battle, and this, under any circumstances, was what Burnside was not capable of doing. He sent his men in by dribblets, never went near the creek himself, never saw the ground except from a distance, and a few Confederate riflemen, and very few, practically without any defenses, picked his men off as they maneuvered and deployed, and halted and marched, and counter-marched up and down in full view of the enemy, until, counting the afternoon, when A. P. Hill, who was not across the river then, attacked him, he lost more than 2000 men. It is a solemn fact that every Confederate on Burnside's front bagged, that day,

three, or perhaps four, of these, and then they themselves walked off, more than half of them, when their ammunition ran out, as the reports show.

General Hooker, in an impassioned letter to Stanton, April 23, 1863, speaks of Burnside's "blundering sacrifice of life at the bridge at Antietam." In the recently published volume, Volume LI of the Official War Records (1897), we have for the first time the official reports of the Confederate brigade commanders, made at the time, and of the commanders of all the regiments which took part in the Confederate defense of the line of the Antietam against Burnside's attack.

Colonel Benning's brigade, or rather two regiments of his brigade,—the others having on the morning of the 15th been sent elsewhere,—had occupied the right bank of the Antietam, both above and below the Burnside bridge, since daylight Monday morning, September 15, and picketed this line and afterward defended it against Burnside's forces. "For a long distance below the bridge," Benning says, "and for some distance above it, the ground rose very steeply from the creek for fifty or sixty yards." This was on the Confederate side, where, he says, "the face of this slope was clothed with rather thinly scattered trees, and in one place, on the left, it had a sort of pit, large enough to hold twenty or thirty men. Behind the trees, at the top of the steep slope, ran a rail fence.

"The creek was fordable everywhere above and

below the bridge; in most places was not more than knee-deep. Pickets and skirmishers were soon [September 15] thrown across the creek several hundred yards to the front," and remained there until driven back across the Antietam by Burnside's approach. Across the creek, on Burnside's side, about two hundred yards' distant, was a sharp ridge, and there were good positions for cannon at from five hundred to six hundred yards beyond the creek, and fully commanding the thinly wooded slope occupied by Benning's two regiments, the Twentieth and the Second Georgia. The Second Georgia was along the slope below the bridge and the Twentieth opposite and above the bridge. I know personally that, when the water on the bar in the river below Shepherdstown is not more than knee-deep, the Antietam above its mouth is equally shallow. The banks are not especially difficult. General Toombs described them as descending gently to the margin of the creek. Boys go bathing all along this part of the creek in summer, as I know.

It was almost the keynote of McClellan's plan that, as soon as the battle on the Union right was under full headway, Burnside should sweep across the shallow creek by the various fords as well as by the bridge, driving everything out of his way, forcing his way behind the Confederate lines and between them and the river. For this purpose he was provided with an enormous force, far in excess of that required to carry the passage, and with an

undue amount of artillery, much specially provided and of large caliber. There was practically nothing in his way to stop such an advance.

But no advance was made. Time wore on until, at 9:10, McClellan ordered Burnside to open his attack, saying that Franklin's corps was only a mile and a half away, and that Burnside would be supported, "and, if necessary, on your own line of attack." This meant that Franklin's Sixth corps would be added to Burnside's Ninth corps and to the Kanawha division in moving along the rear of Lee's whole line. Benning was entirely justified in closing his report by saying of his two regiments: "The service they rendered was, I think, hardly to be overestimated. If General Burnside's corps had once got through the long gap in our line it would have been in the rear of our whole army, and that, anybody can see, would have been disastrous."

McClellan sent his 9:10 order to Burnside by General Sackett, afterward Inspector-General of the United States army, who, in a letter to McClellan after the war, said: "I started at once, and as fast as my horse could carry me." He gave Burnside the order "which," says General Sackett, "seemed to annoy him somewhat, as he said to me: 'McClellan appears to think I am not trying to carry this bridge; you are the third or the fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders.'"

Now what were the opposing forces contesting

this three-quarters of a mile stretch along the creek? Burnside's force, consisting of the Ninth corps, with the independent Kanawha division attached to it, comprised twenty-nine regiments of infantry and four companies of cavalry, with seven batteries, besides a battery of boat howitzers, of which artillery one battery was of 20-pounder Parrotts, and another, in part at least, of the same heavy guns.

A few of Burnside's regiments report their numbers in the line of battle, indicating that the average strength was in excess of that of the army as a whole, and more than thirty per cent. above the average Confederate regimental strength. Every one of Burnside's regiments showed losses in the battle, so that there was no question of soldiership among the men.

The troops opposing Burnside along the creek we are now able to determine with accuracy, and also their numbers and positions. A careful examination of all the Confederate reports—regimental, brigade, and divisional, for all Lee's army—shows that no other troops than those referred to in General D. R. Jones' report had anything to do with this line until A. P. Hill came up late in the afternoon and occupied the high plateau a mile in rear of the creek. Jones' division nominally consisted of six brigades, with four batteries, but, practically, nearly all of them had been taken away from him on the 16th or earlier. Four of these brigades composed the right of Lee's main line,

and were not within reach or engaged at all in resisting Burnside at the creek. Of the remaining two brigades, that of Drayton, excepting the Fiftieth Georgia during a part of the forenoon,—as stated in the report of Jenkins' brigade, Colonel Walker,—was with Jones' other brigades and only Toombs' brigade was actually in action at the bridge.

Of Toombs' brigade two regiments had been detached the morning of the 15th to pursue the Union cavalry to Williamsport and take care of the Confederate train, and did not rejoin the army until the afternoon of the 17th, and were then placed in the main front line of battle in the rear of, and not near the bridge.

Jones says that his entire six brigades on the morning of the 17th numbered only 2430 men, but he evidently underestimated those, for in the Confederate report of losses they are credited with 1312, which is far more than fifty per cent. As they took no part in the Harper's Ferry operations, they could not have straggled down there, and as they had had two days' rest in position, before the battle, they must have had their men well up.

The Second Georgia faced the Antietam to the right of the bridge. Its commanding officer, Captain Lewis, states that it had in line 107 men and officers; Benning says, 97 men. The Twentieth Georgia faced the bridge and extended to the left. Its commander, Colonel Cummings, says it was

about 200 strong; Benning says 250. At all events, both regiments together did not number 400.

On their right was the Fiftieth Georgia, "numbering," as Benning says, "scarcely 100 muskets."

One company from Jenkins' brigade was also placed one-half between the Second and Fiftieth Georgia and the remaining half near a lower ford beyond the Fiftieth. The only battery on this front was Richardson's, back on the high ground far in the rear. Longstreet sent, on request, Eubank's battery; but, Benning says, about nine o'clock this battery was ordered away. He also says that he was thus left "without any artillery supports whatever," which indicates, as does the report of Toombs, that Richardson's battery was at least a mile in the rear, since Eubank was halfway, Toombs says, between Richardson and the creek. He says that Richardson also was too far in the rear to render efficient service against Burnside.

Summing up, then, we have a Confederate force defending the bridge, and the ford, and the stream on the Antietam Creek consisting of not more than five hundred men at the outside, composed of three regiments and an extra company, with a single battery in the rear too distant to be of much service, and another battery withdrawn early in the day.

These five hundred men and officers, and probably only four hundred of them, inflicted a loss on Burnside's force of nearly two thousand men, and

most of this was accomplished by less than four hundred Confederates.

It seems actually incredible, and can only be accounted for on the ground that Burnside had not looked at the stream, and fought his battle strategically, and not as directed. General Sackett says that he remained with Burnside to see McClellan's last order executed, and advised Burnside, who was back with the heavy artillery, "to go down near the bridge," and he then started to do so, but soon returned, saying that "the bridge had been carried and the troops were crossing over as rapidly as possible." This was at or after 1 o'clock P. M. (See Ferrero's report.)

Benning says his troops were withdrawn by reason of an enfilading fire from our batteries on their right, and also from the exhaustion of their ammunition. This latter is a fact, for these two regiments were immediately sent back to the wagons for ammunition, as we see by the reports.

That Burnside frittered away the whole forenoon in desultory shooting is also evidenced by the fact that his men were out of ammunition when the bridge was crossed, and the Confederates had also shot away all theirs, without actual contact. What had 10,000 or 12,000 men to do with shooting at 400 across the creek a whole half day, with more than forty cannon, and many of them 20-pounders, firing at point-blank range, or enfilading these 400 Confederates behind a few fence rails in a strip of

wood not one hundred feet from the "gently-rising" bank of a creek fordable anywhere for infantry? (See General Upton's official "Military Policy of the U. S.," page 389. "Before being placed in command of the Army of the Potomac, General Burnside had repeatedly informed the President and Secretary of War that he did not feel qualified for the position, an opinion which the battle-field of Antietam had sufficiently corroborated.")

But the bridge was not necessary even for the passage of artillery. The Kanawha division had passed the creek in force long before the bridge was taken. Colonel Crook reports that he had received orders in the morning to cross the bridge after Sturgis had taken it, but, finding that Sturgis had not arrived, in General Crook's characteristic way he divided his brigade and arranged his guns to command the bridge, and got five companies across the stream. "I then intended taking the bridge," he says, "but soon after my battery opened on the bridge General Sturgis' command crossed the bridge." Colonel Harland, of the Eighth Connecticut, also crossed by another ford. Colonel Curtis, of the Fourth Rhode Island, reports that his division, "the extreme left of the line, crossed at a ford under fire of the enemy's skirmishers, who were sheltered behind a stone wall; one brigade then moved up stream to the right, the other to the left." Ewing's brigade "crossed the ford of the Antietam under a shower of grape," Colonel White, of this

brigade, describes the operation. On the morning of the 17th "we moved with the brigade to a ford about one mile down the stream. While fording the stream the enemy opened on the column with artillery, fortunately inflicting but little injury. After crossing the stream we moved up along its bank, to the left and front of the bridge over Antietam, to within supporting distance of General Rodman's division. While lying in this position the enemy shelled us severely for about two hours."

After gaining the bridge, however, about 1 P. M., there was a long delay. During this delay the biographer of the Fifty-first Pennsylvania Regiment, the first to cross, says they stacked arms and kindled fires, which the Confederate artillery objected to. "Regiments began pouring over the bridge after this," he says, "but like the two regiments that first crossed, they were all totally out of ammunition; but after a considerable lapse of time a quantity of all kinds of cartridges, both heavy and small, arrived and was issued."

And during these precious but belated hours A. P. Hill's division was tearing its heart out, seven miles away, to reach the field and close this open door. And he closed it. Burnside must have thought that McClellan wanted the Antietam bridge for a specimen. At all events, that is all that Burnside got out of it, and he nearly lost that in the approaching dusk of the evening.

With more than forty guns in position, many of

them of the heaviest field calibers, fully commanding the opposite creek bank and the slopes behind at point-blank distance, or enfilading the whole creek bank behind natural heights at from one-third to a half-mile range, and nearer, if preferred, it was not necessary for Burnside's infantry to have fired a shot; they had far better protection than their own rifles. With fixed bayonets they could have crossed where the Kanawha division had crossed, or anywhere else, in fact, at any time after eight in the morning, and in ten minutes after the line of assault had uncovered itself, and without losing 150 men, they would have sent Toombs' 400 or 500 men whirling up the slopes. Our own artillery would have followed across the bridge, the slope in rear of Lee's fighting line would have been occupied, his whole right enveloped, the Potomac ford cut off, with A. P. Hill still ten miles or more away, and then the Union center would have struck Lee's salient in front of Sharpsburg, and that event would have then occurred which McClellan had planned should occur. Our army won a great victory, but Burnside's thousands, with all their losses and all their gallantry, did not help to win it. They might nearly as well have been back in North Carolina or out in West Virginia.

XII

ANTIETAM—FORCES ENGAGED

It will be found that McClellan's plan of attack at Antietam was closely followed by Lee at Gettysburg, and this was the plan also followed by Marshal Oyama in his great battle of Mukden, which ended so successfully for the Japanese.

First to assault the enemy's left with a real attack in heavy force, keeping up a heavy artillery fire on the center; then, when reinforcements have been drawn from the enemy's opposite flank and his defense weakened, to throw in another heavy attack, without regard to immediate cost, to envelop the enemy's right and threaten his rear and his communications; and finally, by a heavy frontal attack by the reserve in front, to crush the enemy's center.

This was carried out at Mukden; but at Antietam Burnside failed to realize the work he had to do, and this prevented the frontal attack on Lee's center, by the Fifth and part of the Sixth corps and Pleasonton's massed cavalry, already across the Antietam. In the same manner, at Gettysburg, Early's sending off part of his force on a wild-goose chase toward York against a mythical enemy, so

broke up Lee's combinations that the attack on Meade's right on the evening of July 2, after Longstreet had driven in his left, even with the aid of part of Hill's corps in the center, failed to achieve more than a partial success, the troops having been put in in disconnected parts.

Lee's frontal attack at Gettysburg on the 3rd was thereby made another partial attack, and was repulsed. Meade's position at Gettysburg was also much like Lee's at Antietam, and, substituting the Battle of South Mountain for Lee's attack in front of Gettysburg on Reynolds on the 1st, and the long march of the Sixth corps to Gettysburg for the corresponding march of A. P. Hill from Harper's Ferry to Sharpsburg, the parallel becomes complete, excepting that Mansfield and Sumner *did* make their attack early in the morning, while Longstreet, at Gettysburg, dawdled away most of the day in keeping out of sight, and only attacked after the Sixth corps had reached the field.

We now come to the question of forces engaged at Antietam. I have cited the regiments on both sides at the Seven Days, and in Pope's Second Manassas, and I will now give the same statistics for Antietam. Here also McClellan's force was greatly overrated and Lee's underrated, as in the Seven Days, while in the Pope campaign the exact reverse was the case; and popular histories still perpetuate the error. A simple comparison will at once demonstrate the truth. The same armies which

fought at the Second Manassas fought also at Antietam, and the losses at Manassas were not greatly in excess, one with the other, on either side, the Union losses exceeding the Confederate, as usual when McClellan was not present.

A reference to the reports in volume XIX of the Official Records compared with volume XII, shows that every Confederate regiment engaged at the Second Bull Run was engaged at Antietam, excepting one. In addition to these Lee, at Antietam, had received, after the Second Bull Run, forty-eight regiments of infantry, eighteen batteries of artillery, and five regiments of cavalry direct from Richmond. These regiments consisted of the divisions of McLaws, Walker, and D. H. Hill, and Hampton's cavalry brigade, which came up after the Pope battle was over. None of these are to be found in the Confederate roster of the Second Bull Run campaign, in volume XII, War Records, and all are found at Antietam, and the reports of casualties at the latter battle show that all these were very heavily engaged against McClellan.

In McClellan's army, at Antietam, there were twenty-nine new regiments, mostly of new nine months' infantry, just enlisted, and which had never fired a gun off at an enemy, or even been drilled or instructed. These were nearly full regiments. The old regiments were sadly depleted, for while Stanton's order of April 3, to close all the recruiting offices and sell the furniture at auction,

had been rescinded June 6, yet on August 4, before recruiting officers had begun to bring in any considerable number of recruits, the draft for 300,000 nine months' men had been ordered, and those who would have become recruits waited to become substitutes with high bounties. The same order of August 4 described the States as still deficient in their quota of volunteers.

These twenty-nine new regiments not only lacked the first elements of soldiery, but many of them had worthless arms. General Humphreys, referring to one of his brigades, 3600 strong, says "all its arms were unserviceable"; the arms of another of his regiments were unserviceable. There were nine hundred stand of arms in one brigade with nipples or hammers broken. Humphreys wouldn't move from Washington until these worthless arms were replaced, for there were plenty of good arms there, by which delay he did not reach Antietam until the day after the battle. But Colonel Gwyn, whose regiment, the One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania, was so badly cut up at Shepherdstown, reports: "Owing to the worthlessness of our pieces [condemned Enfield], not more than fifty per cent. of which could be discharged, the line began to waver."

The Confederates had on the battle-field of Antietam, September 17, 1862, 179 regiments of infantry, all veterans, 14½ regiments of cavalry, and 71 batteries of artillery.

Deducting Couch's division, absent in Pleasant Valley, watching the Harper's Ferry outlet, and Humphreys' division, which did not arrive till the 18th, McClellan had under his command at Antietam 184 regiments of infantry (including 21 of the new regiments), 15 regiments of cavalry, and 50 batteries of artillery. It will be seen that Lee had 21 batteries in excess of McClellan. Franklin's Sixth Corps did not reach the battle-field until between nine and eleven o'clock Wednesday, and he had with him 27 of the above 184 infantry regiments and 7 of the above 50 batteries.

It may be interesting, now, to compare the regiments and the numbers engaged, with those at Gettysburg a year later, when there was no object in belittling our own numbers and exaggerating those of the enemy.

The marches to these battle-fields had been nearly the same, the marching time nearly the same, the same country was invaded at nearly the same time of the year, and, in each case the Confederate army came from a great victory, the Second Manassas and Chancellorsville, and the Union army from a great defeat. All historians concede that at Gettysburg the opposing forces were nearly equal, with, if anything, a slight preponderance in favor of the Confederates.

At Gettysburg Lee had $168\frac{1}{2}$ regiments of infantry ($10\frac{1}{2}$ less than at Antietam), $26\frac{1}{2}$ regi-

ments of cavalry (12 more than at Antietam), and 60 batteries of artillery (11 less than at Antietam).

At Gettysburg the Union army had 228 regiments of infantry (38 more than at Antietam), 34½ regiments of cavalry (19½ more than at Antietam), and 72 batteries of artillery (22 more than at Antietam).

If Lee did not have his men with him at Antietam, it is difficult to discover where he had them. He claims to have fought the battle of Antietam with less than 35,000 men; but doubtless he left out A. P. Hill's division, which came late in the afternoon, but quite in time to do a great work. And he doubtless estimated his men after the battle. His first army return, dated only five days after the battle, and described as very imperfect, gives 36,418 officers and men *present for duty* (which is several thousand more than he claims to have had in the battle), besides the cavalry and reserve artillery. These numbered 7000. Adding these and his losses, not less than 25,000 men, makes a total accounted for of 68,418. To these must be added the fugitives from the battle-field, who never stopped after they had fled across the Potomac, and whom Lee had provost guards gathering up from the valley for nearly a month afterward. They figure up at least 7000, as reported (see Jones' Report), making a total taken into the battle of more than 75,000 officers and men, as battle-strength goes.

These figures correspond very closely with a total

independent count made while the Confederates were marching out of Frederick, and which I have never heretofore seen quoted. Dr. Lewis H. Steiner, of Frederick, Md., was an inspector in the United States Sanitary Commission. He was at the Second Bull Run, and September 5, when the invasion of his home was threatened, he made his way, by permission, on the last railroad train which reached Frederick, where he remained until McClellan's army, which he accompanied, moved out of that city.

During this interval he kept a diary, and this was afterward published in pamphlet form in the fall of the same year by permission of the Sanitary Commission. It was, by the way, from this diary that the poet Whittier derived his material for his poem of "Barbara Fritchie." Dr. Steiner, in his diary, writes: "Wednesday, September 10.—At four o'clock this morning the Rebel army began to move from our town, Jackson's force taking the advance. The movement continued until 8 o'clock P. M., occupying sixteen hours. The most liberal calculation could not give them more than 64,000 men. Over 3000 negroes must be included in this number. . . . Some of the Rebel regiments have been reduced to 150 men; none number over 500. Their marching is very loose. They marched by the flank through the streets of Frederick." The description which follows shows that Dr. Steiner gave his estimate from personal inspection, and his

position as inspector made such estimates a principal part of his duties in the Sanitary Commission.

Dr. Steiner describes these negroes as to all intents soldiers. They were clothed and fed like the Confederate soldiers. Most of the negroes, he says, "had arms, rifles, muskets, sabers, bowie-knives, dirks, etc. They were supplied, in many instances, with knapsacks, haversacks, canteens, etc., and they were manifestly an integral portion of the Southern Confederacy army. They were seen riding on horses and mules, driving wagons, riding on caissons, in ambulances, with the staff of generals and promiscuously mixed up with all the Rebel horde. The fact was patent, and rather interesting, when considered in connection with the horror Rebels express at the suggestion of black soldiers being employed for national defense."

Next day, September 11, his diary contains this entry: "General Hill's division, numbering about 8000 men, marched through the streets on their route westward this morning; the men marched in better order, had better music, and were fairly clothed and equipped." This was D. H. Hill's division, which had just come up from Richmond and had not been in the Second Bull Run campaign at all. If this force was included in his estimate the day before, it must have been by a subsequent alteration in the original entry. The same is true of Stuart's cavalry, which passed through Frederick later, and noted in his entry of September 13.

In any case he could not have included General John G. Walker's division, also fresh from Richmond,—largely by rail, as was D. H. Hill's division,—for Walker's division did not reach Frederick at all, but was marched back to Point of Rocks and across the Potomac to seize Loudon Heights.

As Walker's division—consisting of nine regiments of infantry and two batteries—is reported, in Guild's defective estimate, with losses of 1052, and in Lee's returns of September 22 as having 3871 present, its strength then could not have been less than 5000. General Walker, with whom I became very well acquainted after the war, told me that it was considerably in excess of this figure.

General Upton, in his "Military Policy," p. 370, puts Lee's army in the Second Manassas campaign against Pope at 60,000. As Lee had but 134½ regiments of infantry (only 120 of which were actually engaged), 14½ of cavalry (only 9½ of which were engaged), and 61 batteries of artillery (not all of which were in action), it will be seen that Lee's regimental strength on the field averaged (after the Seven Days' losses) more than 400.

All the above regiments, excepting one, were present and engaged in the battle of Antietam; and in addition there were 48 regiments of infantry—consisting of McLaws's division, 16 regiments; Walker's division, 9 regiments; and D. H. Hill's division, 23 regiments—which had not fired a shot since the Seven Days, but had been conscripted up to full

strength and brought from Richmond by rail, after Pope's campaign; 5 regiments of cavalry, Hampton's brigade, which reached Manassas after the battle; and 10 batteries of artillery additional, besides 10 left at Leesburg. Lee's entire losses in the Second Manassas campaign were less than 9000, including killed, wounded, and missing.

The casualties in Pope's army during the same campaign were 14,462, the excess of which of course tended relatively to weaken McClellan during the Antietam campaign.

The forces opposed to McClellan, in his various battles, were so minimized by the authorities at Washington—designedly—that history even to this day has accepted these false statements as truth, and it is only by the most painstaking and careful analysis that anything like the exact facts can be obtained. Fortunately for the truth of history, however, this process of depreciation was not resorted to in general,—excepting in the case of McClellan,—so that we can, by taking the official army returns from the month succeeding the first Confederate conscription (that is to say, April, 1862) up to the close of 1863, when the Confederate conscription had nearly spent its force, and the process of consolidation of two or more Confederate regiments, especially in the West, into a single command had become general, will accurately determine the facts.

Commencing with the battle of Shiloh, April

6-7, 1862, there were in Grant's army, prior to Buell's arrival after the first day's battle, 75 regiments of infantry, 5 of cavalry, and 22 batteries, a total present for duty, officers and men, and exclusive of the cavalry, of 32,314, making the average regimental strength about 400.

On the Confederate side were 74 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment of cavalry, and 18 batteries, giving an effective total of officers and men of 35,649, making an average regimental strength of more than 480. (See War Records, vol. x, part 1.)

The forces thus were almost equal, but Grant's position on the defensive gave him some advantage. When Buell joined Grant he brought with him 37 regiments of infantry, 2 of cavalry, and 4 batteries, giving to Grant in the battle of April 7 a disproportion of 10 to 6. Grant was always fortunate in having superior forces, which was the exact reverse of McClellan's case, excepting at the great battle of Culpeper, in November, 1862, which was never fought, having only gone so far as Longstreet's despairing order for battle and afterward Burnside's for retreat, so as to make a fresh start elsewhere.

Fredericksburg was the next great battle succeeding the Antietam campaign. Lee's return for December 20, 1862 (see W. R., vol XXI), after the battle, gives 180 regiments of infantry; present for duty, officers and men, 65,970. Adding Lee's loss in the previous battle, 5309, his infantry strength

was 71,279 officers and men present for duty. This gives an average regimental strength of 400.

At the battle of Murfreesborough, or Stone River, December 31, 1862-January 2, 1863, the Confederate force numbered 98 regiments of infantry, of which 16 had been consolidated into 8, making an actual infantry force of 90 regiments. The infantry present for duty, including artillery, numbered 33,475; average per regiment, 381.

The Union army in the same battle comprised 126 regiments of infantry, having an average strength of 319 per regiment.

The next important battle was Chancellorsville, at the beginning of May, 1863. In this battle Lee had 127 regiments of infantry. The aggregate, officers and men, present for duty April 1, was 52,714. This gives an average regimental strength of 415.

Hooker had 177 regiments of infantry which reported losses in this battle.

At the battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863, Lee had 168½ regiments of infantry. This was 10½ regiments fewer than he had at Antietam. The field returns for June 10, 20, and 30 are not on file, but by adding his losses to his present for duty on field-returns of July 20, and 31—we can reach an approximate estimate.

The return for July 20, immediately after Lee's broken passage into Virginia, with many of his troops scattered, gave 37,103 infantry present for

duty. His losses on the field of Gettysburg (see addenda War Record, vol. XXVII, part 2, p. 346), exclusive of cavalry, were 20,211, making a total of 57,314.

The next return, that of July 31, was more complete, giving, inclusive of the battle losses, 58,607. This would give an average regimental strength of 350.

It is inconceivable that after the heavy losses at Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and the preliminaries of Gettysburg, Lee's strength per regiment should have been as great as on the morning of Antietam, before these losses occurred. It is certain also that Lee's infantry strength at Gettysburg was in excess of the figures above given.

His army was full of enthusiasm, after the victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, just as the year before it was, after the victory of the Second Manassas.

But even taking Lee's infantry strength at Antietam at 350 per regiment, which is certainly underrated, as it was a year earlier than Gettysburg, we will have a total infantry alone opposed to McClellan at Antietam of 62,650, exclusive of cavalry and artillery; or a grand total of at least 75,000 engaged.

At the battle of Gettysburg Meade had 228 regiments of infantry, 38 more than McClellan had at Antietam, which will indicate that the actual average infantry strength of McClellan's regiments at An-

tietam was really much lower than that with which I have credited him. Meade's field return for June 30, 1863, gives a total of infantry, officers and men, present for duty equipped, at Gettysburg, of 76,986. This makes an average regimental strength of 337.

It is difficult to see how McClellan, only ten days after he took command, with constant marching and maneuvering, and considering the state of the débris which had flowed back to him from Pope's defeats, could in regimental strength have averaged much better. Whatever better it was was due altogether to the personality of McClellan.

In the above estimates I have dealt entirely with the infantry, as the artillery always possessed enough men to work the guns, while the cavalry, by its functions, was a variable quantity, and not estimable in the direct shock of great battles. Other armies could be cited, but the above averages, taken between April 1, 1862, and the fall of 1863, during which period the Confederate organization was at its best, will give the fairest results in comparison with McClellan and his armies during the period of his command.

XIII

MARCHING—FIGHTING—STRAGGLING—LOSSES

TAKING the above summaries together, it is clear that Lee's army, when it left Frederick, September 10, 11, and 12, numbered in officers and men not less than 75,000; and may have numbered considerably more, if statistics of other battles besides those of McClellan's are to be accepted as of any value.

If these men were not at Antietam excepting those left dead or wounded at South Mountain and Harper's Ferry, which were relatively few, what had become of them?

Lee says they straggled. There is straggling in all marching armies. We all know the "coffee-boilers," and those who like to take a little rest; but before Lee's army reached Frederick, and after it had left Manassas, straggling was not complained of by Lee, nor was Confederate straggling allowed for by the Washington authorities in estimating the enemy in Pope's campaign.

The Confederates must have done what no coffee-boilers ever do—they straggled away from provisions and plenty back into a land of poverty and

famine. Four armies had just marched over the only part of Virginia which the stragglers could reach if they had straggled back, while right in front, two days' march away, lay virgin Maryland and golden Pennsylvania, right after harvest, and with the fields rich with corn and the orchards filled with fruit.

As Whittier truly says :

"Up from the meadows rich with corn,
Clear in the cold September morn,
Round about them orchards sweep,
Apple and peach tree fruited deep;
Fair as a garden of the Lord
To the eyes of the famished rebel horde."

But Lee says they were worn out with marching. They marched farther next year, and in a shorter time, to reach Gettysburg, and in a rather worse marching month; but when they passed through the villages of Franklin County, Pennsylvania, where I was born, my friends tell me that there were few, if any, stragglers then; those left behind were running to catch up.

Lee's army had from August 16 to September 17, 1862, to go from Richmond to Antietam. Except Jackson's force, which had a month more to march in, all the Confederates went to Gordonsville by rail.

I have made careful measurement examination on the maps of the number of miles actually marched by the different armies, Union and Con-

federate, during the above period, excluding all rail and water transport, and I find that, taking all the different corps of McClellan's army, Burnside's North Carolina and West Virginia forces, and the different corps under Pope, the Union army actually marched, on foot, during the same period, more than twenty miles further than did Lee's army.

So that will not account for it. Then Lee says, in his dispatch to Richmond, under date September 24: "The enemy has suffered from straggling as well as ourselves (I believe to a greater extent), but his numbers are so great he can afford it; we cannot." (War Records, vol. xix, part 2, page 625.)

I have already shown what the relative strengths were, and that the Confederate strength fully equaled, or even exceeded, that of McClellan. There was fearful straggling in our own army up from Washington, as there had been in Pope's army. It was marching after a great defeat under Pope, and to meet a victorious and largely reinforced enemy, and it included many regiments which knew nothing of marching or taking care of themselves. It was being reorganized, also, the broken fragments of three armies being consolidated into one, in ten days, and on the march.

McClellan's circular of September 9 says: "The general commanding entreats all general officers to lend every effort to the eradication of the military vice of straggling. He feels assured that their united determination can break up the practice in a

single week." Within that week the three battles were all fought.

General Pope testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (see Upton's "Military Policy"): "At least one-half of this diminution of our forces was occasioned by skulking and straggling from the army. . . . Thousands of men straggled away from their commands and were not in any action. I had posted several regiments in rear of the field of battle on the 29th of August, and although many thousands of stragglers and skulkers were arrested by them, many others passed around through the woods and did not rejoin their commands during the remainder of the campaign." (See Upton's U. S. Publication, "Military Policy," page 370.)

This was the material for which McClellan had just seven days allowed him to make over again, before starting for Antietam.

Amid all the discouraging and demoralizing circumstances which pervaded and surrounded the Union army, there was a single one only which enabled that army to do its great work; every other factor had been part and parcel of the general disaster—there was but one new factor, and that was the heart, brain, loyalty, duty, and organizing and fighting power of a single individual.

As Dr. Steiner says, in concluding his diary: "On Wednesday the great Battle of Antietam was fought, with such a display of strategy and power

on the part of our general, and of heroism and daring from our men, that the enemy was glad to resign all hopes of entering Pennsylvania and to withdraw his forces across the Potomac. A great victory had been gained; the enemy had been driven from loyal soil, and McClellan had shown himself worthy of the love (amounting almost to adoration) which his troops expressed on all sides."

There was indeed much straggling on the part of Lee's army; but it was not until the evening of September 17 had closed down, and Lee's great army was forced back, defeated, as every private soldier in that army well knew. They knew, too, that behind them lay a broad river, now only knee-deep, but which the floods usually following a great battle might make at once impassable, as they did a year later after Gettysburg. They now slunk away from the shattered ranks, and fled, by ones and twos, officers and men, across the river and back to Winchester—and to safety.

Where is the proof? Lee writes, September 23, to the Secretary of War, asking for a law to degrade regimental and company *officers* for bad conduct *in the presence of the enemy* and for leaving their posts *in time of battle*. To President Davis he writes, the same day, that the main causes of his retiring from Maryland were the casualties and desertion and straggling *connected with the battle*.

September 27 General Jones, who had been sent to Winchester to gather in the stragglers, reported

that he had already sent back between 5000 and 6000, besides 1200 who had thrown away their shoes, and of these he says "the number of *officers* back here was most astonishing." His efforts created quite a stampede, he says, back to the army. This was after Lee's returns, already cited, had been made up.

Now these stragglers were up the Shenandoah Valley. How did stragglers from the Bull Run, Leesburg, or Frederick regions get across the mountains, and fifty miles west, and why did they go there anyway? They evidently fled up the Shenandoah Valley after Lee had been defeated at Sharpsburg, for they would have shown little sense in running away if it were not clear to themselves that Lee was disastrously and hopelessly defeated. Victors do not run away; it is the vanquished who run.

And so closed the full fourteen hours' battle of Antietam, that greatest single battle of the war—greatest in losses for the enemy and relatively in the smaller losses to ourselves. That was McClellan's way; it was because he understood artillery, for it will be found that in every one of McClellan's battles his own losses were far below those of the enemy, not only relatively but in actual numbers, which quite reversed the usual rule during the war. This was largely due to McClellan's excellent tactics, which both Grant and Lee commended, and to his perfect mastery of artillery, which he loved

and used just as Napoleon did in his great battles. A battery well placed had the power of a regiment, but could only suffer the loss of a company.

In General Alexander's Confederate article in the Century Company's "Battles and Leaders," vol. III, "The Great Charge and the Artillery Fighting at Gettysburg," he says the Confederates always called Antietam "Artillery hell."

Major Nelson H. Davis, assistant inspector general, in whose charge the interments were, reported about 2700 Confederate dead buried by himself on the field of Antietam. The trophies consisted of 13 cannon, 39 colors, more than 15,000 stand of arms, and more than 6000 prisoners. Hancock, in a letter to Adjutant-General Bowers, September 28, 1864, says: "I saw myself nine colors in the hands of one division at Antietam."

McClellan estimates, in his letter to Halleck of September 29, that, including South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, Antietam, Shepherdstown, and Confederate prisoners and deserters, the total Confederate loss was not less than 30,000 men. A careful collation of the returns of the different Confederate organizations fully supports this estimate.

The report of Medical Director Guild, in War Records, vol. XIX, pt. 2, pp. 810-813, is grossly defective. He confounds all the brigades and divisions, underestimates Ewell's losses by more than 300, A. P. Hills by more than 100, and entirely omits 16 regiments of infantry which were in the thick of the

fight, and all the cavalry and artillery losses. Many of Guild's other figures show large discrepancies, and the losses in prisoners are not included at all. McClellan claims to have captured more than 6000 prisoners. I have examined the individual reports of all the Union commands reporting prisoners taken, and, omitting all duplications, I find that there were accounted for in these few reports 5060 prisoners, while the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth corps, and one division of the Second and one of the Ninth, make no specific reports for prisoners at all, although they took many.

Correcting the Confederate casualty returns from the battle-field reports, their recorded losses, all told, so far as definitely stated, and adding a proportionate average for the sixteen omitted regiments, and for the cavalry and artillery, and including the 6000 prisoners, make a conceded aggregate, by the Confederates themselves, of between 20,000 and 21,000. Adding the 6000 or 7000 who fled up the Valley during and on the heels of the battle and before Lee's retreat, and the 1200 more who, Jones says, threw away their shoes to avoid being sent back to Lee, we have an aggregate Confederate loss of more than 29,000. Even this is understated, especially in the number of the dead, since these Confederate reports include less than 2000 killed, while Inspector Nelson reported burying 2700, and stated that before Lee's flight the Confederates had buried many of their own inside their lines. "The

Medical and Surgical History of the War" reports 3500 Confederates killed. These estimates of mine of Confederate losses are based on investigations of my own among the confused and incomplete reports of the different Confederate organizations which took part in the battle. Every one of these, from general to captain, has been carefully studied and collated, probably for the first time. General Emory Upton, in his "Military Policy of the United States," states, on the authority of the "Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion," Lee's losses at 3500 killed, 16,399 wounded, and 6000 prisoners. This is undoubtedly correct. He says that most of these prisoners were stragglers; but in this he is altogether mistaken. The 5060 prisoners I have taken from the reports filed were practically battle-field prisoners, and are so noted on my memoranda, excepting some of those gathered up by Pleasonton's cavalry. Hooker reported, at South Mountain, 1000 prisoners taken, and Burnside's whole command, 1500. Hancock, at Antietam proper, 400. The Fifty-seventh New York reports: "We took the colors of the Twelfth Alabama and many prisoners. I am unable to form any very correct estimate of the number of the latter, but they considerably exceeded the number of men in the ranks of my regiment." This was in the charge through the cornfield. Colonel Brooke, Fifty-third Pennsylvania, commanding brigade, and afterward Major-General Brooke, U. S. A., says:

"About 200 stand of arms were captured, as also a great number of prisoners, who were sent through the ranks to the rear." The Sixty-sixth New York reports: "The battalion pressed forward and completely routed the enemy. It was here that we captured a rebel lieutenant of the Fifth Florida regiment, together with his whole company and a stand of colors." General Kimball reports: "In this charge my command captured about 300 prisoners, the enemy leaving on the field several stand of colors."

Colonel Wilcox reports of the Irish Brigade: "They drove the enemy from their stronghold and captured some 300 prisoners, including a number of officers, among them Lieutenant-Colonel Nisbet, of Macon, Ga., all of whom were sent to the rear." Colonel Morris, Second Brigade, French's division: "My brigade captured 2 stand of colors, 2 captains, 7 lieutenants, and about 400 privates. We also took 400 stand of arms. In front of the last position held by the Fourteenth Connecticut more than 1000 of the enemy lie slain." The First Delaware reports: "We captured about 300 prisoners and sent them to the rear. The command continued fighting until their ammunition was expended." General Franklin reports: "Four hundred prisoners from 17 different organizations, 700 stand of arms, one piece of artillery, and 3 stand of colors were captured."

The First Brigade of the Kanawha division sent

to the rear a number of prisoners fully equal to its loss (255). Colonel Crane, commanding a brigade in Green's division, reports: "We charged them in a heavy piece of woods, driving them out of it, capturing a large number of prisoners [among them was a lieutenant-colonel and a lieutenant], and made terrible havoc in their ranks, covering the ground with slain." General Hancock reports: "Nine regimental colors and battle flags were taken from the enemy. . . . About 400 prisoners were captured and 4000 muskets collected on the field in front of the division, and piled." And such extracts could be multiplied. The purposed obscurity cast over these facts, which even misled so profound a student as General Upton, is the excuse for their recapitulation here.

William Bender Wilson, the War Department telegrapher, who was present, says of this battle: "Heroism, patriotism, and valor wrote their names on history's page all over the sanguinary field, which was strewn with nearly 21,000 dead and wounded men—3620 dead bodies and 17,365 wounded men."

The Union losses at Antietam were 12,500, and in all the battles, South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, Antietam, and Shepherdstown, 15,000.

Of this aggregate of the four battles 1100 were reported as missing. As the Confederates claimed no prisoners, except at Shepherdstown, September 20, many of these missing ones were deserters from

the substitutes and bounty men of the new regiments. Of these there were many, and in the general cleaning up after the battle—the first since leaving Washington—all those who had disappeared on the march or slipped away in the silence of the night were charged up to the loss account of Antietam.

For example, I find that the One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania (the Corn Exchange Regiment) reported losses of 269 at the Shepherdstown Ford, September 20, of which 105 were reported captured or missing. But on examining the muster-out roster of this celebrated regiment I find that the correct total was 211, instead of 269. The captured and missing amounted to 70, instead of 105, and of these 70 twelve had deserted *before* the battle, And of the 66 unwounded men captured, 16 deserted when afterward returned. Doubtless in other new regiments, in which there was no time to clean up their rolls on the march, many who were reported as “missing” had disappeared before the fighting commenced.

To illustrate McClellan’s command of artillery, it may be interesting to compare the losses during the three days of the Battle of Gettysburg with those of the one-day battle of Antietam.

At Antietam the Union losses were 2108 killed, 9549 wounded, and 753 missing; total, 12,410. The Confederate losses were 3500 killed, 16,399 wounded, 6000 captured; total, 25,899.

At Gettysburg the Union losses were 3155 killed, 14,529 wounded, and 5365 captured; total, 23,049. The Confederate losses were 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded, and 5150 captured; total, 20,451. See War Records, vol. XIX, part 1, p. 200; XXVII, part 1, p. 193; part 2, p. 346; and Upton's "Military Policy," p. 382.

XIV

SEPTEMBER 18-19—AMMUNITION

MCCLELLAN has been censured because "he did not attack early the next morning (the 18th) and complete the work." This "completing the work" is a very vague idea among civilians and new soldiers. Meade was nearly removed from command by the civilians because he did not "complete the work" in the Gettysburg campaign. Such men imagine that armies can be whirled around like a club, and that a hundred thousand men can be destroyed as Samson destroyed the three thousand Phillistines. And "trap" is another favorite word with the civilian war critics. In the examination of some such pompous officer, newly drawn into the service, and whom I recall as testifying in the winter of 1861 before the civilian Committee on the Conduct of the War, he filled their souls with admiration by describing how an army should be maneuvered and fought. There was to be no halting nor hesitation with him; he would hurl his army right into the face of the enemy. But suppose, he was asked, the enemy should appear on your flank. "Then," he replied, "I would throw two or three divisions over there."

“And if your rear were attacked?” “Then,” he replied, “I should fling a few divisions back there.” And against anything threatening his lines of communication he would whirl a sufficient number of divisions there, too, still keeping his army driving everything before him in his front. It was meat and drink to the civilians, and it is a pity that he was not promoted; but he wasn’t; he disappeared.

McClellan generally got out of a situation all there was in it. The Rebels used to complain of other Union commanders, and among them some subsequent ones in the same army, that “they didn’t clean up as they went, as McClellan did.” It is a curious fact that no ground that McClellan ever fought his army over and won,—in West Virginia, Maryland, or Virginia proper,—ever again fell into regular Confederate occupation. And the same is true of those greater movements which McClellan had previously directed as general-in-chief—New Orleans, North Carolina, Kentucky, Missouri, New Mexico; and, had all his orders been carried out at New Orleans by Butler, Vicksburg, Jackson, Meridian, and all Southern Tennessee and all Mississippi could be included. But that was not to be; the Secretary of War, an excellent lawyer, filed a brief and took command himself.

McClellan did not attack the next morning, for the best of reasons. Not only was Couch’s splendid division absent guarding the river roads to the rear of McClellan’s army, but he could not be withdrawn

until Lee had been so paralyzed as to be incapable of using them. At midnight, after the battle, McClellan ordered Couch's division back; and it reached his front after a hard march during the next forenoon. Humphreys' very full division (of new troops, it is true, but it was under Humphreys; and he himself bluffed the Washington authorities and had its worthless arms replaced) reached the field only after an all-day and all-night twenty-two mile march, at ten o'clock on the 18th. A. P. Hill's Confederate division was nearly fresh, and had suffered but little loss when he drove back Burnside at nightfall, as he reported only a loss of a thousand out of his six brigades—less a few men left at Harper's Ferry—after Burnside's whole corps and a half had been forced back to the hills above the creek.

But the controlling factor was that, while Lee had all the artillery ammunition he wanted,—all he obtained at Harper's Ferry, a large proportion of General Pope's, and the remainder which had come with the new troops, half the way by train from Richmond,—McClellan had little ammunition at all left, and none at all for his heavy guns, of which he had at least seven or eight full batteries—nearly fifty guns in all. McClellan says "a large number of our heaviest and most efficient batteries had consumed all their ammunition on the 16th and 17th, and it was impossible to supply them until late the following day."

That this statement is not overdrawn, we may learn from the report of Benjamin, of Benjamin's United States battery of 20-pound Parrotts. After the firing on the 16th he replenished his caissons on the morning of the 17th, or tried to do so, for he received only forty rounds, that being all that there was in the Antietam supply-train. At 5.30 P. M., the 17th, he fired his last six rounds at the enemy. After that, he says, "by order of General Burnside I fired blank cartridges to draw the enemy's fire from the infantry."

McClellan was pushing the Washington authorities for heavy ammunition from 1 o'clock P. M. on the 17th; he was urging them almost constantly from that time on: "Force some 20-pounder Parrott ammunition through *to-night*, via Hagerstown and Chambersburg." The railroads came in with a hearty swing; General Ripley, chief of ordnance at Washington, joined in; Governor Curtin, our splendid War Governor, did all that man could do; Watson, the Assistant Secretary of War, always loyal and faithful, did his best; President Garrett of the B. & O. pushed his end along with his greatest vigor; and even the Secretary of War, at midnight of the 17th, sent word that everything must be cleared ahead for this ammunition, the life-blood for the palpitating heart and arteries throbbing against the enemy at the front.

At 12.30 A. M., September 18, General Ripley, chief of ordnance, telegraphed McClellan: "A spe-

cial train consisting of 2500 rounds of 20-pounder ammunition left last night for Hagerstown, in charge of Lieutenant Bradford, Ordnance Department." Field and small arm ammunition was to go later, and it went a great deal later—late next day, in fact. Lieutenant Colonel Ramsey, in charge of the arsenal at Washington, sent to General Ripley, September 18, the statement: "The shipment of the ammunition for 20-pounders went last night by way of Hagerstown, with Lieutenant Bradford."

So it seems pretty well established that 2400 or 2500 rounds of 20-pounder ammunition—60 rounds for each gun—started to McClellan from Washington by way of Baltimore, Harrisburg, and Hagerstown before midnight on the 17th of September. What became of it? William Bender Wilson, the special and confidential military telegrapher of the War Department, whose services were so conspicuous that Pennsylvania has recently placed him upon her honored pension roll,—a very rare distinction,—tells us in his little book, published in 1892, "A Few Acts and Actors in the Tragedy of the Civil War," the inside history of the shipment of this vital 20-pounder ammunition. This ammunition started from Washington before midnight on the 17th and, with all the tracks open, with absolute right of way, and with express speed, never reached Hagerstown even—still a six or eight mile wagon-haul distance from McClellan—until one o'clock on the afternoon of the 18th.

Wilson says it was ready at the Washington arsenal at 1 A. M., September 18. Both Colonel Ramsey and General Ripley said it left the arsenal *before* midnight. Wilson did all the telegraphic work regarding this shipment, and followed its course to Hagerstown. It is forty miles from Washington to Baltimore. "Why," he says, "it did not reach the Northern Central Railway at Baltimore until after seven o'clock that morning has always been a mystery." Lieutenant Bradford was aboard; the train consisted of an engine, tender, and four B. & O. cars. How and where these seven hours were passed will never be known. The train, Wilson says, left Baltimore at 7.27; was delivered to the C. V. R. R. at Harrisburg at 10.20 A. M. The run, eighty-four miles, was made in two hours and fifty-five minutes. It arrived at Chambersburg at 12, noon, and at Hagerstown at 12.42, making a run from Harrisburg of seventy-four miles in one hour and fifty-eight minutes. The running time was shorter, for at two stations on the C. V. ten minutes each were lost from hot boxes. He says that when the train ran into the Hagerstown station "all the journal boxes on the four B. & O. cars were ablaze; of this fact I was an eye-witness."

This ammunition, with the running time given it, should have reached Hagerstown, Mr. Wilson says, at 7.20 A. M., and would then have "been of some avail to McClellan on that day"—September 18.

Mr. Wilson had his theory, which he gives on page 71 of his book, and those who care to, may see how he accounts for that fatal seven hours' delay which exposed McClellan, not only to attack by Lee, but to the charge of slowness, which word (used instead of "preparedness") acted on the people like a red rag flashed in the face of an excited bull.

XV

LEE'S FLIGHT TO VIRGINIA—M'CLELLAN'S VICTORY

BUT what of this failure to attack on the 18th? One might understand that on the 18th itself people might say, "Why does he delay?" "Lee may attack, himself." But after the 18th, when Lee had fled in the night from Northern soil, with his crushed and shattered army, why was it important that McClellan should have attacked on the 18th? Least of all, why of importance to a military man? All that could possibly have been gained by an attack was gained; all that an attack could have accomplished was to drive Lee across the river; after Burnside's failure to envelop Lee's right and cut him off from his ford, only a mile in his rear, and to cut off A. P. Hill's approach, Lee could have retreated precisely as he did, battle or no battle, for, as I have quoted, the next morning, September 19th, a Union regiment,—the Fourth Michigan,—marched across the Potomac by the same ford in line of battle, and Lee's trains were already across the river, even before the battle of the 17th occurred. See War Records, vol. XIX, part 1, pp. 339 and 349-350.

It is true that we might have destroyed ten or a

dozen thousand more of Lee's men, but at a cost of ten or a dozen thousand, more or less, of our own men. That process of mere attrition is, however, a sort of game called swapping to a loss, in the game of checkers, which reputable players do not usually approve of. So, in 1863, Lee lay one day also, after the battle, in front of Gettysburg. Who now reproaches Meade that he did not then attack? The victory was no less—it was greater, and Meade's reputation has not been dimmed, but has, on the contrary, been brightened thereby. Great victories crystallize out slowly from a great battle; at first, sometimes, no one knows who has been successful. Like a hunter, struggling body to body with a grizzly bear, it takes some time, even when the final blow has been given, for the grip to relax, for the jaws to fall apart, for the muscles to unclasp, and for the great dying hulk to fall to the ground in the convulsion of death. But the victory is no less great; the result no less inevitable.

If Antietam was not a great crowning victory, then why was Gettysburg? The forces were substantially the same. At Gettysburg we were on the defensive, and Lee attacked and failed; at Antietam Lee was on the defensive, and McClellan attacked and succeeded. When it comes to losses, it is true that at Antietam we, the attackers, only lost one-half as many as we did at Gettysburg, while Lee, the defender, lost from 5000 to 7000 more. At Antietam we took six thousand prisoners from Lee.

At Gettysburg he took six thousand prisoners from us. In both cases Lee lost his campaign, and was driven back to the wasted places of Virginia; and in both cases he was driven from Pennsylvania, for, as I have shown, Lee's invasion of 1862 was an invasion of Pennsylvania just as much as was that of 1863. He was broken to pieces sooner in 1862, that was all.

It is time that history should clearly realize the fact that Antietam was our greatest day of battle, the bloodiest battle for the South and the most glorious for the Union arms in all that wondrous four years' war which gave to the world new examples of patriotism and higher lessons of heroism.

During the night of the 18th Lee withdrew his shattered and depleted remnants across the river, and on the morning of the 19th the invasion and the invaders had passed into history.

General Charles Griffin, commanding brigade in Morell's division, Fifth Corps, describes this broad and shallow ford, on September 19, as follows: "By direction of Major-General Porter the Fourth Michigan was ordered to cross the river and take some guns which our artillery fire had caused to be abandoned. This duty was handsomely performed, the regiment, about three hundred strong, fording the river [some three hundred yards in width, and three feet in depth] in face of the enemy's infantry fire." War Records, vol. XIX, part I, p. 350.

General Porter, in his report (page 338), says that parts of the One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania and Eighteenth and Twenty-second Massachusetts regiments volunteered and accompanied the Fourth Michigan in the crossing and return.

XVI

SHEPHERDSTOWN—SEPTEMBER 20

A MUCH misunderstood episode is what is commonly called the Shepherdstown battle, on the 20th of September. This, while popularly described as a slaughter, was in reality a very creditable affair; and, had it not been for the abominable arms put into the hands of the One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania Regiment, and for which the Washington authorities were alone responsible, would have been considered a very successful and necessary reconnaissance. Many like it were subsequently pushed across the Potomac and up the valley by McClellan during his occupancy of the north bank of the river, between September 20 and October 25, 1862.

Immediately after Lee's flight McClellan sent Couch up to Williamsport and directed Pleasonton, with the cavalry, not to cross the Potomac "unless you see a splendid opportunity to inflict great damage upon the enemy without loss to yourself." And he was to send half his force, with two batteries, to the Shepherdstown front, where Fitz John Porter had advanced with the Fifth Corps, and with the Sixth Corps in support.

On the morning of the 20th General Sykes was ordered to send a brigade of his regulars across the Potomac on a reconnaissance. After coming in contact with the rear of the retreating enemy, he sent back for another of his regular brigades. With this latter brigade was sent the old First Brigade of Morell's division. This First Brigade was composed of six veteran regiments, which, in the Seven Days, had lost 900 men, with one of its regiments detailed away elsewhere; and in the Pope campaign it had lost nearly 600 more, with another one of its regiments detailed away. Such regiments as the Twenty-second Massachusetts, First Michigan, Thirteenth New York, and Second Maine speak for themselves, and could always take care of themselves. But brigaded with these veterans was the entirely new One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania, which knew nothing of war nor of how to take care of itself. To crown all, this regiment had been supplied by the War Department, when it left Washington (see Colonel Gwyn's Report), with condemned Enfield pieces, not more than fifty per cent. of which could be discharged. A very gallant sergeant of that regiment told me that they had to beat down the hammers with a stone to make them go off, and many of the nipples were broken off besides. Then Colonel Prevost, the commander, was shot down as soon as he himself took the colors to the front; and the whole regiment, we may know from this circumstance alone, had become balled up,

part of it being caught by the enemy while still in fours. They could neither advance nor retire, and lingered there, irresolute and confused, while the remainder of the brigade, under orders, safely retired to and across the river, with a loss of less than nine men to a regiment—the purpose of the reconnaissance having been accomplished and the question of the enemy's movement toward Williamsport settled. About two hundred men of the regiment thus left behind were gotten together and the enemy heroically charged, but these few were soon driven back, and then the only thing to do was to try to escape. High rocky bluffs and lime-kilns were in their rear along the river, and down these they slid and tumbled, hid under the bluffs or tried to ford the river; finally most of them got away.

The official casualty returns of all the Union troops on both sides of the river for September 19 and 20 make the losses 363; the losses for the One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania alone are stated at 269. Colonel Gwyn in his report, dated September 30, puts them at 277. But an examination of the muster-out—and corrected—roster of this regiment shows that the actual losses of the One Hundred and Eighteenth on that day were 71 killed or died of wounds, 71 wounded and saved, 4 wounded and captured, and 63 captured unwounded, making a total of 209. As before stated, some of those captured doubtless allowed them-

selves to be taken, for 16 of these deserted after they had been returned to their regiment.

The actual losses of the Union troops across the river on September 20 were 279, for the whole of the eleven regiments engaged. The magnitude of the enemy's forces which engaged these regiments seems startling. A. P. Hill reports that he had in the battle itself, in the first line, the brigades of Pender, Gregg, and Thomas, consisting of 13 regiments; in the second line, the brigades of Lane, Archer, and Brockenbrough, consisting of 14 regiments; and (see Early's Report) in supporting line of battle, in rear, the brigades of Early, Hays, and Trimble, consisting of $16\frac{1}{2}$ regiments, making an opposing total of 9 brigades, comprising $43\frac{1}{2}$ regiments, besides all their artillery. The commanding officer was Stonewall Jackson.

Their losses in this little engagement were 262, a difference, compared with the actual Union losses, of only 17. But they got glory out of it, for A. P. Hill, in his report, told those at Richmond—and those at Washington, also—that “then commenced the most terrible slaughter that this war has yet witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was blue with the floating bodies of our foe. But few escaped to tell the tale. By their own account they lost 3000 men, killed and drowned, from one brigade alone. Some 200 prisoners were taken. My own loss was 30 killed and 231 wounded; total 261.” To which are to be added Early's losses (p. 975,

War Records, vol. XIX, part 1, page 975), making the total, as stated, 262. It would have taken a life-preserver to float a body in the Potomac at that time, and A. P. Hill knew it, for with his foot-sore tatterdemalions he had footed it across that river both ways, back and forth, twice within the previous three days. Poor McClellan! Poor Fitz John Porter! Poor History! The tale went; all hands were willing.

XVII

STUART'S USELESS CAVALRY RAIDS—THE RAIDS OF FORREST—THE UNION RAID FROM HARPER'S FERRY, SEPTEMBER 14-15, 1862

ANOTHER misfortune befell the Confederate army a few days later. It was "Stuart's ride around McClellan," also heralded as a great "Rebel success." It certainly did frighten the Pennsylvania farmers—of whom my own folks were a part—for the safety of Nell and Dobbin. However, Stuart merely wore out his cavalry horses and had to remount his men on Pennsylvania farm-horses to escape—which broke down and went to pieces, as his reports show—as soon as McClellan's great movement began at the end of October. This very expedition paved the way for our own cavalry's triumphant advance, and made Stuart's resistance useless. The "glory," which Stuart so loved, gave him the added theatrical éclat to "do it again" next year, when "he rode around" Meade so far that he lost Lee entirely, and so destroyed Lee's sole opportunity for a successful invasion or of winning the Battle of Gettysburg. Stuart did no more "riding around" after that campaign, you may be sure. He

was a brilliant soldier, but theatrical and boastful, and he did not understand war in its larger aspects.

We have the type of a scientifically correct "riding around," or riding through, by cavalry in the operations of Forrest,—who was a born general,—and of Van Dorn, when they rode around Grant in the late fall of 1862 while Grant was moving down to Meridian, and Jackson, and Central Mississippi, to strike Vicksburg in the rear. They reached and struck Holly Springs, Grant's base of supplies, destroyed it and tore up the railroads north from Jackson and north from Tallahatchie, and, as Grant graphically says, December 23, 1862, "have cut me off from supplies, so that farther advance by this route is perfectly impracticable. The country does not afford supplies for troops and but a limited supply of forage." And so Grant's great army, then far south, was sucked back, as it were, and the movement was never undertaken again.

Or, take the cavalry expedition from Harper's Ferry on the night of September 14 and morning of September 15, just before the Battle of Antietam, of which it was a part, and which it so powerfully influenced. I was one of this expedition, and can confirm Colonel Voss' unofficial report, for, by the scattering of these temporarily joined organizations, after Antietam, no full report was ever sent in. The cavalry at Harper's Ferry, on Sunday, September 14, demanded that they be allowed to go out, first, to escape surrender, and second, to strike and

damage the Confederates by a night attack, if possible. There were about 1500 to 2000 cavalry, in four or five different organizations—the Twelfth Illinois cavalry, Seventh squadron Rhode Island cavalry (to which I was attached), the First Maryland cavalry (two organizations), and the Eighth New York cavalry, the whole placed under command of Colonel Voss, who says: “The commanding officers of the several cavalry organizations held a meeting to discuss the feasibility of escape by cutting their way through the enemy’s lines. Present at this meeting were Colonel Davis, commanding Eighth New York cavalry; Major Corliss, commanding the Rhode Island Squadron; Lieutenant Green, commanding detachments from First Maryland cavalry; myself, and my second in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Hasbrouck Davis. It was unanimously agreed that the plan was feasible, and a committee was appointed to obtain the consent of Colonel Miles, the commander of the fort. At first he would not listen to such a proposition at all, denouncing it as wild and impracticable, imperiling the lives of the whole command; but he finally yielded, and assented to the expedition.”

At this time Stonewall Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill lay across the angle in rear of Harper’s Ferry, on the Virginia side, from the Potomac to the Shenandoah; General Walker, with his division and his heavy guns, occupied Loudon Heights, across the Shenandoah, looking down on Harper’s

Ferry, and the two divisions of McLaws and Anderson occupied the Maryland side of the river below Harper's Ferry, and had crowned Maryland Heights with artillery; while two of McLaws' brigades, having penetrated Solomon's Gap, lay along the northern slopes of Maryland Heights above Harper's Ferry. During Sunday afternoon the town was under bombardment from all three positions, and Jackson had attacked for position with his infantry also.

The place surrendered at 8.30 next morning, but without the cavalry, or their 1500 trained cavalry horses. On Sunday, also, the battles of South Mountain and Crampton's Gap had been fought, within hearing. In the night, D. H. Hill, from the former, and Longstreet, from Boonsborough and Hagerstown, were moving down to Sharpsburg, and Anderson and McLaws had been driven by Franklin down Pleasant Valley, and were occupying both sides of Maryland Heights to the Potomac.

The expedition crossed the river, commencing at 8.30 o'clock P. M., in darkness, by the single, slight, pontoon bridge in place there, turned up the north bank, and almost at once climbed a very steep log road to the summit of the mountainous belt between Elk Ridge and the Antietam Creek. One company turned, by mistake, to the right, and in a few moments came upon the enemy. The night was very dark; the first fifteen or twenty miles was

through the mountains by rough mountain roads, and not till the Antietam was nearly reached did we emerge from this almost impassable kind of country. McLaws' pickets were encountered on this mountain road, and the Confederate camp-fires were smoldering everywhere; but by a curious coincidence (see McLaws) just as the night came on the brigades of Kershaw and Barksdale, excepting one regiment, were withdrawn from the top and western slopes of Maryland Heights, to form a line of battle across Pleasant Valley, to the east, and this accidental evacuation left the road nearly clear for the cavalry. At Sharpsburg we struck the main Boonsborough-Shepherdstown pike, along which lay, by this time—which was after midnight—Longstreet's just-arriving forces. At the north end of Sharpsburg, near an old church, a strong Confederate picket was encountered, which fired upon the closed up head of our column—Colonel Voss says "a sheet of flame from at least a hundred rifles." The column turned up toward Hagerstown, and the fence-bars opening into a field on the left of the pike were let down, beyond Sharpsburg, and below Jones's cross-roads, and the route deflected across country to strike the Hagerstown and Williamsport road where it connects at right angles with the Williamsport and Greencastle road leading up into Pennsylvania. Lee describes this action with his advance post at Sharpsburg.

Here on the Hagerstown pike, just before we left

it, occurred another coincidence. Right in front of us, marching down from Hagerstown to Sharpsburg, Benning's brigade (see Benning's report) was approaching; we had hardly cleared the pike when it reached that point, and marched by, on its way to Sharpsburg. There it heard of the cavalry raid, and two of its regiments were at once turned back, without a halt, to pursue the cavalry and protect Longstreet's threatened wagon trains. They did not overtake the cavalry, however, which marched more than fifty miles that night, mostly over abominable roads, and much of it in impenetrable darkness. But these two Confederate regiments, by reason of this pursuit, did not reach Antietam till near noon on the 17th, were then worn out, and could not take their place with the Second and Twentieth Georgia in defending the Antietam Creek and the bridge against Burnside, but were put into the general line of battle, the Confederates thus being able to oppose only two regiments instead of four against Burnside's attack.

And see also General Pendleton's report (chief of artillery), who passed Jones' cross-roads almost immediately afterward from Boonsborough to Williamsport, which fixes the route of the cavalry. War Records, vol. XIX, part I, pp. 829-830.

After leaving the pike, says Colonel Voss, "we were also guided in choosing our path by the faint glimmer of their bivouac fires." (See report of Confederate General Pendleton, War Records, vol.

xix, part 1, page 830, "I immediately posted guns to the front and on the flank, sent messengers to General Toombs, understood to be at Sharpsburg, for a regiment or two of infantry, set to work collecting a band of armed stragglers, and sent scouts to the front.") These stragglers were those who brought the information to General Pendleton, and through whom, in the cornfields, we had been riding. These were ridden through headlong, as it was now moonlight, and our columns were closed up. We then emerged on the Hagerstown and Williamsport road, when a third coincidence occurred. Lee was sending his trains across the river, by Williamsport, and Longstreet's ammunition train had already left Hagerstown and was pushing down toward Williamsport, but had not yet reached the point where we now struck the road, in the first gray dawn of the morning. The rumble of many wagons came from the right and clouds of yellow dust were there seen rising. His train consisted of "85 army wagons," says Colonel Voss, "each drawn by six fine mules, and loaded with munitions of war and provisions, and followed by thirty or forty head of fat young steers." In addition, many of the wagons had wounded men piled upon their loads, 175 in all, I believe, who became prisoners, including a brigadier-general. The train was captured entire. Our troopers went with it, and turned each of the wagons to the right, at the intersection with the Greencastle road, just below,

and took them on a dead run up toward Pennsylvania while the main force remained behind to head off and occupy the wagon guard, said to have consisted of a brigade of infantry. We soon got out of their reach, with some desultory firing, blew up with their own ammunition sixteen of the wagons which broke down in the rush, and entered Greencastle, covered with dust, and hungry, at 9 o'clock A. M., Monday, September 15. Next day the command was ordered to Antietam, and posted on the extreme right, below Jones' cross-roads, near the pike. See War Records, vol. LI, part I, Supplemental, p. 851. Colonel Voss reported more than 600 prisoners taken in this operation.

Now this was a good cavalry expedition. We saved 1500 to 2000 good cavalry horses from falling into Jackson's hands, we put two Confederate regiments out of four out of the Antietam fight, just where they were most needed, and we captured one-third, or even more, of Longstreet's whole ammunition train, all his reserve ammunition, and a lot of prisoners and beef on the hoof. This was one of those humorous occasions concerning which the President asked General McClellan, October 24: "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?" He ought to have read General Pleasonton's reports and dispatches; perhaps he had no opportunity.

It is doubtful indeed whether they ever learned

of this expedition at all at Washington; but Longstreet wrote, more than fifteen years after the event: "The service you refer to was very creditable, and gave us much inconvenience. The command being in retreat, and in more or less apprehension for its own safety, seems to have exercised more than usual discretion and courage."

General John G. Walker, who was upon Longstreet's right and held the Confederate center in the battle of Antietam, told me, after the war, that the loss to Longstreet was very serious, and that the exploit itself was looked upon by the Confederates as a most remarkable achievement. One of our regular army officers at Vicksburg afterward told, in my hearing, that he had chanced to be in Greencastle, Pa., on some duty at that time, and said that "he never was so proud of American soldiers as one morning in September, 1862, when he saw the Union cavalry coming up out of Lee's army with his long train of ammunition and a lot of prisoners in their possession." When I told him that I was one of that party, he came over and congratulated me again and again. Alas! he was soon afterward himself killed, so that even he could not report it. McClellan alone speaks of it. In his despatch to Halleck, September 23, he recommended Colonel B. F. Davis—dear old Grimes Davis—for promotion in the regular army, from captain to brevet-major, "for conspicuous conduct" on this occasion. He received his promotion, and the next June, at

Beverly Ford, says Pleasonton's report, "the brave and accomplished Colonel B. F. Davis, while commanding a brigade, charged at the head of his column into the midst of the enemy and was shot through the head." He would have reached high rank had he survived.

XVIII

M'CLELLAN'S PLAN TO DRIVE LEE BY A FRONTAL ATTACK UP THE VALLEY

AFTER Lee's flight across the river, and his precipitate sending back of the divisions of A. P. Hill and Early to meet a threatened advance of McClellan's army, McClellan bent all his energies to preparing to cross the Potomac directly in his front and attack Lee in the lower Shenandoah Valley. To determine whether Lee would stand for a fight to a finish or retire up the valley, to return when the pressure was relieved, it was necessary to make repeated reconnaissances in force, with bodies strong enough to fight a battle, if necessary. To attack Lee successfully, or to so move as to avoid the necessity of giving up the whole movement halfway, and turning back to follow Lee again to Pennsylvania, it was necessary to have either the Potomac rise so as to make it possible to cut him off if he crossed, or else to cross and attack him in front, behind the Potomac. A move by McClellan up east of the mountains at this time would inevitably have brought Lee north again, and with terrific consequences down at Washington.

This direct attack was the plan McClellan urged, and it took all the power and influence of the Government to force McClellan to adopt the slower and less direct method of moving up east of the mountains, and so "threaten Richmond," as it was called, nearly two hundred miles away. They offered him the splendid bribe of a whole added army from Washington to aid him if he would adopt this plan. And they did much more; they so retarded his supplies that he could not attack, defeat, and afterward pursue Lee up the valley, as I shall describe. McClellan well knew—and Lee knew it as well as McClellan, for his dispatches are full of it—that as soon as McClellan passed up east of the mountains Jackson would cross the still shallow Potomac into Pennsylvania, with Longstreet guarding the passes south of the Potomac, to prevent McClellan's direct interference. (See Lee's reports.)

No one need doubt what would have happened then in Washington, in the North, and to McClellan and his army, and to himself personally. So McClellan's only attack was a direct frontal attack, provided Lee would stand and take it rather than give up the still comparatively rich lower Shenandoah Valley, where his army was now feeding and recuperating as well as getting reinforcements, for the new conscription law, taking in all under forty-five (instead of thirty-five), had gone into effect just previously.

September 26 McClellan sent a cavalry recon-

naissance from Shepherdstown toward Martinsburg, and found the enemy in force two miles back of Shepherdstown. October 2 a reconnaissance in force was made to Martinsburg. The enemy were found in force near Bunker Hill. Pleasonton, in his report of October 14, details these actions; Lee, October 2, gives a graphic account of this fight. General Kimball, with his brigade, and the Sixth United States cavalry and two batteries, advanced from Harper's Ferry to Leesburg, October 3. After the pursuit of Stuart, and the return from his fruitless raid, October 10, General Humphreys, with a force of 6000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 6 pieces of artillery, crossed at Shepherdstown and advanced to Charlestown and Leetown. The Confederates lost 24 men in resisting this advance. At the same time General Hancock, with the whole of his division and 1500 men of other divisions, and a force of cavalry and artillery, advanced on Charlestown also, and General McClellan accompanied the force and directed its operations in general. October 20 a reconnaissance was made by General Geary, to Lovettsville, across from Berryville, and on the mountain. The Confederate army had retired to near Winchester. The fall rains were at hand, and both armies were being refitted, as best they could, for the next movements. So the month of October was passing away, with the Army of the Potomac starving for supplies or fed from hand to mouth, and clothed scarcely at all.

It was not till October 16 that Lee (see letter to General Loring, W. R.) gave up his idea of entering Pennsylvania if McClellan's movements gave him the opportunity.

No army during the whole war needed supplies more than McClellan's army at this time, unless it was the army of Lee, who says, in his letter to President Davis, September 28: "History records but few examples of a greater amount of labor and fighting than has been done by this army during the present campaign." Of course, what was true of Lee's army was true of McClellan's, with this proviso, that the next move must be an aggressive advance by McClellan away from his supplies and a defensive retirement by Lee upon his supplies. See Grant's statement about his pursuit of Lee in 1865, chapter xxix, in this narrative.

XIX

DOCTORED SYSTEM OF SUPPLIES FOR M'CLELLAN'S ARMY

BUT McClellan's army on the upper Potomac was not supplied. Lee knew this very well. Lee writes, October 1: "I think it probable that as yet General McClellan is able only to procure supplies from day to day." Again: "I think he is yet unable to move, and finds difficulty in procuring provisions from day to day." October 9: "I do not think that he is able to make any move yet." October 11: "Notwithstanding the assertions of the Northern papers, I think this [McClellan's] army is not yet sufficiently recuperated from its campaign in Maryland to make a vigorous forward move."

The components of McClellan's army had marched and fought since spring over all eastern Virginia and over a large portion of North Carolina and Maryland. A family of school children would want a couple of new outfits in that time. The Cumberland Valley, Northern Central, and Baltimore and Ohio railroads delivered their trains right into the camps of McClellan's army, and the Chesapeake and Ohio canal came up to its very doors.

Now the most ingenious contrivance was put

into operation, of which you may be sure that neither President Lincoln nor Secretaries Seward and Welles had any knowledge, whereby the whole country would feel that McClellan's army in the field was having supplies flooded in upon it in almost unexampled quantities, and which yet left his army to sit down to a veritable Barmecide feast, in which everything was snatched away when almost within its grasp. We need not necessarily suppose that this was deliberately done by any high military officers, for, as Napoleon said, "Generals are always asking for more, and never have enough." But it robbed McClellan's army of its supplies just the same.

It will be recollected that, after President Lincoln had, in a personal interview, September 1, directed McClellan to take charge of the fortifications and troops in Washington, when Pope's routed army was streaming back, Halleck, on behalf of the War Department, issued general orders No. 122, dated September 2: "Major General McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washington and of all the troops for the defense of the capital." This order had not been revoked, and, indeed, so far as the public was concerned, was the only actual authority under which General McClellan was doing any work at all, either in Washington or elsewhere.

How McClellan took command in the field is most graphically told in the Report of the Commit-

tee on the Conduct of the War (see General Upton's "Military Policy," p. 376). "Bragg in the West had begun his march toward the Ohio River, while Lee with renewed confidence was crossing into Maryland. For two or three days the President consulted his advisers, but with no satisfactory result. At last, assuming all the responsibility, he took the general-in-chief with him, turned his back on the War Department, and, without disclosing his purpose, proceeded to the home of General McClellan, where, for the moment, he brought the long controversy to a close by saying: 'General, you will take command of the forces in the field.' " This command was verbal only, and was in contradiction of the still standing official orders of the War Department of September 2. And the War Department then turned its back on both the President and General McClellan, issued no new orders, and did not revoke or modify the previous one.

As a result, everything that went to the eighty thousand men lying around Washington, or fearlessly riding through its streets and suburbs, and whatever was required for all the needs of society and recreation, "went to McClellan's army," and the people everywhere believed that it actually did. It was on the principle by which the husband compelled his wife to take the castor-oil prescribed for him, since they were married and were really both the same. And that is why the Army of the Potomac sat down to a Barmecide feast from the 17th

of September to the 15th of October, and then for the next two weeks had such a flood of clothing, food, and supplies poured in upon its hapless head that they could not be distributed, but were left in great piles at the depot or on the dumps when the army marched away from them, picking up what they could as they passed.

The following statement from the Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac will show the comparative numbers of the most essential supplies received at the different depots of the army actually in the field, and which could have been of any possible use only to the army in the field, for two different periods, the first up to October 15, from September 1, a period of forty-two days (six weeks); the second from October 15 up to October 31, a period of sixteen days (two weeks and two days):

AGGREGATE, FIRST 42 DAYS.

Coats and jackets.	17,500
Pairs stockings...	28,000
Pairs drawers....	27,700
Flannel and knit	
shirts	27,000
Trousers	16,000
Blankets	20
Boots and bootees.	19,000

Aggregate per day, 3220

AGGREGATE, SECOND 16 DAYS.

Coats and jackets.	33,000
Pairs stockings...	95,000
Pairs drawers....	70,000
Flannel and knit	
shirts	36,000
Trousers	77,500
Blankets	11,000
Boots and bootees.	77,000

Aggregate per day, 25,210

But Lee's army fared a little better. He got 5000 pairs of shoes while in Maryland; 6400 on

October 2. Jackson was getting 400 pairs per week, and Lee 8150 pairs when McClellan moved, while October 28, the Confederate Secretary of War reported nearly enough clothing to supply the army for the winter.

Colonel Ingalls, the chief quartermaster, says of this extreme slowness in supplying McClellan: "From this cause we were very late in receiving clothing, and *much of it arrived at Berlin too late for issue*, as the army was already on its march to White Plains, Warrenton, etc." Fifty thousand suits of clothing were left at Harper's Ferry, partly on the cars and partly in store.

General Meigs stated to Halleck, October 14, that 9254 horses had been "issued" to the Army of the Potomac *since* the battles in front of Washington; but the report of Quartermaster Myers, October 31, shows that only 3813 of these came to McClellan's own army; while, during the same period 3000 had been turned over to the Quartermaster's Department, from that army, as worn out; and 1500 more were unfit and diseased.

XX

THE GREAT MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER

THERE is no military movement in the art of war so fraught with danger, and almost certain disaster, as to endeavor to pass across the front of a vigilant and well-commanded enemy, even inferior in strength, by the flank. This is what McClellan accomplished in this great movement on Culpeper, in spite of all that Stonewall Jackson and Lee, with urgent orders, and Longstreet, attempted to prevent. Jackson, at Winchester, in the valley, faced McClellan's advance across his front, directly; but the gaps in the Blue Ridge were his only line, and McClellan, by a swift right-wheel in force, closed them, one by one, and left Jackson helpless and useless. As the Potomac was now, from lateness of season, unavailable to Lee, McClellan accepted the President's preference, to move up the east side of the mountains, and crossed the Potomac by pontoons, one at Berlin, just below Harper's Ferry, and the other at Harper's Ferry itself.

The movement commenced October 26,—five weeks after the last gun was fired at Antietam,—by a brigade of Pleasonton's cavalry and two

divisions of Burnside's Ninth Corps crossing at Berlin and taking the advance. Next day the other division of Burnside's Corps and the rest of Pleasonton's cavalry crossed, and the First and Sixth Corps followed. The Second and Fifth Corps crossed at Harper's Ferry, and by the 2nd of November the entire army was across, and started on the march. A day, in a heavy rain, was lost in supplying the army with what it could hastily pick up from the supplies just arriving. On the first of November the First Corps moved to Purcellsville, the Second to Woodgrove, the Fifth to Hillsborough, and the Sixth was marching out from Berlin. Pleasonton's cavalry occupied Philomont and Bloomfield. The army marched along the eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge, closing the gaps by cavalry and infantry as it advanced. The Twelfth Corps, with General Slocum and General Morell, were left to guard the north bank of the Potomac, from Harper's Ferry up to Sharpsburg and Williamsport.

The moment McClellan started, Lee started, with Longstreet's corps, up the Valley through Chester Gap to Culpeper, leaving Jackson near Winchester, with orders, of October 28, to that officer: "Should you find that the enemy is advancing from the Potomac east of those mountains, you will cross by either gap that will bring you in the best position to threaten his flank and cut off his communications." But Jackson was not able to do either. McClellan

advanced with such rapidity that Jackson was totally unable to strike a blow at the enemy's communications or to penetrate the gaps, or even save himself; so that when later on McClellan's army had advanced to within less than six miles of Culpeper, and was about to attack,—had begun the attack, in fact,—and Longstreet was forced to order battle with his own corps alone against McClellan's whole army, Jackson had been bottled up in the Valley, and was still back at Winchester, 125 miles away from Longstreet, by the nearest route he could take to rejoin him.

Stonewall Jackson won many laurels, and he deserved them all; but he never won any from McClellan. Against McDowell, at the First Bull Run, he won his badge of knighthood. In the Shenandoah Valley and beyond, against many commanders, his army became known as the foot-cavalry, and swept the valley up and down, at their pleasure. He played with Pope as a cat plays with mice, at Cedar Mountain and the Second Manassas, and when ready seized and shook him out of his skin. At Harper's Ferry against Miles—poor handicapped, broken-hearted, and syndicate-sacrificed Miles—he counted his loot like an Eastern potentate. At Fredericksburg, against Burnside, he held the Confederate right, and broke and baffled all who tried to touch him; and at Chancellorsville he was the incarnate spirit of victory against Hooker.

But when he touched McClellan the tale was different. When he, with Lee's great army of veterans to aid him, struck McClellan's right at Gaines' Mill, though outnumbered three to one, Fitz John Porter held him at bay under McClellan's eye and command until the night had fallen, and then marched across the Chickahominy to join the great movement already in progress to the James, leaving far fewer dead, and no wounded, than the Confederates left. At White Oak Swamp McClellan so fixed it that Jackson stood gazing, and could not attack at all; and when he could and did attack, at Malvern Hill, he sorely wished that he had not done so. At Antietam historians scarcely know of his place or his deeds; he was merely "one of those who also fought." And when McClellan, on his last grand movement up east of the mountains made him helpless to carry out his instructions to aid Longstreet's out-numbered and out-manuevered corps, or even to save himself, McClellan swiftly and securely bottled him up at Winchester, while his own splendid army swept onward to victory.

Lee speaks of McClellan's moving with more activity than usual. Colonel Ingalls says in his report: "The march from the Potomac at Berlin to Warrenton, where General McClellan left the army, was a magnificent spectacle of celerity and skill."

The public has always believed, or has been taught

to believe, that McClellan was removed from the command because he was slow. He certainly was not slow in getting Lee out of Maryland, eighty miles away and eight days after he was given command of the army; but this march of his army from the Potomac to Culpeper, by way of Warrenton, was one which has never been looked into, or compared, in the light of what has been called "the deadly parallel."

On October 25 the pontoon bridge was constructed at Berlin. At Harper's Ferry there was one across the Potomac and another was thrown across the mouth of the Shenandoah, to connect. Two of Burnside's divisions were sent over at Berlin, October 26. Burnside wrote McClellan a friendly letter on the morning of October 27, protesting against McClellan's rush; that the passage was already protected, and that he didn't want to move his other division during the storm, because the advance might be reduced by sickness by the time its supports got up. McClellan consented. October 28 McClellan wrote Lincoln that headquarters were at Berlin; that Franklin's troops were all over; that Reynolds was massed at Berlin, completing his supplies of clothing "to-day and early to-morrow"; and that McClellan was about starting for Lovettsville.

But to learn from original sources the dispositions and movements of the units of McClellan's army from this time on until, and,—at Burn-

side's request,—for a few days subsequent to, his removal, volume LI of the Official Records must be consulted. Most of these papers had been removed from the files, or for some reason had disappeared,—possibly by the means which Pope so fiercely charged against Halleck in the West (see Chapter xxxv), so that nearly all of the most important of these papers could not be included at all in volume XIX, where they belonged. They were subsequently discovered, and have been inserted in the Supplemental Volume, which was not published until 1897, ten years after the publication of the volume in which they chronologically belong. By means of these dispatches and other papers we are now enabled to determine precisely what McClellan was doing each day, where he was operating, and what means he was employing to accomplish his purposes. In fact, all the significant papers will be found only in the Supplemental (LI) Volume.

McClellan's orders to Pleasonton, of 1.30 A. M., Sunday, October 26, are very explicit. He was to cross the bridge at 9 A. M.,—one of Burnside's divisions to precede and another to follow him,—and was to move the same day to Lovettsville, and next day to Purcellsville, there to be reinforced by Devens. He was to leave everything behind which would impede his movements for the next three days. Next day Sturgis with his division (of the Ninth Corps) was ordered to move at twelve o'clock to Lovettsville. The same day McClellan

orders Franklin to send Averell with a strong cavalry force to make a reconnaissance toward Martinsburg. If Franklin finds that the enemy's infantry has moved toward Winchester, then Franklin was to move to Berlin and cross at once, "prepared to march next morning." October 29 Couch's Corps moved from Harper's Ferry around Loudon Heights, and on the morning of October 30 Reynolds crossed his corps at Berlin, Meade's division at 7.30, Rickett's at 9, and Doubleday's at 11 o'clock. October 29 Sturgis was ordered to move at daylight next morning to Purcellsville, to communicate with Whipple near Hillsborough. He was to avoid interfering with Getty and Whipple marching on the same road. Getty was then, the same day, ordered to Bolington, and from thence to Wheatland, starting at daylight. Stoneman's cavalry was ordered to connect with Getty.

October 30 Fitz John Porter's Fifth Corps marched at 1 P. M. from Sharpsburg to Weverton, in Pleasant Valley, on the Potomac. Same day Franklin's Corps moved from Hagerstown by way of Keedysville, to Berlin. The same day the Ninth Corps was far in advance, with Sturgis at the intersection of four roads near Hillsborough, and with artillery on the flank, Getty in reserve one mile in rear to the left, in position to support Sturgis. Pleasonton was holding back Jackson's advance from the valley, in Snicker's Gap. Next day, November 1,—on orders of the preceding day,—Rey-

nolds with the First Corps moved by the front, passing Burnside by the flank, and took up position between Snickersville and Hamilton. Couch with the Second Corps moved forward between Woodgrove and Snickersville, and Pleasanton to Philomont, picketing the Snickersville and Aldie Road, and on to Upperville.

By these maneuvers Jackson was shut off from forcing Snicker's Gap and striking McClellan's communications opposite Berryville and twenty miles up from the Potomac.

Meantime Sykes, of the Fifth Corps, on the night of October 31 was ordered to march past Humphreys' division and camp near Couch. The order reads: "While continuing to supply your command with what it needs, you will hold it in readiness for active operations."

It will also be seen from these maneuvers, that a great army in the presence of the enemy does not march like a gentleman taking a morning walk or a commercial traveler trying to catch a train, but by a series of co-operative moves, like those of the pieces of a chessboard, the combined result being some important point in strategy which will call "check" to the enemy in one direction, then in another, and finally, if properly carried out, "check-mate."

Battles, in a properly conducted war, are only accidents. In the great Ulm campaign of Napoleon, a type of the highest war, there was no battle to

be called a battle at all, yet Napoleon captured three separate armies outnumbering his own, crushed Austria, captured her capital, and drove away a Russian army. Says the historian: "Fifty-four thousand prisoners, 12,000 killed and wounded, 200 guns, 80 standards, and 5000 horses were the trophies of the campaign." The entire French loss was 6000 men.

It has been seen that by reason of the woeful demoralization of the three combined armies in the Pope campaign, McClellan had to reorganize his army on the march to Antietam; and so, here, he had to supply his army on the march to Culpeper. The army was now glutted. For the previous six weeks it had been starved; for the previous six weeks it had been naked and shoeless; now on the march it had more clothing and shoes than it had strength to carry or time to put on.

To Pleasonton McClellan writes on the evening of October 31: "Burnside will advance beyond Reynolds on the 2nd. I think we shall continue to advance from to-morrow."

November 1 he orders Couch with his Second Corps to enter Snicker's Gap and attack and carry it at once. "General F. J. Porter will follow you with his corps." Should there be no enemy there, he was to leave a force and push on, which he did. General Pleasonton was at the same time ordered to advance and seize the Manassas Gap railroad at Springfield. November 2 the Fifth Corps passed

the Second Corps, General Porter asking Couch to see that his wagons should not interfere with Porter's marching. On the night of November 1 Averell with his cavalry was ordered to leave off observing the Shenandoah Valley, beyond the mountains, and join Pleasonton by a forced march.

The concerted movements then went on to close Ashby's Gap or fight the enemy, if he appeared there. November 2 Hancock held Snicker's Gap, and dispersed with his artillery a Confederate force of 5000 or 6000 that advanced to retake it. November 3 Couch's Second and Burnside's Ninth corps were ordered to Upperville, the entrance to Ashby's Gap. November 4 Ashby's Gap was occupied in force, and held, and the cavalry was pushed on to Piedmont. The same day the First Corps was pushed forward to Rectortown, on the Manassas Gap railroad, between that point and White Plains. Couch still held Ashby's Gap, now in rear, with orders to be ready to march south. The same day the Sixth Corps was ordered to Upperville, and Burnside was ordered to push on next morning to Salem, beyond the Manassas Gap railroad.

At the same time Pleasonton was ordered *to move on with his cavalry toward Chester Gap and down the road thence to Culpeper Court House*. Averell had had a heavy engagement with Stuart, and Pleasonton was asked to find out and report his losses. November 5 Reynolds with his First Corps was ordered to move next morning as far in the

direction of Warrenton as possible, by way of Salem, and Bayard's cavalry was sent in rear of Warrenton. Sigel—from Washington—was now at Thoroughfare Gap, in the Bull Run Mountains.

On the night of November 5 Pleasonton was ordered to concentrate Averell's brigade with his own force and *move upon Little Washington and Sperryville. Chester Gap had already been sealed,—*the gap through which Longstreet had passed south,—and Pleasonton's move, when supported by infantry, would close Thornton's Gap, the last available gap which Jackson could use down to Swift Run Gap thirty miles behind Lee and Longstreet, who were then at Culpeper.

November 6 McClellan occupied Warrenton in force, with the First Corps. Couch, with the Second Corps, was ordered *to follow Burnside's Ninth Corps to Waterloo; Pleasanton to Little Washington and Sperryville; and Franklin to White Plains,* with Fitz John Porter moving to the same point. The same day Burnside was ordered to push on to *Waterloo, occupying that place by that night with at least a division.* Sigel was ordered forward from Thoroughfare Gap to New Baltimore.

At night, November 6, Sickles was ordered to push a portion of his force to Warrenton Junction, from Manassas Junction, and repair the railroad as he advanced.

Bayard's cavalry was at the same time ordered to turn Warrenton and reach the upper Rappahan-

nock, keeping in touch with Burnside on his right. November 7 Bayard was ordered to scout the Rappahannock from Waterloo to the crossing of the Orange and Alexandria railroad. Sumner was ordered to Cedar Run, Franklin to New Baltimore, Reynolds in front of Warrenton, Bayard across the Rappahannock, and Pleasonton to near Sperryville; general headquarters to move next morning to Warrenton. The Ninth Corps was directed to Miller's Ford and Orleans, with Sturgis in front, *on the direct road to Culpeper, where Longstreet's corps lay*. The same date Sturgis was ordered to *Amissville and Jefferson*. "The general commanding," the order reads, "relies upon your prompt and efficient services in this matter, *as an important movement is impending*." Pleasonton at the same time was notified that Sturgis was at Amissville, with his other brigade and two batteries, as he was directed to assume command of the division and co-operate with Pleasonton, "so as to enable you to carry out your instructions. He will send the two regiments at Amissville to Jefferson. Should you need further assistance, send a despatch to me [the corps commander] through General Stoneman at Waterloo, who has thrown a bridge over the river at that place."

We are now able to locate and determine the positions, distances, and movements of all the components of McClellan's army, and to determine what McClellan's plan was with such certainty that the

record will stand against any denial, even if he himself had denied it. Comparing the above with Longstreet's paper, cited in Chapter XXIII, it will be seen that Longstreet's proposition had been entirely anticipated and neutralized.

The order relieving McClellan was issued on the 5th, but was not received until late on Thursday, November 7. Burnside asked McClellan to continue in charge for a couple of days, until he could get his plans perfected. McClellan did so, and arranged the movements so that they continued even after McClellan had left the army, on the 10th, for Burnside did not assume active command, or issue any orders, or interfere with any movements, until November 15. (See Halleck's report, War Records, vol. XXI, p. 47, and Burnside's report, p. 101.)

Halleck says "General Burnside did not commence his movement from Warrenton until the 15th." Burnside says that, on receipt of a telegram from Halleck informing him that the President approved his plan, sent November 14, "*arrangements for a move were commenced by drawing in the extreme right to the neighborhood of Warrenton.*" The extreme right was at that time in the immediate front of Longstreet at Culpeper Court House, and in battle contact, so that all the movements up to this time, November 15, were McClellan's, and the coming battle had been already established—"The Battle of Culpeper Court House," as it would have been known in history.

XXI

CELERITY OF ARMY'S ADVANCE—COMPARISON WITH OTHER MOVEMENTS

Now we are in a position to consider the question of McClellan's celerity or slowness, on which, ostensibly at least, depended his retention or removal.

This route now traversed by McClellan—for the first time by any Union army—was afterward traversed by other armies. For example, Meade, after Lee had recrossed the Potomac in July, 1863, passed up to Culpeper over the same route precisely; and Lee, on his great flanking movement toward Centerville in the fall of the same year, did so likewise; and Lee also, in his march to Gettysburg, moved over pretty nearly the same route north to the Potomac, except that he, with Longstreet's corps, entered the Shenandoah Valley from Upper-ville.

The distance in an air-line from the bridges at Harper's Ferry and Berlin, to Culpeper Court House is sixty-five miles; by the roads one-third more. McClellan commenced his crossing of the Potomac by two pontoon bridges October 26. A

delay of a day occurred—on Burnside's protest—on account of a severe storm and to supply his troops with delayed clothing. On November 8 Pleasonton was at Amissville, seven miles in front of Culpeper Court House, with his whole division, and with his advance near Culpeper; and, calling for the infantry, Sturgis's division of the Ninth Corps, with artillery, moved up to his support and *attacked the enemy next day, November 9.*

From the report, November 6, of Colonel Alexander, Lee's chief of artillery, we find: "Longstreet's corps in position about Culpeper. Large force of enemy advancing toward the Rappahannock, and continued hot skirmishing of the cavalry in front."

From Pleasonton's report: "From the 7th instant my advance pickets were at Hazel River, within six miles of Culpeper."

Sickles reports, November 8: "General Bayard occupies Rappahannock station."

Willcox, with the Ninth Corps, reports same day: "Ferrero's brigade started across Miller's Ford at 1.40; took with him Dickenson's battery. Two regiments were ordered to Amissville, and then to Jefferson. Stoneman has commenced building a bridge at Waterloo."

Same date, November 8, Lee writes to Jackson, in the valley, near Winchester: "Since my letter to you of the 6th the enemy has occupied Warrenton and reached Amissville from Salem, via Orleans.

There is said to be, in the vicinity of Amissville, a large force, infantry, cavalry, and artillery. There is also a large force of cavalry at Jefferson, and his cavalry last night was at Rappahannock Station. Stuart has fallen back to Hazel River."

Willcox, corps commander, writes November 9: "I have ordered General Sturgis to Amissville with his other brigade and two batteries. He is directed to assume command of the division and co-operate with you, so as to enable you to carry out your instructions."

So now we have, on November 9, at least a whole division of infantry and one of cavalry at Amissville, in front of Culpeper, with their own divisional artillery and extra batteries, and all ready to advance at once, *according to instructions* already given. The remainder of the army was bivouacked within supporting distance, the most of it within less than a day's marching distance, and Pleasanton's cavalry and part of the infantry were at Hazel River in front, and in contact with Longstreet's corps.

General Lee reports, November 10, that the Union advanced forces were attacked by Stuart with a brigade of cavalry and two regiments of infantry, and driven back upon Amissville; and that at Amissville three brigades of infantry advanced upon Stuart and drove him back.

McClellan's time consumed in reaching Amissville and the line of the Rappahannock, and pass-

ing it with his cavalry, and bridging it, with his infantry, and with his whole army prepared for battle and within easy supporting distance, was from October 26, when two divisions crossed, or November 2, when all were across, to November 8, or November 9 at the latest. The extreme time is therefore thirteen days, and the actual time from the completion of the crossing to the infantry occupation of Amissville is seven days.

The marching distance is ninety miles; air-line distance, sixty.

Now Meade, in July, 1863, crossed by the same bridges, with an extra one, however, at Berlin. He marched over the same roads, seized and held the same passes in the same way, followed Longstreet as McClellan did, and moved by Warrenton and the mountain slope to Amissville and the Upper Rappahannock.

Meade's itinerary is given in Volume xxvii of the Official Records. The crossing commenced July 17, the last corps, the Sixth and Eleventh, crossing July 19. All were across July 20. July 30 the cavalry reached Amissville.

General Howard reports, July 30: "Culpeper Court House, Brandy Station, and Stevensville being occupied by the Rebel army; Longstreet's and Stuart's cavalry are said to be there; all the fords along the Rappahannock guarded."

Scouts were, however, out toward the Rappahannock, and at noon, July 30, engineers reached the

river and were at the station, and a point for throwing a bridge was being selected.

We have, therefore, the time for Meade's movement,—from July 17 to July 30 as the extreme time,—thirteen days, the same as McClellan; and actual time from completion of the crossing to the cavalry occupation of Amissville, and of infantry at the Rappahannock below, ten days, which is three days in excess of the time consumed by McClellan.

In R. H. Anderson's report of the Gettysburg campaign he gives the itinerary of the Confederate march from Culpeper to Shepherdstown, which is much the same distance as McClellan and Meade covered from the Potomac to Culpeper. Anderson's was a simple march of his own division, with no maneuvering, no presence of the enemy, and no considerations except those of the ordinary service-marching of a large organization. His division left Culpeper June 17 and reached Shepherdstown June 23, too late to cross it that day. This gave the marching time of seven days, which is precisely the number of days occupied by McClellan in marching, maneuvering, and fighting his entire army over substantially the same ground.

General Kershaw's actual marching time from the Potomac to Culpeper, on his return march from Gettysburg, is given in his official report as seven days, arriving July 24. This was the same time for Kershaw's brigade as for McClellan's whole army.

In Lee's foot-race with Meade, in October, 1863, for Centerville, Lee marched from Culpeper to near Broad Run,—commencing his march October 9 and ending his advance in the evening of October 14,—and occupied six days. Meade's parallel movement occupied the same time. The distance was just one-half that from the Potomac to Culpeper.

In the Pope campaign Longstreet's force was sent from Richmond to Gordonsville by rail, August 16. Longstreet thence commenced his infantry movement against Pope. Time was everything to Lee, because, while Longstreet was moving from Richmond to Jackson's aid and against Pope, McClellan was moving from Richmond to Pope's aid, and against Lee. It was a foot-race also. But Longstreet did not reach Jackson's hard-pressed lines until three corps of the Army of the Potomac had by a longer foot-march reached the field—on August 29, a period of thirteen days. Yet by the route taken by Longstreet from Gordonsville the distance was ten miles shorter than that from the Potomac to Culpeper.

And to cite a historic example, when there was no enemy to oppose, and beautiful broad fields and roads to march over, in the inspiring Southern atmosphere of December, and when in their enthusiasm it is said that the sweet potatoes even started from the ground—I refer to Sherman's march from Atlanta to the sea. Colonels Bowen and Irwin, in their *Military Biography* of that splendid soldier, say:

"Thus, on the 10th of December, 1864, the enemy's forces, under Hardee, were driven within the immediate defenses of Savannah, and Sherman's entire army, having leisurely marched over three hundred miles in twenty-four days with trifling opposition through the whole of the enemy's country, was massed in front of the city."

Sherman's march may have been leisurely, but a great many people, including Grant and Lincoln, were "almighty anxious to know where he was at." Had Sherman kept up the gait that McClellan did, on the march when the latter was removed for "slowness," Grant and Lincoln and all the rest of us would have heard from Sherman, at Savannah, a number of days before the 10th of December; for a little calculation will show that the Army of the Potomac covered more ground per day than the men who proudly nicknamed themselves "Sherman's Bummers"; of whom, for a couple of years, I myself was one.

In the Vicksburg campaign of 1863 Sherman's force marched on Jackson, Miss., and assaulted and captured the place. Celerity here also was vital, in view of separating Johnston from Pemberton. Sherman marched from Grand Gulf (see Grant's "Memoirs") May 6, and reached the works in front of Jackson May 14, a period of nine days. The marching distance was ten miles shorter than from the Potomac to the Rappahannock, where McClellan reached the river.

Another historic case of rapid marching is cited in Major Adams' "Great Campaigns" (from 1796), a work which no military student can afford to overlook. In the Friedland campaign of 1807, Benning-sen attempted to surprise Napoleon's left (Bernadotte) by rapid marching. After marching seventy miles in ten days, he failed in his attempt, and halted for the following three days on account of fatigue and want of food. Bernadotte did not know that such a movement was even under way.

On the pursuit of Lee's army from Petersburg to Appomattox, the pursuit was under full headway on the morning of April 3, and, considering Sheridan's move from Five Forks, earlier. The surrender took place on the forenoon of the 9th, giving a marching time of a little less than seven days. The distance from Five Forks to Appomattox, where Sheridan passed Lee and closed on his front, is almost precisely the distance from Harper's Ferry, or Berlin, to Culpeper. And yet the speed was so great that Grant's forces had long outmarched his wagons, and even his ammunition, and Grant, in one of his conversations with John Russell Young (which Grant himself revised before publication) said: "My pursuit of Lee was hazardous. I was in a position of extreme difficulty. You see, I was marching away from my supplies, while Lee was falling back on his supplies. If Lee had continued his flight another day I should have had to abandon the pursuit, fall back on Danville, build

the railroad, and feed my army. So far as supplies were concerned, I was almost at my last gasp when the surrender took place." (See "Around the World with General Grant," vol. ii, page 460.)

In Adams' "Great Campaigns," p. 606, criticizing the projected march, from Dijou to Blesme, of Bourbaki, with an army of nearly 200,000 men, to cut the transportations of the Germans, then besieging Paris, and with no enemy along the line, the distance being 94 miles, he gives for this urgent advance a marching rate of $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles per day. This chapter, and also "Comments on Bourbaki's Operations," explains Grant's anxiety, in the Appomattox campaign, to settle his advance there without penetrating further southwest.

Such examples can be multiplied, from the Official Records, to any extent desired. In fact, I took the daily itinerary of a three years' regiment in the Army of the Potomac, which entered the service early in 1861, and added up all its marches under different army commanders and divided the total for each commander by the number of days of service, and used the official itineraries of other organizations from 1864 to the end of the war to complete the record, and compared with them the corresponding itineraries of the troops of McClellan and other commanders, and the results were so startling to me that I refrain from giving them. Suffice it to say that, after counting as a whole McClellan's entire period of command in Eastern Virginia and Mary-

land,—15½ months,—and including in the count all his periods of rest, march, recuperation, organization, and reorganization, his average daily army march for all these months taken together was in excess of that of any other army commander East or West for equal periods. He fought more pitched battles, won more victories, inflicted greater losses on the enemy, and at less cost to his own army, for the same period than any other commanding general during the whole four years from April, 1861, to the end of the war. Any one can verify these facts who chooses to take the pains; which, with considerable labor and a careful study and grouping of the itineraries of all our armies and all separate parts of those armies, I have done, from the Official War Records.

XXII

LONGSTREET ISOLATED—JACKSON CUT OFF—LEE
BEWILDERED—THE CAMPAIGN WON—THE
ARMIES FACE TO FACE AT CULPEPER, PROPOR-
TION 3 TO 1

WE are now in a position to take a broad view of the final epoch of the Maryland campaign of 1862, that is, of the movement from the Potomac along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge to Sperryville and Culpeper, and also along the Orange and Alexander railroad to the upper Rappahannock. This whole movement forced Longstreet back to Culpeper Court House and cut off Jackson, far behind at Winchester, from entering the Gaps, and compelled him to rejoin Longstreet, if at all, by a movement from Winchester up the Shenandoah Valley to Swift Run Gap, and thence back to Culpeper, an air-line distance of 100 miles and a marching distance of about 125 or 130. We shall find that at the culmination, when Longstreet issued his order of battle on the morning of November 16, Longstreet was at Culpeper and Jackson at Winchester, with McClellan's army squarely interposed between the two, and within infantry and artillery

firing-contact with Longstreet. The battle had, in fact, actually commenced.

The forces on the opposite sides (see Volume XXI, Official War Records) were at this moment, just before Burnside took active command, as follows :

McClellan's army consisted of 268 regiments of infantry, 18 regiments of cavalry, and 73 batteries of artillery, the largest force by far which McClellan ever carried into battle, and which a few weeks afterward Burnside broke and shattered to pieces against the heights of Fredericksburg.

Against this force of McClellan's stood Longstreet's corps, including all the forces with him, which consisted of $89\frac{1}{2}$ regiments of infantry, 15 regiments of cavalry, and 45 batteries, which latter comprised also all the *reserve* artillery of Lee's army.

McClellan's preponderance was in the proportion of nearly or quite 3 to 1.

Jackson's force, near Winchester, and entirely cut off and eliminated by McClellan's swift advance, and the holding of all the mountain passes by heavy bodies of infantry and artillery, consisted of 91 regiments of infantry, 3 regiments and 2 battalions of cavalry, and 23 batteries, comprising about one-half of the whole Army of Northern Virginia. This latter, in all, counted 180 regiments of infantry, 19 regiments of cavalry, and 68 batteries of artillery. For the first time McClellan's artillery

exceeded all that of Lee, while previously it had always been very much less than Lee's. The proportion of all McClellan's organizations, regiments and batteries, to all of Lee's, including both the divided halves, was a little less than 2 to 1.

And this was the proportion, also, when Burnside fought the battle of Fredericksburg. At Chancellorsville Lee had one-third less.

McClellan's advance did what had never been done before, so far as the official records reveal, with reference to Lee himself. It paralyzed and bewildered him, and his official despatches show this bewilderment so clearly that no amount of explanation can affect the facts disclosed.

Within forty-eight hours, from November 7, Lee issued four different written orders for action against McClellan, all incompatible with one another, and not one capable of being carried out, and not one of which was even attempted to be carried out; while the final order of battle, early on the 16th, was issued by Longstreet alone, and was contrary to all the other orders.

November 7 Lee wrote Stuart: "Should we be pressed back from here [Culpeper Court House], my design is to retire through Madison, while Jackson ascends the valley, so that a junction can be made through Swift Run Gap, and we hold ourselves on the enemy's right flank if he attempts to proceed southward."

November 8 he writes to Jackson: "It is more

necessary than ever that you should move up the valley, since Swift Run Gap is now the nearest one open to you, unless the road through Fisher's is practicable."

November 9 he writes to Jackson: "The enemy's object may be to seize upon Strasburg with his main force, to intercept your ascent of the valley. This would oblige you to cross into the Lost River Valley [into the Alleghanies], or west of it, unless you could force a passage through the Blue Ridge; hence my anxiety for your safety. If you can prevent such a movement of the enemy, and operate strongly upon his flank and rear through the gaps of the Blue Ridge, you would certainly, in my opinion, effect the object you propose. A demonstration of crossing into Maryland would serve the same purpose, and might call him back to the Potomac."

November 9, at night, he writes to Stuart: "Can you ascertain what he is doing in your front; if he is stationary, or what he is about? If he moves into the valley, I will advance Longstreet's corps to cut off his communication with the railroad."

November 10 he writes to Jackson: "As soon as you think that your presence in that portion of the valley will not retard or prevent the advance of the enemy east of the Blue Ridge, I wish you to advance with all celerity to unite with Longstreet's corps."

Jackson was still at the same place, however, even a week later.

The same day, November 10, Lee writes the War Department: "Should the enemy descend into the valley, General Longstreet will attack his rear and cut off his communications. The enemy is, apparently, so strong in numbers that I think it preferable to attempt to baffle his designs by maneuvering rather than to resist his advance by main force."

As a result of all these orders, and all these maneuverings, nothing at all was done. Jackson's half of Lee's army lay idle at Winchester, and Longstreet's half, at Culpeper, confronted McClellan, who was more than three times as strong as Longstreet, and twice as strong as Lee's whole army had it been united.

Meantime, however, the inspiring spirit of the whole had passed away. McClellan was removed from the command and Burnside put in his stead, and the movements instituted by McClellan and carried on at Burnside's request even after McClellan's removal, had spent their force. The army and, visibly to Lee, its cavalry, infantry, and artillery, opposite Longstreet at Culpeper, became gradually quiescent. Lee was more bewildered than ever. Stuart, on the 10th, was ordered to penetrate this mysterious screen, and he drove back our advance, but was met by the Ninth Corps and forced to retire, and the mystery in front became deeper than ever.

During this interval Burnside had evolved his plan: to abandon Lee and Longstreet and Jackson to their own devices, and march, by the left flank,

thirty miles away to Falmouth. Here the river, so little where he now was, had become a mighty stream, with Nature's own fortifications beyond, far stronger defenses than man could build,—defenses which frowned from their impregnable heights over the town and over the deep and wide Rappahannock, and confronted the heights at Falmouth on the northern bank, too far away from the Confederate lines to be dangerous to the defending Confederate army.

And this plan was carried by Halleck to Washington on the 9th, and there the wiseacres sat in judgment upon it, and Burnside waited. November 13 Burnside could not wait longer, and urged Halleck, if possible, to send him a definite answer. And then, November 14, Halleck sent him an approval, in the name of the President; but given with such Halleckian conditions that, if Burnside should succeed, the credit would belong to Halleck, and if he should fail the blame would fall upon Burnside. All the official reports establish this.

Then on the 15th, and not till then, the new commander of the army waked up, and ordered the retirement to Fredericksburg. An unwonted activity prevailed along Longstreet's front; our troops of all arms were in motion. The military eye and mind of Lee and Longstreet could not conceive that an advantage such as Napoleon at Boulogne had worked many months to achieve could be thrown away merely to discredit its author, and the crisis

of the campaign was felt to be upon them. There was now to be no movement to Swift Run Gap to join Jackson and "hang on McClellan's flank," if he tried to move south; there was to be no march of Jackson up the valley to unite before the battle with Longstreet; there was to be no falling upon McClellan's rear, to cut his communications with the railroad; there was to be no advance of Jackson into Maryland to call back McClellan to the Potomac.

There was to be a battle then and there, at Culpeper Court House, on the 16th day of November, to be known to history as the "Battle of Culpeper," in which McClellan's whole army, three to one, was to be hurled straight forward upon one-half of Lee's army. The other half was 125 miles in the rear across a sealed-up range of mountains, with McClellan squarely between, so that McClellan, after Longstreet had been disposed of and his beaten fragments pursued and scattered or destroyed by an overwhelming force of one-half McClellan's army, could with the remaining half of his men himself turn back through the coveted gaps south of Jackson, close in upon him, and defeat and destroy his other half of Lee's army, or drive it, as Lee had said, across the western mountains into "Lost River Valley, or west of it," and then turn to follow up the debris of Longstreet. Longstreet must stand fast and fight where he was, or else lose either Richmond, or Jackson, or both, and, in any case his own army, as an army. At this moment Long-

street's corps lay in front of Culpeper Court House. The Army of the Potomac stretched from Hazel River, four miles in front of Longstreet's position (commencing several miles west, with the Ninth Corps in front of Thornton's Gap), and extending in a continuous series of positions to the front of Warrenton—with our left near the Rappahannock River, at the Station. Our entire army was concentrated—the two projecting flanks excepted, and they connected—along an air-line of fifteen miles. Our right covered, by a short extension, Milan's and Swift Run Gaps, with Madison Court House midway, and in front, on the Rapidan. Jackson's Confederate corps lay to the north, distant 50 miles in an air-line, across the mountains, and by the gaps a march of 125 miles.

XXIII

LONGSTREET'S BATTLE-ORDER — BURNSIDE'S RE- TREAT—LEE'S GREAT RELIEF

So on November 16, on or before the morning dawn, we may be sure, Longstreet issued his battle-order for that day, to be found only in Volume LI, part 2, pp. 645-6, Official War Records.

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 49.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,
November 16, 1862.

The troops of this command will be held in readiness for battle upon a moment's notice. Commanders will see that provisions, ammunition, and transportation are at hand and in such quantities as may be wanted to meet their necessities. The Commanding General relies upon the valor and patriotism of these well-tried troops to sustain them in the struggles that they may be called upon to encounter. Officers, be cool and take care of your men. Soldiers, remain steady in your ranks, take good aim, and obey the orders of your officers. Observe these injunctions, and your general will be responsible for the issue.

By command of **LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LONGSTREET.**

I find no similar order from Longstreet during the whole course of the war; it was like a last will and testament.

General Pleasonton was entirely right when he wrote back, from Corbin's Cross-roads, to his corps commander, November 10: "Jackson has no cavalry except some few for scouts. Leave a strong force to face Jackson, covering Warrenton and its junction, with a corps of observation at Barbee's; push your forces down to Culpeper vigorously, inclining to the right, *to take in Woodville and Madison. Give us ten days more of good weather and wind up the campaign in a blaze of glory.*"

Yes, these were the "carrying out of his instructions" in the Ninth Corps commander's letter of November 9; the infantry of Sturgis, and Stoneman's cavalry, and the artillery had come on, on that same day, to Amissville and Jefferson; Pleasonton was extended away over west to Sperryville on the foot-hills of the Blue Ridge. He was carrying out McClellan's instructions. Poor man! He knew, to his heart's sorrow, that McClellan was lost to the army; but he did not know, he could not believe, that everything else was for years, in that day, lost with McClellan.

By referring to map 1, sheet LXXIV, of the atlas accompanying the Official War Records, the positions of the respective armies can be clearly understood. The successive gaps in the Blue Ridge from the Potomac to far beyond Swift Run Gap are all laid down, and it will be seen that Snicker's, Ashby's, Manassas, Thoroughfare, Chester, and Thornton's gaps were all closed and sealed by McClellan,

while Longstreet, at Culpeper Court House, was more than twenty miles southeast of the nearest of them in the flat country between the Rapidan and the Rappahannock. The intervening country was covered by McClellan's army, so that for either Longstreet or Jackson to reach the other the entire Army of the Potomac must first have been attacked and defeated by either half of Lee's army.

Of Pleasonton's ability to perceive and understand a military situation I cite the following opinion of General Sickles, in the *North American Review* for March, 1891 :

"Pleasonton, chief of the cavalry corps, made his arm superior to that of the enemy in every equal combat. Besides, he was gifted with rare military intuitions. He sent Buford, with our strongest cavalry division, to Gettysburg when nobody had divined the place chosen by Lee to concentrate his army for the battle. He sent Gregg to our right to encounter Stuart and thwart his movement to our rear; on the third day, the day of Pickett's assault, he sent Kilpatrick on our left, where the enemy attempted a similar diversion, but was defeated."

Regarding McClellan's plans and operations, we have a powerful corroboration from the principal Confederate actor in the events described, except that when he made his statement he was not aware that McClellan's plans and operations, at Burnside's request, were being fully carried out for some days after McClellan's removal from command, no active

part having been taken by Burnside until consent to act in another direction had been received from Washington, November 14-15.

General Longstreet, in his article on the Battle of Fredericksburg ("Battles and Leaders," vol. III, p. 84; Century Company), written long before the publication of the Supplemental Volume LI, of the War Records, which first published the facts, correctly states what McClellan—at the time of his removal—had purposed to do. Longstreet never knew that McClellan's plans had been already practically accomplished before Burnside took command, and that the gaps which Longstreet refers to as possibly open, were by November 9 hermetically sealed by the Ninth Corps and all McClellan's cavalry, under Pleasonton, down past Hazel River, and well on to Madison Court House and beyond.

The following is the extract from Longstreet's article above referred to :

"Burnside made a mistake from the first. He should have gone from Warrenton to Chester Gap. He might then have held Jackson and fought me, or have held me and fought Jackson, thus taking us in detail. The doubt about the matter was whether or not he could have caught me in that trap before we could concentrate. At any rate, that was the only move on the board that could have benefited him at the time he was assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac. By interposing between the corps of Lee's army he would

have secured strong ground and advantage of position.

"With skill equal to the occasion he should have had success.

"This was the move about which we felt serious apprehension, and we were occupying our minds with plans to meet it when the move toward Fredericksburg was reported. General McClellan, in his report of August 4, 1863, speaks of this move as that upon which he was studying when the order for Burnside's assignment to command reached him."

There was no battle; it turned out to be a huge but very pleasant joke on Longstreet, and he found it out as soon as his battle-order was sent out; and when he and Lee saw the great Army of the Potomac marching off as if in retreat, the snappy orders came from Lee like whip-cracks, to McLaws, and Ransom, and Anderson, and Pickett, and Alexander, who went gaily trooping away, on interior lines, to Fredericksburg, and Jackson, with McClellan and all his troublesome attentions out of the way, was making those long-legged tracks of his up the valley, not away up to Swift Run Gap this time, but anywhere, all the gaps open, to join Longstreet and have a good time. (See orders, in the War Records, to each of the above commanders.)

McClellan left the army. General Emory Upton, then commanding a volunteer regiment, tells of the army's "demonstrations and applause," and how he and his own regiment stood, by his orders, cold and

silent because he was the son of an Abolitionist, and an Abolitionist himself. But when afterward confronted with the true facts he learned to know McClellan; he vindicated him; and his later and better judgment found vent: "Twice I destroyed all that I had finished, because it fell short of carrying conviction. It may astonish you that I now regard McClellan in his military character as a much abused man"; that "the differences of opinion between him and the Administration would probably never have arisen but for the interference of Stanton. He was at the bottom of all the disasters of the year 1862." (See General Michie's biography and letters of Upton.)

XXIV

WAR DEPARTMENT STRATEGY, CONFEDERATE AND UNION

To show the almost irresistible power of the malific civilian cabal at Washington, to which Lincoln himself was subjected, I cite an incident showing General Meade's extreme peril many months even after the battle of Gettysburg, from which peril Lincoln was able to save him, and probably the army, and the cause of the Union, only by strategy, by fighting fire with fire. Lincoln had once half-jestingly said: "You must understand that I have very little influence with this Administration"; and again, without any jest, had cried: "I am so borne upon." And indeed, in the extremity of his embarrassment, had offered to resign the Presidency to obtain relief. The incident I quote is taken from the authorized biography of Zachariah Chandler, a senator who was all-powerful in the cabal to which I refer, and the origin of which I have referred to elsewhere in this volume.

"At the War Department Mr. Chandler was as well known (and was reputed to be scarcely less powerful than) as the Secretary himself." See "The

Detroit Post and Tribune [his own newspaper] Biography, 1880."

"The Committee on the Conduct of the War did not believe that the selection of General Meade for the command of the Army of the Potomac was a fortunate one. . . . It is a fact that they recommended the removal of General Meade from the command, and the reinstatement of Hooker. On the 4th of March, 1864, Mr. Chandler and Mr. Wade called upon the President, and told him that they believed it to be their duty, impressed as they were with the testimony the Committee had taken, to lay a copy of it before him, and in behalf of the army and the country demand the removal of General Meade and the appointment of some one more competent to command. The President asked what general they could recommend. They said that for themselves they would be content with General Hooker, believing him to be competent.

"They said that Congress had appointed the Committee to watch the conduct of the war; and unless the state of things should be soon changed, it would become their duty to make the testimony public which they had taken, with such comments as the circumstances of the case seemed to require." (See Biography of Senator Chandler, page 245.)

It will be seen that this threat is almost *verbatim* the threat which Pope made to Halleck on October 30, 1862, and which was sufficiently powerful to cause the removal of McClellan as soon as the letter

reached Washington, November 4-5, and while our final victory was already in hand, and which removal gave us two more years of war besides countless treasure and hundreds of thousands of brave men lost. (See statement of General Upton.)

Lincoln had yielded then, but he had had fifteen months' experience since, and while, even now, he was not strong enough to force the cabal, he was strong or skillful enough to force their hand.

The Chandler biography says: "Meade was not removed, but General Grant was, within a week, given command as general-in-chief."

Grant was too strong for the cabal, and for Stanton and Halleck. Meade was safe.

It was not only in the Union army that this interference of the Secretary of War appeared. In the Confederate army it manifested itself. It is true in only a modified form, for it came by indirect authority of the President, but it could not be tolerated in any form, and it was instantly seized and crushed and a barrier erected to make its repetition impossible ever afterward. Well would it have been for the cause of the Union and the success of its armies had the like treatment been accorded a usurping Secretary here, for license grows by what it feeds upon, and it is but a step from the exercise of delegated authority to the assumption of the authority itself.

January 31, 1862, just before the depletion and disorganization of McClellan's army began, and just

when Jefferson Davis had written, "Events have cast on our arms and hopes the gloomiest shadows," Stonewall Jackson wrote to the Secretary of War that the Secretary's order requiring him to direct General Loring to return with his command to Winchester immediately had been received and promptly complied with. Jackson then adds: "With such interference in my command I cannot expect to be of much service in the field, and accordingly respectfully request to be ordered to report for duty to the superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington. Should this application not be granted, I respectfully request that the President will accept my resignation from the army."

This communication of Jackson's was endorsed by General J. E. Johnston: "Respectfully forwarded with great regret. I don't know how the loss of this officer can be supplied."

Secretary Benjamin then wrote to Johnston, stating substantially the excuse made to McClellan for ordering away his First Corps and Blenker's division while the movement was in progress: that Loring's command had been ordered away because he and Davis had news of some contemplated movement up at Winchester by McClellan, and volunteering, in true Stantonesque language, the opinion that Jackson had scattered his forces "quite too far apart for safety," but concluded by saying that these suggestions were merely his own opinions, "the decision being left to yourself."

General Johnston begged Jackson to reconsider. "Under ordinary circumstances," he said, "a due sense of one's own dignity, as well as care for professional character and official rights, would demand such a course as yours; but the character of this war, the great energy exhibited by the Government of the United States, the danger in which our very existence as an independent people lies, requires sacrifices from us all who have been educated as soldiers."

The Governor of Virginia wrote Jackson an impassioned appeal. Johnston wrote the President earnestly to prevent such a catastrophe from occurring again, saying: "On a former occasion I ventured to appeal to your Excellency against such exercise of military command by the Secretary of War. Permit me now to suggest the separation of the Valley District from my command, on the ground that it is necessary for the public interest. A collision of the authority of the honorable Secretary of War with mine might occur at a critical moment. *In such an event disaster would be inevitable.* The responsibility of the command has been imposed upon me. Your Excellency's known sense of justice will not hold me to that responsibility while the corresponding control is not in my hands. . . . What I propose is necessary to the safety of our troops and cause."

Jackson authorized the Governor to withdraw his resignation, stating that his views remained un-

changed, and adding: "If the Secretary persists in the ruinous policy complained of, I feel no officer can serve his country better than by making his strongest possible protest against it, which, in my opinion, is done by tendering his resignation, rather than be a willful instrument in prosecuting the war upon a ruinous principle."

The Secretary's wings were clipped. On March 13 Executive General Orders were issued: "General Robert E. Lee is assigned to duty at the seat of government; and, *under the direction of the President*, is charged with the conduct of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy."

General Huger afterward complained that the Secretary of War was nothing but a clerk, so far as troops were concerned.

XXV

M'CLELLAN'S STRATEGY FOR TURNING THE CONFEDERATE POSITIONS ON THE PENINSULA MADE IMPOSSIBLE BY INTERFERENCE FROM WASHINGTON

THIS case, on a small scale, was precisely what befell McClellan on a large scale, when Blenker's division and then the First Army Corps were taken away from him at a time when most of his army, and the commanding general himself, had already landed on the Peninsula and the First Corps was absolutely necessary, and its coöperating destination and movements had been prepared and ordered. But the stake was too great for McClellan to have resigned; a hundred thousand of his men at Washington and on the Peninsula, and the fate of the nation, depended on his continuance in command, even as best he could, for the people at Washington were children in the art of war.

When McClellan's army, in March, 1862, was drawn back from the Warrenton front and rapidly moved by water to its new base at Fort Monroe and the Peninsula, he left more than 55,000 men, the heavy artillery, and the works on which he had

expended the labor of thousands of contrabands for months.

At a council of all the corps commanders held March 13, the Peninsula movement was unanimously recommended, provided the *Merrimac* (Rebel ironclad) could be neutralized, which was most effectually done by the *Monitor*, which McClellan rushed forward. (See War Records.)

Heintzleman, Keyes, and McDowell agreed that, besides the garrisoned works, a force of 25,000 would suffice to render Washington secure; Sumner put it at 40,000. McClellan left more than 50,000, besides, of course, those afterward detained.

The movement commenced. Hamilton, Fitz John Porter, Heintzleman, Couch, the regulars and cavalry, had landed on the Peninsula. Then, March 31, Stanton notified McClellan: "The President directs that Blenker's division be sent forward to Harper's Ferry, there to await orders, instead of being sent to Fort Monroe." General Sumner wrote, March 31, from Warrenton Junction, that his two principal divisions had been removed. Then, April 4, came the crowning blow. "The President, deeming the force to be left in front of Washington insufficient to assure its safety, has directed that McDowell's force [the First Corps] should be detached from the forces operating under your immediate direction." Did these men know what they were doing?

Magruder had been fortifying across the Penin-

sula, on the Yorktown line, for many months, employing all the negroes he could hire or impress, from one thousand to two thousand in number. McClellan's main move must be against these works, because the James River was still in possession of the Confederates, and the heavy forts at Yorktown, and at Gloucester immediately opposite,—only at short cannon range apart,—forbade the passage of wooden transports up the York River while Gloucester was in possession of the enemy. (See Magruder's elaborate dispatches in the War Records.)

McClellan's plan was to break this blockade by using McDowell's corps in a great turning movement on the north side of the York River. It was fashionable to sneer in those days at fortifications; and, indeed, the only possible means of even keeping the public quiet after McClellan was deprived of McDowell corps was to iterate and reiterate,—to have the press teem with these innuendoes and charges,—that McClellan didn't need McDowell's corps and that Washington City needed it badly; that McClellan lay in the mud with more than 100,000 men in front of a line of works that even an energetic cow could climb over in most places; and that if he had had McDowell's corps to put into the mud also it would have been all the same, or worse. Even Grant had not yet been educated up to the value of fortifications. August 23, 1861, he wrote from Jefferson City, Mo.: "I am not fortify-

ing here at all. . . . With the picket guard and other duty coming upon the men of this command, there is but little time left for drilling. Drill and discipline are more necessary for the men than fortification. Another difficulty in the way of fortifying is that I have no engineer officer to direct it; no time to attend to it myself, and very little disposition to gain a 'Pillow notoriety' from a branch of service that I have forgotten all about."

But after that period Grant learned,—at Vicksburg, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg,—quite a different lesson, and the branch of service that he had forgotten all about came back to him with a vividness that left all along the trail of his armies fortifications of a class and scope which America had never seen before; and he so taught his soldiers, that the first thing they did, when in the face of the enemy, was to take to digging with sticks, bayonets, spoons, and tin cups.

Grant wrote to Meade, July 30, 1864: "Our experience to-day proves that fortifications come near holding themselves without troops. If, therefore, the enemy should attempt to turn your position, do not hesitate to take out nearly every man to meet such attack. . . . With a reasonable amount of artillery and one infantryman for six feet, I am confident either party could hold its lines against a direct attack of the other."

July 5, 1864, General Warren proposed the withdrawal of two corps from his left, provided he could

construct or have two small redoubts with a battery and 500 men, and another along the road that would hold 1500 men. He counted these 2000, with their batteries and works for defensive purposes, as equal there to two army corps for offensive purposes, and added: "It gives you an idea how important I regard the similar works now held by the enemy in our front."

July 12, 1864, Grant writes Meade: "I would not permit any attack against the enemy in an intrenched position."

July 27: "I do not want Hancock to attack intrenched lines."

October 2, to Meade: "Intrench and hold what you can, but make no attack against defended fortifications."

October 24: "Parke should be instructed that if he finds the enemy intrenched and their works well manned, he is not to attack, but confront him, and be prepared to advance promptly when he finds out by the movement of the other two columns to the right and rear of them that they begin to give way."

This is so accurate a description of McClellan's proposed turning movement by McDowell, while Heintzleman and Fitz John Porter held the front, that it could have been incorporated *verbatim* in McClellan's report.

Grant tells Butler, October 24: "I do not want any attack made by you against intrenched and defended positions."

Again: "Let it be distinctly understood by corps commanders that there is to be no attack made against defended, intrenched positions."

December 7, 1864, General Humphreys wrote Meade that, as directed, he had withdrawn 13,300 men for a movement elsewhere, leaving "the lines held by a minimum force," which he described as "total six miles of line, 4600 men."

December 8 Meade wrote Grant that he proposed to hold all the intrenched lines of the Army of the Potomac "with about 11,000 men, leaving about 22,000 men and 30 guns available for any movement."

So evident, even to the enemy, was Grant's revised opinion of the extreme value of fortifications, that in 1864 Lee wrote the Secretary of War, August 22: "I think it evident that the enemy has abandoned the effort to drive us from our present position by force, and that his purpose now is to compel us to evacuate by cutting off our supplies. I think his intention in the late demonstration north of the James River was not only to cause the removal of troops from Petersburg, but also to try to break through to Richmond."

If one will substitute York for James, and Yorktown for Petersburg, he will have, exactly, McClellan's plan, just before McDowell was withdrawn.

While General Grant had learned these lessons at great expense from the Confederates, and the

Administration had learned it from Grant, and the people were left in the opinion that Grant was still banging away and charging the works, McClellan had learned his lessons, at a very small expense, from the Russian works in the Crimea, and the Allied assaults and their results, where the United States Government had sent him during the Crimean War for that very purpose. (See McClellan's great report on the Armies of Europe, republished in 1861, which Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography describes as "a model of fullness, accuracy, and system.")

As for our men lying in the mud and water so long before the Rebel works, I will later on cite the testimony of General D. H. Hill, an eye-witness, who will tell us that the condition of the Confederates was so much worse, and that our own men were so much more healthy and comfortable, that they used to pity the poor Johnnies, as good Christians ought to have done.

McClellan's plan (see his letter of April 4, dated at Fort Monroe, the very day McDowell's force was taken away from him,) was that, with one division of the First Corps he should land on the Severn River, up the Bay, and assault the Gloucester works from the rear. The fort at Gloucester Point was on much higher ground and commanded the works at Yorktown at short cannon range, but was open in the rear.

General Magruder had written of the defenses

at Gloucester on September 7, 1861: "The landing of the [Union] army in rear of Gloucester Point can be effected easily, and without opposition, an extensive shore and many navigable rivers affording every opportunity."

McClellan's movement of McDowell was to be extremely prompt; in fact, he had already telegraphed—when he wrote McDowell, April 4—to Franklin and Rucker to get this division embarked at once.

Now Magruder states, as to his own forces, in his report of April 11, that "some 1500 are over the York River, at Gloucester Point."

McClellan's next directions, April 4, to McDowell were that he should hold the other two divisions to move up the York River immediately upon the fall of Yorktown. The captured works at Gloucester and the navy, under Goldsborough, who was ready and anxious to attack, would have silenced the Yorktown works, so that McDowell's force could have gone up protected by the navy, while his other division marched up the excellent sandy roads along the north bank of the York River. This force, moving to the head of York River, would have been in rear of Magruder, who would have had to abandon his works and retire on Richmond or else cross the James River,—as occurred in a like case during the Revolutionary War,—to save themselves.

July 6, 1781, Cornwallis lay with his army near

Williamsburg. Lafayette and Wayne appeared on the Peninsula, north of him, and attacked. Although the attack was repulsed, yet the Americans still hung near the Chickahominy above him, and Cornwallis, the day after the battle of Green Springs, retreated across the James River by boats and abandoned the Peninsula. (See Johnston's "Yorktown Campaign of 1781.")

McClellan would now have been at liberty to use water transport to establish his new base at the White House and present himself in front of Richmond before the bulk of General J. E. Johnston's army, then upon the upper Rappahannock, could have arrived there.

The effect of this movement, if carried out, is clearly shown in Lee's letter, to General Magruder at Yorktown, dated April 9: "I intended to call your attention to the possibility of the enemy's forcing a passage by the batteries on the York and James rivers, below your lines at Yorktown and Williamsburg. It was not my intention to advise the abandonment of the Williamsburg lines, even if you should be compelled to fall back from Yorktown, *unless the movements of the enemy by water* should place him in the rear of the former as well as the latter position. In that event you would be compelled to place the Chickahominy between you and the enemy."

He was advised to destroy the wharves on the York and James rivers, "in the rear of your present

lines, as the enemy would be most likely to use them for landing their troops."

This, of course, meant the abandonment of the whole Peninsula and the concentration of Magruder in front of Richmond, to defend that city alone, no other considerable part of the Confederate army having yet, at that time or for many days afterward, reached Richmond or Yorktown.

XXVI

POSITIONS AND NUMBERS OF CONFEDERATE FORCES WHEN M'CLELLAN OCCUPIED THE YORKTOWN FRONT ON THE PENINSULA

LET us try to see where Johnston's army of Northern Virginia actually was located while McClellan's investment of Yorktown, and the operations on the Peninsula were in progress.

In the "Summary of Events" at the beginning of Volume XL, Official War Records, we find: "March 17, 1862, Embarkation of the Army of the Potomac commenced at Alexandria, Va." "April 2, Headquarters Army of the Potomac transferred to vicinity of Fort Monroe." "April 12, Command of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, extended over the Departments of Norfolk and the Peninsula."

McClellan had sent his forces down by divisions, as the transport service was slow.

The condition of the country roads at this time at Warrenton, and thence to Richmond, is shown by numberless dispatches. General G. W. Smith reports, March 10, from Warrenton Springs: "I am fairly launched on a sea of mud."

McClellan's movements were not known until after the end of March. General Johnston on March 27 was encamped on the Rapidan, 125 miles in an air-line from Yorktown. Ewell's division was on the Rappahannock, near the bridge; the divisions of Longstreet, Jones, Early, and D. H. Hill were near Johnston, on the Rapidan.

Lee had just ordered 10,000 men to Richmond. Huger, south of the James, had been ordered to Magruder, who was holding the Yorktown line, and the Peninsula, against McClellan. By April 5 (Magruder's report on that date) McClellan's forces had reached the Confederate works, and had begun firing. Magruder's force was about 11,500. This was a small force, relatively, but it was much larger, and of better quality, than the force which defeated Grant in his attempt to break the merely temporary works held largely by militia, in front of Petersburg in June, 1864.

March 28 the divisions of Early and Toombs were ordered South to Richmond, but did not get away until April 4. Ewell was in command at Williamsburg April 6; Rodes' brigade arrived April 7, without transportation, the other regiments reporting in the same condition. General McLaws' command arrived about the same time and Early's brigade April 8.

March 28 the public property was ordered from Gordonsville, but Lee forbade its being sent to Richmond. March 28, also, Huger was ordered by

Lee to hold his few troops at Norfolk, across the James. "The move on the Peninsula may be a feint, and the real attack be on Norfolk."

The same date, the 28th, Lee wrote Johnston on the Rapidan, to hold his lines there, as it would be better to give up the Peninsula and Norfolk than lose the Central Railroad and connection with the valley at Staunton.

It was not until April 4 that Johnston was ordered to move to Richmond from the Rapidan.

Johnston wrote Lee, still from the Rapidan, April 6, that "the railroad is operating so slowly that there is abundant time to instruct me further."

April 11 Magruder reported the arrival of D. H. Hill, bringing his total force up to 20,000 men.

April 13 Hill took command at Yorktown, and reported only sixty-five rounds of ammunition per gun for the heavy artillery. General Magruder had removed five 8-inch guns to the land side of the works, adding that "General Johnston's presence and General Johnston's army may save us; otherwise the contest will be hopeless."

April 15 Hill reported that Goldsborough has been bombarding Yorktown with two gunboats for two days, and that he had but two guns which could reach the gunboats; "the other shells are worthless." He says, "I am much troubled about the river." "If the enemy get a position in rear of us [that is, across the York River] our men cannot stand to their guns on the land side. Every day is

a gain to the enemy." It was only on April 20 that Johnston's army had reached the Yorktown lines.

April 21 D. H. Hill wrote the War Department: "As far as the defense of our position is concerned, we are immeasurably the losers. The enemy keeps beyond the range of our guns and pelts us all day long. It is true that but few are killed daily, but our men are kept in the wet trenches and are harassed day and night. Disease will destroy a hundred-fold more than the Yankee artillery. Protected by these guns, however, he can retire to his comfortable tents and fires while our poor fellows are in the wet and cold. This is a sad but true picture of our situation."

XXVII

THE DETRACTORS OF M'CLELLAN—HIS FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERS — LINCOLN'S VINDICATION OF M'CLELLAN

THOSE who witnessed the scene at Warrenton, when McClellan, stripped of all authority and ordered to report himself at Trenton, N. J., rode through the ranks of that magnificent and triumphant army, as he left it, to that army's woe and to his country's needless and irreparable loss, will never forget it. Those who have read the description of eye-witnesses will ever be thrilled by its recollection; and those who have done neither, but have traced during the Rebellion the parallel careers of McClellan and the army he created,—for while the Government furnished money and men, it was McClellan himself who created and made the Army of the Potomac,—will know what must have happened on that wonderful occasion. I need not describe it, save to quote a sentence from a private letter of General Hancock to his wife, on that occasion: "The Army are not satisfied with the change, and consider the treatment of McClellan most ungracious and inopportune."

It is true that there were men in the army at one time or another who did not like McClellan, and who eagerly came before the civilian strategists, including the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, and testified most bitterly and recklessly against him. But the history of the army careers of these witnesses themselves vindicated McClellan more triumphantly than the strongest testimony from these men could have done, if in his favor. It was not Grant, Meade, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Hancock, Reynolds, Couch, Slocum, Wright, Buell, Ingalls, Williams, Hunt, Humphreys, Warren, Pleasonton, and soldiers of this stamp and eminence, that were to be found in the ranks of those detractors, but men that belonged to the bread-and-butter brigades who sought to curry favor with the powers that were, and who, as a reward, lost caste, influence, and command. Many of those in power at Washington who loved the prejudiced information, despised the prejudiced informer, so that the inexorable law of the "survival of the fittest," long before the war ended eliminated these men from command more effectually than McClellan himself could have done, had he been all-powerful and so disposed. You will search the records of 1864 and 1865 in vain for the names of these men; nearly all are missing, and justly so.

And that great Lincoln, not himself a soldier, and slow to learn the principles—and never to learn the practice—of the art of war, but a few months

after McClellan's removal lived to vindicate in the following letter McClellan's previous career and all his teachings and practices; to legitimize all McClellan's repudiated requests; to confirm all his arguments; and to establish all that McClellan had so vainly sought to have accepted and to disestablish all that he had so vainly urged the authorities not to do.

The remarkable letter, cited below, from Mr. Lincoln to General Halleck, written September 19, 1863 (vol. XXIX, part 2, pp. 207-208), should have a place in history alongside that other celebrated letter he wrote to Hooker on the question of a dictatorship, and that other noble letter in which he declared that he would save the Union with slavery, or he would save the Union without slavery, his sole object being to save the Union. This letter was written by Mr. Lincoln himself, unknown to Halleck or to anyone else:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, September 19, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK: By General Meade's dispatch to you of yesterday, it appears that he desires your views and those of the Government as to whether he shall advance upon the enemy. I am not prepared to order or even advise an advance in this case, wherein I know so little of the particulars, and wherein he, in the field, thinks the risk is so great and the promise of advantage so small. And yet the case presents matter for very serious consideration in another aspect. These two armies confront each other across a small river, substantially midway between the two capitals, each defending its own capital and menacing the other. Gen-

eral Meade estimates the enemy's infantry in front of him at not less than 40,000. Suppose we add fifty per cent. to this for cavalry, artillery, and extra-duty men, stretching as far as Richmond, making the whole force of the enemy 60,000. General Meade, as shown by his returns, has with him, and between him and Washington, of the same classes of well men, over 90,000. Neither can bring the whole of his men into a battle, but each can bring as large a percentage as the other. For a battle, then, General Meade has three men to General Lee's two. Yet, it having been determined that choosing ground and standing on the defensive gives so great advantage that the three cannot safely attack the two, the three are left simply standing on the defensive also. If the enemy's 60,000 are sufficient to keep our 90,000 away from Richmond, why, by the same rule, may not 40,000 of ours keep their 60,000 away from Washington, leaving us 50,000 to put to some other use? Having practically come to the mere defensive, it seems to be no economy at all to employ twice as many men for that object as are needed. With no object, certainly, to mislead myself, I can perceive no fault in this statement unless we admit we are not the equal of the enemy, man for man. I hope you will consider it.

To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his entrenchments at Richmond, and there to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear against it that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made, if the General in command should desire to make it. My last attempt upon Richmond was to get McClellan, when he was nearer there than the enemy was, to run in ahead of him. Since then I have constantly desired the Army of the Potomac to make Lee's army, and not Richmond, its objective point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city."

Where now was the vaunted march on Centerville? Where the "On to Richmond"? Where was the great garrison of 80,000 men, besides all the fortifications, to guard Washington? Where now was the condemnation of McClellan's move to the Peninsula, to reach the communications and Lee's army by the back and side doors, and strike there first? and where the robbing of McClellan to keep his troops back at Washington and so render success impossible? And where was Lincoln's urging for McClellan to move east of the mountains and take 40,000 from Washington's 90,000, or west of the mountains and get 15,000?

Mr. Lincoln's reference to McClellan's running into Richmond when he was nearer there, and so getting ahead of Lee's army, refers to the very part of the 1862 campaign during which McClellan was removed, and shows that Mr. Lincoln did not yet understand war or topography.

For McClellan to pass by his own flank across the front of Longstreet and Jackson, to "run into Richmond," was the very plan employed by Grant the next year, which began at the Wilderness, where his whole front half in the advance had to be called back, when it had gotten twenty miles ahead, to save the rear half from total destruction, and which ended at Cold Harbor, where the Confederates lost, substantially, but as many hundreds as we lost thousands.

Mr. Lincoln never thought of Lee's suggestion

to Jackson, when he was in his direst strait, November 9, 1862, to cross the Potomac, so as to draw back McClellan's army to that river. But if Jackson had been able to make the movement,—which, however, McClellan had fully provided against,—the yell from Washington and the North would have hurried McClellan back, as it nearly did Grant in August, 1864, even if at the very gates of Richmond, and practically "moving in"; and Mr. Lincoln would have been the first to utter it. And so he ought to have been. For Grant's dispatch, scare at Washington July 26, 1864, see W. R., vol. xl, part 3, page 484: For removal of all Grant's heavy guns and ammunition to be sent north, in urgent haste, and all in our works, see from page 641 to page 727; orders, dispatches and reports. See also General Hunt's report, vol. xl, part 1, pages 658-660. For Lincoln's visit to meet Grant at Fortress Monroe, part 3, page 636. Everything on board transports for sailing, at City Point and Broadway Landing, July 31. Page 721. For Grant's letter to Halleck, of August 15, 1864, "My withdrawal now from the James River now would insure the defeat of Sherman," vol. xlii, part 2, page 193; and Lincoln's reply of August 17, 1864, "Hold on with a bull-dog grip, and chew and choke as much as possible," vol. xlii, part 2, page 243.

Besides, McClellan was not nearer Richmond than Lee was, but directly the reverse, for from Sharpsburg to Richmond is 150 miles in an air-

line; while from Longstreet's position, near Front Royal, with Jackson immediately behind him, is only 105 miles. By marching routes the difference in favor of Lee was enormously greater. Then, Mr. Lincoln obviously believed that McClellan could slip past a Confederate front of 60 miles, in full view from the mountains, "unbeknownst" to Lee; and that the preparations for and initiation of a great military movement does not betray itself at once, of necessity, to the military eye and mind of the enemy.

As a matter of fact, the day McClellan began to move Lee began, and with Longstreet's corps passed the southern gaps, which McClellan had not yet reached, and was at Culpeper Court House before McClellan was at Warrenton. Lee's mistake was in leaving Jackson in the valley too long; he took the chances, for military reasons, but miscalculated McClellan's speed, and Jackson was caught, and held fast there, in spite of all that could be done to relieve him or bring him to Longstreet's aid.

XXVIII

THE CAUSE OF M'CLELLAN'S REMOVAL

THE question recurs: Why was McClellan removed, and ordered to Trenton? As a last ditch, many have fallen back on what is called McClellan's attitude on the slavery question. But McClellan's attitude was precisely that of Lincoln, but not at all that of Stanton and some of the members of Congress with whom the Secretary of War was in close and secret contact. And these matters ought to be made clear, because they have affected the judgment of military men who ought to have learned better—Grant and Upton, for example.

Early in the war—May 17, 1861—McClellan wrote to Adjutant General Townsend, at Washington, from his Headquarters, Department of the Ohio, at Cincinnati, that Garrett Davis had told him that the Union men of Kentucky had resolved that "we will remain in the Union by voting, if we can; by fighting, if we must; and if we cannot hold our own we will call on the General Government to aid us." And he asked McClellan what he would do, from Ohio, if they called upon him for assistance. He replied that if there were time he would refer to General Scott for orders; if there were not

time, he replied, "I would cross the Ohio with 20,000 men. If that were not enough with 30,000, and if necessary with 40,000; but I would not stand by and see the loyal Union men of Kentucky crushed." (Official War Records, Supplemental Volume li, part 1, pp. 381, 383.)

To Buell he wrote, while general-in-chief, November 7, 1861: "It is absolutely necessary that we shall hold all the State of Kentucky. Not only that, but that the majority of its inhabitants shall be warmly in favor of our cause. . . . You will please constantly bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting. That issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the General Government over all portions of our territory. We shall most readily suppress this rebellion, and restore the authority of the Government, by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. I know that I express the feelings and opinions of the President when I say that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and the constitutional authority of the General Government.

"The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it that their domestic institutions will in no manner be interfered with, and that they will receive at our hands every constitutional protection." (War Records, vol. v, page 38.)

That this was in accordance with Mr. Lincoln's views is demonstrated by the fact that Kentucky

was excepted in the Emancipation Proclamation. That McClellan's views of the protection of slaves did not extend beyond the loyal boundaries is shown by his general plan of army movements throughout the Rebel States, submitted to the Secretary of War, for the President, February 3, 1862: "We should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure all the Southern seaports, to occupy all the avenues of communication; to use the great outlet of the Mississippi; to re-establish our government and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; to force the slaves to labor for our subsistence instead of that of the Rebels; to bid defiance to all foreign interference."

McClellan was the very first to use fugitive slaves in a large way.

General Butler, down at Fortress Monroe, in May, 1861, was wonderfully pestered with the slave question. On May 25 three slaves ran away from the plantation of the commander of the secession forces of the district and gave themselves up to his picket guard. Butler examined the negroes separately, and "determined for the present, and until better advised, to avail myself of their services," which were much needed, and that "I would send a receipt to Colonel Mallory that I had so taken them, as I would for any other property of a private citizen which the exigencies of the service seemed to require."

General Scott and Secretary of War Cameron

both endorsed this report as having "much to praise and nothing to condemn. It is highly interesting in several aspects, particularly in its relation to the slave question."

In July Butler made a complaint against Colonel Duryea, that he took nine of these escaped slaves to Washington with him, against his express orders, and after a portion of them had been detained by Butler's provost-marshal. He wanted instructions, but he doesn't seem to have gotten any until McClellan got to Washington, and he was not so squeamish. General Wool was then in command at Fort Monroe, and wrote to the Secretary of War, September 22, 1861: "I have called for an immediate report from the proper officers as to the negroes here, in reference to General McClellan's request, and I shall then forward as many as can be spared."

General Wool had written, September 18: "I would be much gratified if you would tell me what I am to do with the negro slaves that are almost daily arriving at this post from the interior. Am I to find food and shelter for the women and children, who can do nothing for themselves?"

McClellan cried "Yes," and the Secretary of War, Cameron, at once wrote to General Wool from Washington: "You will, as early as practicable, send to General McClellan at this place all negro men capable of performing labor, *accompanied by their families.*"

Who is so silly as to imagine that General McClellan had temporarily "borrowed" the women and babies from their Rebel owners?

September 26, 1861, McClellan requested the general-in-chief "to send contrabands to Harper's Ferry to perform the labor required, if there are any disposable in Washington."

And McClellan saw that these men were paid fifty cents per day and board, and that government supplies were issued to feed and clothe the women and children.

The amount of misrepresentation regarding McClellan is so great everywhere that it is almost impossible to run these clues out, in every case; but whenever they are laboriously and persistently run out, misrepresentation, false suggestion, and falsehood will be found as thick as blackberries.

McClellan's main purpose, as was Lincoln's, was to save the Union; others had different views and purposes connected with conquering and subduing; and Lincoln, to avoid divided counsels, was obliged to use these factors as well, and they in turn were constantly endeavoring to use Mr. Lincoln also.

There were two diametrically opposing views at Washington, both in favor of suppressing the Rebellion, but outside that dominating purpose one view was to conquer the South absolutely, to rule it as conquered territory, and to ignore State lines, and the States themselves. This view was a real view, and had something in its favor; but it con-

ceded the right of secession, as well as that of conquest, and neither Lincoln nor McClellan accepted this view at all. To them it was a Union of indivisible States.

Secretary Chase expressed the radical view in his letter to Mellen, of March 26, 1862: "While I think that the government, in suppression of rebellion, in view of the destruction by suicide of the State governments with the actual or strongly implied consent of the majority of the citizens of the seven Rebel States, have so far forfeited all right to be regarded as States," etc. (see Warden's "Life of Chase"); and also in his conversation of December 10, 1861, with Senator Wade and Representative Ashby, Chairmen of the Territorial Committees of their respective houses, and who concurred with Chase in his statement, that when a State government attempted to withdraw from the Union "the State organization was forfeited, and it lapsed into the condition of a Territory, with which we could do as we pleased."

This was in accordance with President Johnson's phrase, "To make treason odious," and also with the spirit of the Reconstruction period.

But these men, even in the darkest days of the Rebellion, did not represent the people for whom they claimed, or, in fact, often did not even claim, to act. They possessed speech, and they often suborned the press, they worked in secret, and sought by every art and device to bring the people

up to their plane of action. But they never succeeded; the great Northern people never endorsed them, and the army repudiated them with indignation. It was only the lamentable tragedy of Lincoln's assassination which, even for the moment, swept the American people off their feet, and gave this coterie of active theorists their power successfully to interfere. The great mass, even of the strenuous Abolitionists, always belonged to that class to which the poet Whittier belonged, of whom his biographer says: "After the war was over he would have made the terms of settlement liberal and conciliatory. He was too wise and too humane to stir the still living embers of passion and resentment for any political end, however dear to him."

Lincoln, during the war, kept on organizing States in the Confederate territory wherever he could find a loyal nucleus,—in West Virginia, Louisiana, and in Virginia,—and he represented those more enlightened views which, after Reconstruction had demonstrated the futility, the danger, and the unpopularity of the radical plan, were universally accepted.

McClellan, in his letter of instructions to Buell, in Kentucky, November 12, 1861, clearly put forth his views on this subject. "Bear in mind," he said, "that we are fighting only to preserve the Union, and to uphold the power of the General Government. *As far as military necessity will permit,*

religiously respect the constitutional rights of all. Preserve the strictest discipline among the troops, and while employing the utmost energy in military movements, be careful to so treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the Rebels."

Since the war we have tried both plans; and I feel satisfied that the views of Lincoln and McClellan will now find almost universal endorsement, and the theory of "State suicide" almost universal dissent.

As regards emancipation, this proclamation was regarded by McClellan, as well as by Lincoln, as purely a war measure, and McClellan believed that it would prove ineffective in hostile regions wherever our armies did not penetrate, and could not reach; while, without it, in hostile regions where our armies did penetrate, the slaves were already free to abandon their masters, and we would protect them,—would, as McClellan said, "force the slaves to labor for our subsistence instead of that of the Rebels." By ceasing to be rebels, and surrendering, in all our territory, under McClellan's plan, they could avoid the penalty; by ceasing to be rebels, and surrendering, in rebel territory, under Mr. Lincoln's plan, they must still suffer the penalty. One plan invited early submission; the other, resistance to death, for it was the slaves who supported the armies in the field and the women and children at home. One said to the boy in the tree, "I will punish you if you

don't come down"; the other, "I will punish you as soon as you do come down."

It is true that, almost under any circumstances, the system of human bondage must have received its death-blow with the success of our arms. It was a "peculiar institution," and was rapidly growing out of harmony with the age, and even with the mass of the Confederate soldiers. (See what Dr. Steiner said of the negroes in the Confederate ranks at Frederick, and the fact that negro soldiers were afterward enlisted in 1865 in the Confederate armies.) But there was a far greater question at issue, and one involving even emancipation itself, and that was the preservation of the Union; for the success of the Confederacy meant not only the destruction of our great Republic, but the failure of emancipation also. If we could not conquer the Rebels when they were a part of our own population, much less could we have found men and means to invade and conquer the South when an independent foreign country. It will be seen a little later on into how grave peril the Union cause fell from political mismanagement, even in the very closing months of the war.

No one now believes that the Emancipation Proclamation legally freed any slaves, except temporarily by martial law. Lincoln knew that himself, or he would not have insisted, in his conference with the Rebel Commissioners at City Point at the end of January, 1865 (see Grant's

"Memoirs"), that they must concede the surrender of slavery as a prerequisite to any peace. (See Volume XLVI, part 2, p. 509, Official War Records.) Mr. Lincoln's demands were that three things were indispensable: "First, the restoration of a national authority throughout all the States. Second, no receding, by the Executive of the United States, on the slavery question, from the position assumed thereon by him in the late annual message to Congress and in preceding documents. Third, no cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government." The first and third were, of course, subject to acceptance or rejection; but if the second had become a "*res adjudicata*" in 1862, it is difficult to see how any amount of "receding" could put these negroes back into slavery again in 1865.

The slaves were already free, slavery was already abolished, if the proclamation was legally effective when issued; and the Constitution of the United States, and of the States themselves, forbade already the reduction to slavery of any legal freeman. We all now know what freed the slaves and abolished slavery in the United States; it was not the Proclamation; it was an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that was not adopted till after the war had ended.

But there is no doubt that the Proclamation increased the hostility of the South, enforced, willingly, universal conscription, silenced the Southern

Unionists, and prolonged the war. Everyone agrees to that. The sole excuse of its issuance was that it was worth the price, especially for political effect upon other nations, as defining the attitude of our Government on the question of slavery in so far as the States in rebellion were concerned. The validity and strength of this position may be fully conceded. But a shorter war would have afforded the same advantage, with less loss and far less risk.

But historians in general, and the public as well, do not clearly understand what that price was, and how we were, at last, and almost by a miracle, saved from paying some such fearful price.

XXIX

OUR GRAVEST PERIL IN THE CLOSING YEAR OF THE WAR

MCCLELLAN could have preserved the Union, enlisted home aid in every Rebel State, ended the war, and brought peace and fraternity in 1862, as Upton categorically declares, and as Jefferson Davis practically conceded, when he wrote on the very eve of McClellan's spring campaign, February 19, 1862: "Events have cast on our arms and our hopes the gloomiest shadows."

In July, 1861, Mr. Davis again wrote: "Everybody disappoints me in their answers to my requisitions for troops, and the last hope of a large force of militia coming to your aid seems doomed to add another to past disappointments." Up to this time the Southern heart was not fully enlisted in the cause.

September 5, 1861, he wrote: "We have been disappointed in our efforts to get arms. Lee is still in the mountains of Virginia. My means are short of the wants of each division of the wide frontier I am laboring to protect. One shipload of small arms would enable me to answer all demands, but

vainly have I hoped and waited." The Confederate correspondence during all this period, up to the assumption of generalship and command by our new Secretary of War, and his active interference with our armies, betrays the hopelessness of the Confederate cause in the East, and gives ample intimations of equal peril in the West.

Then McClellan's comprehensive plan was submitted (vol. v, Official Records, p. 44), describing his proposed Peninsula campaign and its expected results, dated February 3, 1862, as follows: "The second base of operations available for the Army of the Potomac is that of the lower Chesapeake Bay, which affords the shortest possible land route to Richmond and strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the East.

"The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year. The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington (which is very unfavorable), much more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the spring some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his entrenched position at Manassas in order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do this; for should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in battle, in which he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, gives

us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the Rebels, Norfolk would fall, all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours, all Virginia would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine Forks."

This extract is a capital essay on the principles of war. It disposes of the boastful notion that the point of attack should have been the intrenched armies of the enemy, and dissipated the allegation that McClellan had some other dilatory scheme of his own. Grant started in to "buck the tiger" at the Wilderness, and expended an army and a whole summer in getting to where McClellan went by water without losing a man or a week. Grant then spent nine months more in facing and flanking the works at Petersburg,—and it was necessary work, and capitally done,—but as soon as he could extend his left far enough *away from* the armies in front of Richmond and Petersburg to cut the sole line of Confederate communication (as Richmond was the sole line in 1862), lines more than sixty miles to the west, Petersburg fell, Richmond was abandoned, and the whole Confederate government and archives were in hopeless flight, and ended in a final and early surrender. As I have shown elsewhere—which is substantially the view of Napoleon—battles in war ought to be in the nature of unpreventable

ble accidents, occurring only where strategy fails or is resisted. A perfectly conducted war would be one of positions, communications, flankings, turnings, and the like, in which hostile armies are compelled to move thus and so under penalty of annihilation or surrender; in which case sensible men who understand war, finding a battle hopeless, would move themselves and their men accordingly. Battles, of course, occur; so do railroad accidents and street fights, but these are evidences of miscalculation on one side, or on both.

In the fall campaign, the so-called Bristoe campaign, of 1863, Meade got to Centerville first. Lee was balked, and retreated without an attack. In the Mine Run movement the conditions were exactly reversed, and Meade retreated without an attack. In the Pope campaign, if Pope had fallen back to Centerville, instead of moving around, bewildered, out among the Bull Run Mountains, Lee would not have attacked; or, if he had, he would have been defeated. Strategy is by far the superior and more powerful agency of the two in war. It is all a question of "Where you are at," if you have anything available by means of which to "be at," when the time and opportunity arrive.

By one blow McClellan would have cleared three States. The proof is that the same blow did the same thing three years later; but during those three years—alas!

McClellan continues to unfold his plan: "Should

we be beaten in battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with our flank perfectly covered by the fleet. During the whole movement our left flank is covered by the water. Our right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time. He can only oppose us in front. We bring our fleet into full play.

“After a successful battle our position would be: Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held securely; our center connecting Burnside with Buell, both by Raleigh and Lynchburg; Buell in eastern Tennessee and North Alabama; Halleck at Nashville and Memphis. The next movement would be to connect with Sherman [not William T.] on the left by reducing Wilmington and Charleston; to advance our center into South Carolina and Georgia; to push Buell either toward Montgomery or to unite with the main army in Georgia; to throw Halleck southward to meet the naval expedition from New Orleans. We should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure all the Southern seaports; to occupy all the avenues of communication; to use the great outlet of the Mississippi; to re-establish our *Government* and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; to force the slaves to labor for our subsistence instead of that of the Rebels; to bid defiance to all foreign interference.”

A comprehensive plan! Was it simply ideal? Then trace the history of the war of the Rebellion

from the day that McClellan stated these proposals, and you will find that every part of his plan was not only feasible, but that it was carried out to the letter (by others). Not one was missed; but the time of accomplishment was sadly postponed. Even the re-establishment of Southern State governments, which Lincoln carried out, was in the plan.

After what pain, what cost, what blood and tears did it come! After what heart-breakings at home and in the field! And after what long years, still hoping and praying for the day,

“When the cruel war is over.”

And all the South was sprinkled with blood, and scattered over it everywhere are the national cemeteries of gallant soldiers who perished that this nation might live. Was the War Department strategy worth what it cost us? We could have had all this salvation in 1862, almost “without money and without price.”

It was ours to take, or to leave; and we left it. And, after all, we won only, as it were, by a scratch—by almost a miracle, in fact.

The inside history of the winter of 1864 and the spring of 1865 has never been written, and has never been appreciated. Our armies were melting away. It is true that the Confederate armies were melting away also, but that was by the casualties of battle, and the dead in battle are but a small portion of those who

“Live to fight another day.”

They deserted, too, but that was from starvation; and their armies could have even then gone where supplies were abundant. (See later on in this chapter.)

But the time of our regiments expired, and the men marched home, as they had a right to do. Piled up bounties, which Upton has so strenuously condemned in his history, created a new profession; the purlieus were drained, foreign supplies of rag-tag and bobtail were imported at great cost; skillful emissaries even searched the South and supplied substitutes to fill their Northern State quotas from the ignorant and degraded field-hands of Southern plantations; and the recruits were a sad lot.

Major O. C. Bosbyshell, of the Loyal Legion, in his history of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania veteran regiment, describing the battle of Poplar Spring Church, in the Petersburg front, September 29-October 2, 1864, says:

"Some of the Massachusetts regiments in the front line, having large numbers of Germans in their ranks, many of whom had not been in the country over six weeks, and were utterly ignorant of the English language, were thrown into great disorder by the savage charge of the Rebel regiments. These Germans ran pell-mell through the ranks of the supporting regiments. Pleasants was greatly enraged at these fleeing soldiers as they dashed blindly to the rear, pushing and shoving their way between the ranks of the Forty-eighth, and with drawn sword

slashed to the right and left among them with the strength of an athlete, staying the flight effectually anywhere near his sweeping saber. Many a sore head and stinging rib resulted from the blows well laid on by him."

That Massachusetts should have so filled her quotas is evidence of exhaustion of her own better material. If so patriotic a State had to resort to such means, the other States must have suffered also. Perhaps I exaggerate. Read General Grant's testimony. He writes to Stanton as early as September 11, 1864: "I hope it is not the intention to postpone the draft to allow time to fill up with recruiting. The men we have been getting in this way nearly all desert, and out of five reported North as being enlisted, we don't get more than one effective soldier."

At the same time Halleck wrote Grant from Washington: "Had not the new infantry regiments now coming in [these were drafted, not recruited] better be sent to City Point? Facilities for desertion here and with General Sheridan are so great that we shall soon lose large numbers."

Stanton, referring to the drafts, says, September 11, 1864, that candidates try to keep back the men till after election, especially in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Not a regiment, or even company, has been organized in Illinois. "A special call from you would aid the department in overcoming the local inertia and personal interests that favor delay."

Grant writes: "The enforcement of the draft and prompt filling up of our armies will save the shedding of blood to an immense degree."

September 20 he writes: "The ease with which our men of late fall into the hands of the enemy would indicate that they are rather willing prisoners."

January 5, 1865, Stanton wrote: "If you do not guard against straggling and desertion you will lose many men, as the facilities at Baltimore are great, and the business vigorously conducted by bounty brokers."

Sheridan writes January 6: "We have lost a great many men by desertion."

January 8 he writes that Grover was obliged to lie over a day in camp; "this gives the bounty-brokers a chance to work on the men, and I am afraid will cause desertion."

January 10 the quartermaster wrote to Washington that "Grant could not move his army if he would, for want of forage; that the animals had been on half rations since January 3."

February 15, 1862, Halleck wrote a remarkable letter to Grant from which I make the following extracts:

"In reply to your telegram in regard to the payment of the troops before Richmond, I would remark that these troops have been paid generally to a later period than those in the West and South. Some are unpaid for seven or eight months. The

fault is not in the Pay Department, but a want of money in the treasury.

"I understand that the Quartermaster's Department is already \$180,000,000 in debt, and that until a part, at least, of this is paid it will be almost impossible to purchase and transport supplies. The manufacturers cannot furnish cloth, or the tailors make clothes, or the shoemakers make shoes, or the railroads transport troops and supplies, much longer, unless paid a part, at least, of their claims. Some of the Western roads cannot pay their employes and threaten to stop running their trains if they cannot be paid what the Government owes them. Serious difficulties also exist with the New York Central, Hudson River, Harlem, and other roads.

"What is here said of the Quartermaster's Department also applies to the Commissary, Medical, Ordnance, and other departments.

"If we pay the troops to the exclusion of the other creditors of the Government, supplies must stop, and our armies must be left without food, clothing, or ammunition.

"What we want is some more great victories to give more confidence in our currency and to convince financial men that the war is near its close. In money matters these are the darkest days we have yet had during the war."

During the closing month, in front of Petersburg, President Lincoln was with Grant almost constantly. During this period both Admiral Porter

and General Sherman testify to Mr. Lincoln's great anxiety to have the war ended at once, if it could possibly be done, and far preferably without serious fighting.

Says General Grant, in one of his conversations with John Russell Young, on his Eastern tour, which conversations Grant personally revised: "He was very anxious about the war closing; was afraid we could not stand a new campaign."

Grant himself says: "Rich as we were, I do not see how we could have endured it another year, even from a financial point of view."

Speaking of this great fear, General Grant says: "There was no time in the war when it was more critical than after the battle of Five Forks, when Lee abandoned Richmond. It was President Lincoln's aim to end the whole business there. He was most anxious about the result. He desired to avoid another year's fighting, fearing the country would break down financially under the terrible strain on its resources. I know when we met it was a standing topic of conversation. If Lee had escaped and joined Johnston in North Carolina, or reached the mountains, it would have imposed on us continued armament and expense. The entire expense of the government had reached the enormous cost of four millions of dollars a day. It was to put an end to this expense that Lee's capture was necessary."

He tells us by what a hair's-breadth Lee was captured, how narrowly his junction was prevented,

either with Johnston in North Carolina, or Johnston's junction with him in the great valley of southwest Virginia, reaching down by way of Bristol, east Tennessee, into Georgia and Alabama.

Grant says: "My pursuit of Lee was hazardous. I was in a position of extreme difficulty. You see, I was marching away from my supplies, while Lee was falling back on his supplies. If Lee had continued his flight another day I should have had to abandon the pursuit, fall back to Danville, build the railroad, and feed my army. So far as supplies were concerned, I was almost at the last gasp when the surrender took place." (See conversations with Grant, revised by himself, in John Russell Young's "Around the World With General Grant," volume II, page 460, copyright 1879.)

Had Lee known this, he could easily have gained another day. At Amelia Court House he lost thirty-six hours in foraging over an exhausted country for supplies, when his railroad trains had by a mistake carried his own supplies to Richmond, and left them there. He had thousands of horses and other animals in his commissary and quartermaster's supply train, which had no supplies to haul, and which were afterward captured or broken down before his army reached Farmville. There was plenty of such meat, to be driven on the hoof, to get his army out of their emergency. At Appomattox Station there arrived from Lynchburg, on the night

before the surrender, five heavily loaded trains filled with hams, cornmeal, and all sorts of foods, shoes, and clothing. I can speak personally of this, as I supplied my command, and all the rest of us infantry and cavalry officers did the same, from these trains, after their capture on the morning of the 9th, and the piled up food looked about as abundant when we left it as it did when we found it. We captured and emptied these moving trains only four miles from Lee's advance, while he was halted at Appomattox Court House, and only six hours before the surrender took place.

General Grant says, and he ought to have known: "Nor have I ever felt that the surrender at Appomattox was an absolute military necessity. I think that in holding Richmond, and even in consenting to that surrender, Lee sacrificed his judgment as a soldier to his duty as a citizen and a leader of the South."

His love for Virginia and for his Virginia soldiers and their families doubtless influenced him greatly; but had he abandoned Virginia with his army, even temporarily, and joined Johnston, or not joined Johnston, boundless supplies awaited him. His railroads were worthless and worn out, but they would have been as worthless for carrying our supplies as for carrying his; and by marching his army to the supplies, instead of trying to haul them to his army over railroads that couldn't haul, he might have solved the problem and given our

national Government certainly another campaign, another year, and perhaps more.

The official report of the Confederate Bureau of Subsistence, dated March 10, 1865, says: "The crops south of North Carolina, in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, were never so large." "From North Carolina 7,500,000 bread rations, 6,000,000 meat rations; from Virginia, 5,000,000 bread rations, 5,500,000 meat rations; from east Tennessee and its communications 15,000,000 bread rations, 5,000,000 meat rations." These were all predicated on the railroads. Beyond these, in central Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia, the supplies were illimitable, as the Confederates had ceased planting cotton and gave their time to food supplies.

There was nothing at all in front to prevent Lee or Johnston from going there; Sherman's army was on the Atlantic Coast; most of Thomas' army had just joined him, and Grant was on the James River. We practically had no others.

But this had not been the Confederates' only chance, of late. When Sherman abandoned the pursuit of Hood's army, leaving it intact, to make his march to the sea, it was the same army which had just baffled Sherman from Dalton to Atlanta, with more than six months of continuous fighting.

Among all the fatuous things ever done by a Confederate army, one of the worst was that of Hood's planting himself down in front of Nashville, doubtless a part of some occult War Depart-

ment strategy at Richmond, and lying there for long weeks while all the North was open to his invading columns. Sherman had left no army behind to take the place of that which he marched across to the Atlantic; he left behind his sick, wounded, and worn-out, whatever was not fit for the march before him, and all this débris was scattered over thousands of square miles of territory. Hood's was the only compact and efficient army in the field in the West. And Hood lay down before Nashville and waited, while Thomas set himself to work to make an army. With the Twenty-third Corps as a nucleus, under Schofield, and the Fourth Corps, under Wood, he armed and drilled all that he could find or gather—wagoners, mechanics, any and everybody. He gathered a bit here and a bit there; he dragged out his convalescents and scoured his scattered garrisons; he sent up to middle Missouri and brought down A. J. Smith and his men (see War Records, vol. XLV, part I, pp. 31-34), and after weeks of incessant labor he got together, December 15-16, 1864, a force which attacked and defeated Hood, and drove him south in scattered fragments, to be reunited only months afterward in the Carolinas.

Grant's anxiety about Hood was natural, and it was very great. But it was no part of prudence for Thomas to have attacked before he was fit to attack; because, had Hood, later on, pulled up stakes and gone to where he ought to have gone

in the first place, Thomas by that time had boats and transportation enough with which to follow him around by water, and fight him. But when Hood first planted himself before Nashville, after driving back Schofield from Franklin, there was no concentrated force anywhere which could have interfered with him, and none which could have been concentrated in time. Says General Grant, very properly: "My objection to Sherman's plan at the time, and my objection now, was his leaving Hood's army in his rear. I always wanted the march to the sea, but at the same time I wanted Hood. If Hood had been an enterprising commander he would have given us a great deal of trouble. Probably he was controlled from Richmond. As it was, he did the very thing I wanted him to do. If I had been in Hood's place, I would never have gone near Nashville. I would have gone to Louisville, and on north until I came to Chicago. What was the use of his knocking his head against the stone walls of Nashville? If he had gone north Thomas would never have caught him. We should have had to raise new levies. I was never so anxious during the war as at that time."

Yes, Hood could have marched through Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, and he, too, could have sung the song:

"Five hundred miles of latitude, five hundred to the lakes."

Or he could have crossed Ohio to Pennsylvania,

captured Pittsburg, swept West Virginia and the Valley, threatened Washington, or even joined Lee; or he could have done the same by marching east from Parkersburg in West Virginia.

The "new levies" to which Grant referred, not to speak of time,—when there was no time,—would have been useless against Hood's veterans. What would have been instantly wanted, and imperatively demanded, were soldiers. And the only soldiers available, for Sherman was buried and unheard of in the depths of Georgia, and there were no armies to be had elsewhere, was the Army of the Potomac, and all of it, to meet Hood's triumphant sixty thousand veterans.

That meant that the spring campaign of 1865 would have started from Washington, where the spring campaign of 1861 had started, and if Grant and Lincoln and Halleck were good judges of the situation, it would have been very difficult to have had it start anew and continue very vigorously, if at all, if it had to start anew—after four years of war—where it had started at the beginning.

The statements above made in this chapter show a moral exhaustion in the loyal States almost equal to the physical exhaustion, especially in transportation, of the South. Napoleon said that the moral factor was far more important in war than brute force, that war was essentially a moral and not a physical problem.

The loss to Great Britain of Cornwallis' eight

thousand at Yorktown was of trifling moment, but seven years of war had brought an inertia in camp and cabinet, a weariness, and a moral exhaustion which could not be revived; and we ourselves, after four years, found the same difficulties, the same moral exhaustion, the same scraping the slums for worthless recruits, the same desertions, and the same financial depletion and collapse, at hand.

XXX

GRANT'S PICTURE OF SECRETARY STANTON'S CHARACTERISTICS—DANGER OF THE REWARD OF M'CLELLAN'S SUCCESS—M'CLELLAN'S QUALITIES AS A COMMANDING GENERAL

So we see that it was not merely a matter of a few more years of war, to secure certain personal results, with the conclusion destined to be the same in the end, that was involved in preventing McClellan from finishing up the war in 1862. It was a matter that put to deadly peril the Union, the Government, republican institutions, and all that for which our soldiers, our young men, so gladly went to fight and so freely gave their lives. It was one of those blunders which are said to be worse than crimes. Said General Upton, writing in 1879 to his friend Colonel Henry A. DuPont: "If you want to know who was the cause of a three years' war, after we created a disciplined army of six hundred thousand men, it was Stanton."

Grant in his "Memoirs" clearly depicts the character of the Secretary of War in such aspects as show how he was able to accomplish so much actual injury in so short a space of time. He depicts

him as a man of tireless energy, personally timid, but bold in action and direction until called down by a higher authority. Then, if he saw that his superior "meant business" and was bound to have things done in his own way, Stanton subsided at once and did as he was directed, always, however, furtively glancing at the bone from which he had been driven away, and ready to seize it on the slightest relaxation of the master's attention or as soon as opportunity offered. To translate Grant's language into the vernacular, he was from tip to toe what is called "a bluffer," and one who increased his power by bullying and lacerating whenever it was safe to do so. It is not an agreeable task to speak ill of anyone, and Stanton had high abilities; but he was backed up by a secret clique of civilians, he represented a powerful guild of politicians, and he felt that he was justified in carrying out his and their purposes at whatever cost to army, people, or country, believing that the end justified the means, and that the means, if boldly employed, were within his compass.

Says General Grant, who alone made Stanton bend the knee to him, and stipulated for this before he would consent to assume command in the East at all: "Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority to command, unless resisted. He cared nothing for the feelings of others. In fact, it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify. He felt no hesitation in assuming the function of

the executive, or in acting without advising with him. If his act was not sustained, he would change it—if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so.” Consult Grant’s “Personal Memoirs,” vol. II, pp. 536-537, etc.

“Mr. Lincoln,” continues General Grant, “did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfillment of a public trust. Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in making and executing their plans. The Secretary was very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against the enemy guarding the Confederate capital. He could see our weakness, but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. The enemy would not have been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field.”

As General Upton has so clearly shown, the Secretary was very much in the field; or, rather, he was like that other aggressive creature, who does so much damage when he plants himself in a china-shop, while suffering no personal danger to himself. But the bull does his damage while ignorantly trying to get himself out, whereas the Secretary did his while ignorantly trying to get deeper in.

Then, of course, there was seen looming up, before these men at Washington, the ever present danger that what had been granted to Washington, Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, and Pierce,—and was

yet to be awarded to Grant, Hayes, Garfield, and Harrison, and, later on, Roosevelt,—might be granted to McClellan. A military man, successful and conspicuous, might be chosen by the sovereign will of the people of the whole country to be their President; and this was something to be prevented at all hazards.

But McClellan, in his place in the army, could surely have done nothing politically to ensure this reward at the hands of the people; none of those other soldiers I have mentioned did so. Yet still, if he were the really successful general I have attempted to describe, such danger would doubtless exist; while on the contrary, if he were the slow, inefficient, and useless general he was depicted to be, then the surest way to ruin his chances of political preferment would have been to allow him to work out his own damnation for himself, and remain in command of that army whose soldiers wept when he left them, and whose great officers joined in a magnificent tribute to him soon afterward, when he was powerless and helpless, and which Stanton, on hearing of it through General Carl Schurz, investigated, and suppressed with a bang!

Then, was it for his slowness that he was removed? If so, his sloth must have been recently acquired. General Scott wrote him, July 13, 1861, to Beverly, Va.: "The General-in-Chief and, what is more, the Cabinet, including the President, are charmed with your activity, valor, and consequent

successes of Rich Mountain, the 11th, and of Beverly this morning. We do not doubt that you will in due time sweep the Rebels from Western Virginia, but we do not mean to precipitate you, as you are fast enough."

I think I have been able to show, when McClellan appeared slow, who it was that slowed him; and when he was unsuccessful, what it was that made him so; and when he was successful, that it was only in proportion as he could get the ropes of interference off which were wound around him from Washington; and that when he was free of these he was the most successful of all our commanding officers, the most thorough, and the most rapid.

It was for these qualities that Grant—who had then been Major-General, Lieutenant-General, full General, and twice President—said to John Russell Young, when in the Straits of Malacca: "I knew McClellan, and had great confidence in him. I have, for that matter, never lost my respect for McClellan's character, nor my confidence in his loyalty and ability. I saw in him the man who was to pilot us through, and I wanted to be on his staff. . . . I should have liked to have joined McClellan."

McClellan, afterward describing how they came to miss one another, said, in his love and admiration for Grant: "This was his good luck; for had I been there I would, no doubt, have given him a

place on my staff, and he would probably have remained with me and shared my fate."

And Grant, as well as McClellan and Meade, had several close shaves of his own, and from the same uncanny source.

While McClellan was in command at Camp Dennison, in 1861, there passed between him and the War Department the shortest and oddest correspondence which I have come across in the War Records, and which throws a pleasing side-light on that officer :

"CINCINNATI, OHIO, May 22, 1861.

HON. SIMON CAMERON, *Secretary of War*:

Will you please authorize me to use boards to put up places for worship at Camp Dennison? Parties furnishing nails and labor.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, *Major-General*."

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 22, 1861.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Cincinnati:

The Lord's will be done.

SIMON CAMERON, *Secretary of War*.

It was for these qualities, also above narrated, that General Long, Lee's military secretary, afterward Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery of the Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, reports in his "Memoirs of Lee" (edited under the supervision of General Marcus J. Wright, afterward Agent of the United States for Collecting Confederate Records), the following, which occurred

long after the war: "One thing I remember hearing him say. He asked General Lee which, in his opinion, was the ablest of the Union generals; to which the latter answered, bringing his hand down on the table with an emphatic energy, 'McClellan, by all odds!'" (See page 233.)

XXXI

WHY WAS M'CLELLAN REMOVED AND FITZ JOHN PORTER COURT-MARTIALED — THE POPE-HAL- LECK-STANTON DISPATCHES

So the question again recurs, What was that which we doctors call "the exciting cause" of McClellan's removal from command on that most unfortunate occasion?

We shall have to look far away for an answer to what was then the scene of an Indian uprising, in the wilder parts of Minnesota. We shall take up the antecedent features of the astounding affair, and more particularly detail in Chapter XXXIII following just what this "exciting cause" proved to be.

It was especially important to the War Department strategists at Washington that someone at that time should turn up, somewhere far removed from the wholesome influence of the loyal Army of the Potomac and its commander; and, like a gift of Providence, came forth the twin heroes Halleck and Pope.

General Halleck sent to Secretary Stanton, June 4, 1862, his made-up dispatch:

"HALLECK'S HEADQUARTERS, June 4.

HON. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*:

General Pope, with 40,000, is thirty miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard. He already reports 10,000 prisoners and deserters from the enemy, and 15,000 stand of arms captured. Thousands of the enemy are throwing away their arms."

Stanton telegraphed back:

"Your glorious dispatch has just been received, and I have sent it into every State. The whole land will soon ring with applause at the achievement of your gallant army and its able and victorious commander."

And even the President was deceived. He telegraphed also:

"Your dispatch of to-day to the Secretary of War received. Thanks for the good news it brings."

The fighting in the West, it is true, had been actually done by others; but Lyon was dead, and Grant in disgrace, and Halleck and Pope emerged into public view in the very nick of time. A victory far beyond that of Fort Donelson, or that of Shiloh, or of anywhere else, was made to order and heralded abroad, for it brought thousands of prisoners, and more to come; and the great, tender-hearted Lincoln wanted Rebel prisoners far more than he wanted dead Rebels.

Pope, within one week from the proclamation abroad of the bogus dispatch, was rushed to Washington; and within ten days more he was made

commanding general of a new army,—the Army of Virginia,—with Washington as its very own, and all the rest of Virginia as its “hinterland,” or sphere of influence. When Pope reached Washington he must have tried to explain matters, for Stanton telegraphed Halleck to know why he sent such a dispatch. Halleck excused himself, like a lawyer, by saying that he sent only the reports the generals made to him. If anybody had lied, the inference was, it must have been Pope.

Halleck himself was brought on next, immediately following Pope. He was a lawyer, a closet-strategist, and a compiler at second-hand of books on strategy, but one who never manifested any strategical skill of his own; or, if he did, feared to use it. (See Grant, “Personal Memoirs,” vol. I, p. 578; vol. II, pp. 317, 318, 327, 337.)

Now, when General Pope came to the Eastern armies every officer in those armies knew the truth about the bogus victory, about Grant, and everything else, for the grapevine telegraph among soldiers always took care of that sort of thing.

William F. G. Shanks, in his “Personal Recollections of Distinguished Generals,” relates an incident which could not have failed to reach the armies in the East, for it brought Sherman and Grant together for life, and Sherman was an Eastern army officer, and one of McClellan’s generals, having been sent by the latter to command in the West.

There is much of romance in the story of Grant’s

and Sherman's friendship. It began in 1862, and ever afterward continued to grow in strength. When the armies of Halleck were lying—literally so, indeed—before Corinth, Grant was to all appearance shelved in disgrace. He was second in command, but to be second in command then was to be the "fifth wheel to the coach." Grant was much chagrined at his position, and felt in tenfold degree each petty indignity which Halleck heaped upon him. One day General Sherman, who commanded one of the divisions of the wing under the command of General George H. Thomas, went to General Grant's quarters and bolted with his usual abruptness into Grant's tent. They didn't stand on ceremony in the field. He found the general actually weeping with vexation. Sherman asked the cause, and for the first time Grant recounted the indignities which he had endured, the troubles he had encountered, and the false position in which he had been placed before the country. "The truth is, Sherman," he said, "I am not wanted. The country has no use for me, and I am about to resign and go home."

"No, you are not," returned Sherman impatiently; "you are going to do nothing of the sort. The country does need you, and you must stay here, bear these petty insults, and do your duty." And, the author says, Sherman argued Grant down, and kept him there until Halleck's appointment, as general-in-chief, "left the command in the West vacant."

Then Grant had his chance, but neither he nor Sherman ever forgot Halleck. Sherman, in his "Personal Memoirs," relates this story in much the same manner.

Pope's coming East under these circumstances could certainly inspire no confidence in the men. His boastful address to his Virginia army, that in the West they had always seen the backs of their enemies while in the East we did the opposite—when every officer and soldier in Virginia knew that all the battling which Pope ever did in the West did not equal, in actual fighting, Big Bethel or Dranesville—was tactless, to say no worse. His order—promptly vetoed by the President—to remove from their farms and homes and send beyond our lines all male citizens found therein, unless they took the oath of allegiance, was harsh, ill-timed, and despotic. An important fact, clearly set forth in General Upton's "Military Policy," was that Pope attributed to one day, in his Bull Run battle, the events which had really occurred on another day, and that, after assuming command on June 27 he never went out to see his army until July 30. Therefore, in the light of the foregoing acts, Pope could not have failed to produce an uneasiness among all military bodies, private soldiers and officers alike, long before the Army of the Potomac had been ordered up from the Peninsula.

I can testify of my own knowledge to the feeling prevalent among the troops near Washington at

the beginning of July, when General Pope conducted a review of a few thousand men near Fort Worth, back of Alexandria. A mere corporal in the ranks then, I knew little of General Pope; but a jest, with a curse, went the rounds, after that terribly hot day of double-quicking past the grandstand (doubtless not true, but it was in everybody's mouth): "Oh, Pa, twot 'em 'round again; they look so pretty." The incident has no value as history, but it exemplifies a popular feeling in the army at the time, long before McClellan or his army was a possible factor in the case.

There is nothing that sifts out a man like soldiering. A man can fool courts and cabinets, newspaper reporters and editors, and even the public, but if he is a military commander he cannot fool the intelligent and square-dealing veteran soldiers. These men, giving up their time, their pleasures, their business, their wives and sweethearts and families, and throwing just so much of their actual lives away like chaff, have offered themselves as living sacrifices for their country, and are ready to pay the price with life or suffering. And these men want to feel and to know that the commander into whose hands they are put for weal or woe is a good man, a capable man, a powerful man, the best that can be obtained; and that they are as safe in his hands as they can be in any human hands, and that the great cause for which they have periled life and all that makes life worth living is in good hands. Talk

about the fierce light which beats upon a throne! It is nothing to that searching light by which among soldiers—skilled soldiers, true soldiers, veterans—the commander is observed, and felt; and, if worthy, tied fast to, and lived with, and died for. When they find one such that they can trust in implicitly, that they can believe in absolutely and follow fearlessly, they surrender themselves and all they have to that commander with a joyful self-sacrifice that makes them immortal heroes.

Of such commanders Emerson says: "A river of command runs down from the eyes of some men, and the reason why we feel one man's presence and not another's, is as simple as gravity; and this natural force is no more to be withstood than any other natural force."

Lord Wolseley says: "This is the influence which men, with what I may term great *electrical power* in their nature, have exercised in war. Caesar, Marlborough, Napoleon, Sir Charles Napier, and many others I could name possessed it largely. The current passed from them into all around, creating great enthusiasm in all ranks far and near, and often making heroes of men whose mothers and fathers even had never regarded them in that light. This feeling is an addition of at least fifty per cent. of strength and energy to an army where it exists."

Bonaparte said that he often noticed the immediate electric effect of his arrival on the battlefield.

We all recollect what occurred when Sheridan reached his half-routed army in his ride from Winchester to the battle-field of Fisher's Creek, in the Shenandoah Valley.

On the hurried march from the Potomac to Gettysburg, and especially on that exceedingly long march of the Sixth Corps, the word passed in the night from rank to rank, "McClellan is back again, and in command." The whole column took on new life and energy, and enthusiasm took the place of uneasiness and despondency, as they marched on in anticipated triumph, to the glory of a new Antietam. It was not McClellan; but it was the next best thing possible, it was one of his own chosen three—Reynolds, Meade, and Hancock—who took the army and saved the country.

So the poor boy-private at Antietam, with his leg shot off at the thigh, raised himself on his elbow and cried out with his dying breath, as McClellan was riding by along the battle lines: "God bless you, General McClellan!" And the peerless Bayard, dying beside a tree on the fatal field of Fredericksburg, sent this message: "Tell General McClellan that my only regret is that I do not die while under his command." So, too, General Grant said to John Russell Young: "McClellan is to me one of the mysteries of the war. As a young man he was always a mystery. He had the way of inspiring you with the idea of immense capacity, if he would only have a chance. Then he is a man of unusual

accomplishments—a student, and a well-read man.” Grant thus separated this peculiar psychical power of the commander from the habits, education, and acquirements of the individual, while he attributed both to McClellan. It is from the universal recognition of this controlling factor, by his old soldiers, that even to this day they have never been satisfied with what history professed to teach regarding him. What General Emory Upton discovered by investigation, his old soldiers found out by personal experience; and they know, with General Upton, that the military answer to the McClellan problem, as so far presented in current history, “cannot be made to prove, and is not correct.”

XXXII

POPE'S BATTLE AND HIS DEFEAT—SECOND MANASSAS

GENERAL Upton traces the Second Bull Run battle with a pen of fire, and puts the blame where it belongs. This is what he says: "The criticisms on the march of Franklin's corps have all been based on the assumption that there was a broad pike from Alexandria to Centerville, that this highway was all the time open, and that nothing prevented a junction with the hard-pressed Army of Virginia save the indifference of the commander of the Army of the Potomac. . . .

"The facts as subsequently established were that, from the afternoon of the 26th until the afternoon of the 28th, from 25,000 to 30,000 Confederates were on the direct line of communication with the Army of Virginia; that from the time General Pope reached Centerville, on the 28th, till the evening of the 29th, no positive information had been received as to his whereabouts; that his cavalry was so used up that not five horses per company could be forced into a trot; that he sent no dispatch to the Government till the morning of the 30th, and that

Franklin's corps, on the information derived on the night of the 29th, joined him on the 30th, part of it having marched twenty miles."

After Pope's defeated army began to pour back upon Washington, and after McClellan's Army of the Potomac had been entirely sent out to Pope, leaving himself in command of only his staff and orderlies, less than one hundred men, General Upton says that, having acted on the theory of the War Department strategists, there were only 5989 men left to garrison Washington, "of whom 2235 were militia, whose term of service would expire before the end of the month."

As regards the Army of the Potomac, in this Pope campaign, I quote General Upton again: "The accusation that the Army of the Potomac would not fight, will justify the inquiry, 'What troops fought the Second Battle of Bull Run?' The Army of Virginia, as we know, consisted of the corps of General Banks, Sigel, and McDowell. Of these General Banks' corps took no part, being assigned to the protection of the trains."

Sigel reported June 30 that his corps was not in good condition, the organization not complete, and the cavalry not more than 800 effective men and horses.

Pope had already complained of straggling, as early as July 22. He stated afterward, of the battle itself, that "at least one-half of this great diminution of our forces was occasioned by skulking and

straggling from the army. Thousands of men straggled away, and were not in any action." This corps (Sigel's) was estimated at 9000 on the 26th of August.

In addition, the two divisions of King and Ricketts numbered 13,000; "these two divisions," says Upton, "about 13,000 men, and General Sigel's corps, 9000, were all the troops belonging to the Army of Virginia who confronted the 60,000 Confederates on the 29th and 30th." To these are to be added Reno's division of Burnside's corps—the other two divisions being still opposite Fredericksburg. The remaining troops, says Upton, Reynolds, Kearny, Hooker, of Heintzleman's corps, and Morell and Sykes, of Porter's corps, in all 20,500, belonged to the Army of the Potomac.

Had Pope fallen back on Centerville on the 24th or 25th, says Upton,—as Meade did in October of 1863,—Franklin and the remaining divisions of Burnside could have reached him in time.

But, as Upton says, Pope did not understand his own plan. He was claiming a great victory, driving the Rebels, and he could not understand the events which were taking place all around him; and as there was later on demanded someone to suffer, Pope poured the vials of his wrath on Porter and McClellan, and the War Department strategists were only too glad to compound, for bringing Pope and Halleck to Washington, by laying their failure on the men who really saved them. That such was

the case Pope, in especial, never did and never could comprehend.

Porter was court-martialed, as is well known. The evidence was cooked. That which was inconvenient was suppressed, exculpating dispatches were concealed, the testimony of the Confederate officers who knew the facts on their own part was ignored, and the victim was cashiered. But subsequently, when the urgent necessity of convicting him to save Pope, Halleck, and Stanton had passed, a new and fairer tribunal, composed of Schofield, Terry, and Getty, went over the whole case and clearly demonstrated that it was Fitz John Porter who had saved Pope's army, instead of defeating it, who had saved the capital, and that he deserved well of his country. (See War Records, vol. XII, part 2, pp. 513-536.) Grant, too, in his fair-mindedness and breadth of character, promised to stand by Porter forever, and he did so; and his article, published in 1883, "An Undeserved Stigma," not only vindicated Porter, but was the noble act of a fellow-soldier now too great to be assailed, but who had himself passed under the same harrow. Grant to Porter:

"As long as I have a voice it shall be raised in your support, without any reference to its effect upon me or others." (*North American Review*, December, 1885.)

XXXIII

POPE'S DEMAND WHICH HALLECK DARED NOT REFUSE—THE FALSE DISPATCH OF HALLECK'S WHICH BROUGHT POPE AND HALLECK TO COMMAND AT WASHINGTON

AFTER Pope's campaign in Virginia was over, he was sent to Minnesota to command against the savages—a position of degradation, as he held it to be. He wrote a series of remarkable letters to Halleck, commencing with one of September 30, 1862. (See War Records, vol. XII, part 3, pp. 816-827.) He accused Halleck of not sustaining him against McClellan; that McClellan would never forgive Halleck for superseding him; that Halleck was under "a deep personal obligation" to Pope, and that he could learn what it was by consulting the President, Secretary of War, or other members of the Administration; that he had besought the President, and Halleck himself, to be allowed to go West to his old place again; and that the journals, and members of the Cabinet even, were representing that McClellan was really commander, "while you are but a tool in his hands."

Halleck replied, defending himself in his usual manner by showing that whatever credit there was, was his, and whatever blame there was belonged to the "President and entire Cabinet."

But Pope came at him again, under date October 20: "The greatest criminal is McClellan, and my charge is direct and plain against him. Your reason for retaining him in command, 'the feelings of many officers of the Potomac Army,' is the very strongest reason, in my view, why he should not be retained. . . . He [McClellan] should never have been placed in command of anything under such circumstances. . . .

"I wrote you because I desire you to understand fully my feelings, and *the course of action that I shall pursue. I had hoped that you would render official steps unnecessary.* . . .

"Had I imagined for a moment that he would be rewarded with his partisans for abandoning me, and betraying his trust, and that you would, at least, have consented to his and their advancement after such an act, and would have failed to sustain me, or even to do me the barest justice, or to make the slightest acknowledgment in public of my services, I would never have put foot in Virginia."

And now comes the stinger:

"Your not doing so, when the whole facts came to be known, cannot fail to be the subject of remark, *especially so as the circumstances under which you came to Washington and I undertook the campaign*

in Virginia are well known to one-half of Congress." The italics are mine.

He adds that if Halleck cannot do justice, even in words, to him, "No man regrets more than I do that you occupy such a position, or would more gladly see you out of it."

Halleck evidently considered and consulted. He did not reply so far as publication shows, and Pope came at him again. This letter was dated at Saint Paul, Minn., October 30, 1862. It should have reached Washington November 4. The very next day, November 5, McClellan was removed from command, by the following order:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJ. GENERAL'S OFFICE.

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 182.

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1862.

By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the Command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that army.

By order of the Secretary of War.

Then General Pope, and the rest, felt easier. Pope wrote, November 20: "I will wait the action of the Government with all the patience that is in my nature."

They had not finished yet with Fitz John Porter, and, as Pope says, "My position here is not pleasant. . . . My future command or place I leave to yourself, without uneasiness, feeling assured that you will do me justice."

And so the knowledge in the breast of one-half of Congress, and in the secret files of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and in the minds of various others who thought it the better part of valor to be prudent, slumbered until the war had ended, and then, and not till then, General Pope felt free to ask ugly questions, and to put them in print, too, which he did. (See War Records, vol. x, part 2, pp. 635-637.)

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
July 3, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK, U. S. A.,
Washington, D. C.

General:

The war has now ended, and the events and incidents connected with it are passing into history. As I do not wish that any report or misconception which has been circulated to my prejudice, and which is susceptible of explanation, should stand recorded against me, and as the reasons which actuated me in preserving silence until this time no longer exist, I desire to invite your attention to a dispatch published in the newspapers, dated at Corinth, Miss., June 4, 1862, purporting to have been sent by you to the Secretary of War, and containing substantially the following words, viz.: "General Pope is thirty miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard. He already reports 10,000 prisoners and deserters, and 15,000 stand of arms captured," etc. I do not know that you ever sent such a dispatch; but as I do know that I never made such a report, I infer that if you sent the dispatch in question, you must have done so under a very great misapprehension. I have therefore to request that you furnish me a copy of any report made by me upon which such a dispatch as that in question was sent. I have full records of

all my letters, dispatches, and reports to you during the operations at Corinth, and no such report is among them.

I am, General, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE.

But Halleck declined to furnish Pope a copy of such report, and said that all his papers were boxed up for California, adding: "I never reported to the Secretary of War dispatches received from you which were not so received."

This lawyer's letter was too much for Pope, and he wrote Halleck, July 5, that that officer was to pass three weeks before going to California, in New York; that only a short time would be required to look up this paper; that if Halleck meant to still insist that the dispatch was a correct transcript of anything that Pope had sent him, he was "altogether unsatisfactory,"—which was certainly true, but that was because in this case he had to be. "In short, General, I utterly deny that the dispatch purporting to have been sent by you to the Secretary of War was based upon any report from me such as is therein stated, and I therefore call upon you to disavow this dispatch or to furnish me with a copy of the report attributed to me." He says that such a question "in almost any other case" could be easily and conclusively settled by a reference to the official files, "but I have ascertained, General, that when you left the West you ordered that portion of the dispatches and reports concerning the operations around Corinth, which bear upon this question, to be

cut out of the official books, and brought with you to Washington, *leaving the official records in Saint Louis mutilated and incomplete.*”

Pope then sums up the case; says that he has all the evidence requisite; that if Halleck would not, or could not, clear it up,—which, of course, Pope knew that he couldn't, and which Pope himself had not done when it would have been of some use,—he would feel quite different toward what one may call his old friend and comrade; that Pope desired to still maintain those relations, but——!

Halleck, however, believed that silence was golden in this case, and no answer is recorded to General Pope's last letter. However, the letters answered themselves.

It is somewhat humiliating, and not creditable to any of those concerned, to have to record these facts; but it is a question of either McClellan or of his detractors, and the innocent should not in such a case, and in so serious a case particularly, be the one to be made to suffer.

It is perfectly clear that General Pope, when he wrote his letters to Halleck from Minnesota in 1862, was thoroughly aroused. He was no hypocrite in believing that he was a grossly abused man, and that Halleck was responsible for it; and that in his bogus dispatch, mutilation of records, and other conduct just before he left Corinth, and when he came to Washington as General-in-Chief, Halleck had been guilty of acts which would, if made public, forfeit

him his place in the army and degrade him as a man, and he offered to Halleck in categorical terms the alternative either to dismiss McClellan and court-martial and convict Fitz John Porter, or else to be court-martialed and cashiered himself.

Halleck chose the former alternative, and at once, through his co-partner Stanton, had McClellan removed and Fitz John Porter court-martialed, and the court packed to cashier the latter—if not to have him shot.

XXXIV

M'CLELLAN—THE PRESIDENT—THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—CONCLUSION

THERE is nothing to show that the President ever had the slightest cognizance of the circumstances and conditions surrounding these tragical events. Indeed, it is certain that Lincoln not only did not know, but never even dreamed, of cabals and machinations. He was surrounded with webs and entanglements, and there was absolutely no one to whom he could then turn whose words of advice, if just and true, would not be drowned out or silenced, and the adviser would have been destroyed for doing his unselfish duty. McClellan himself never believed that Lincoln was anything else than just and friendly. In the report of his final campaign, dated August 4, 1863, long after his removal from command, he accords this just and noble tribute to the President:

"I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to the President for the constant evidence given me of his sincere personal regard, and his desire to sustain the military plans which my judgment led me to urge for adoption and execution. I cannot at-

tribute his failure to adopt some of these plans, and to give that support to others which was necessary to their success, to any want of confidence in me; and it only remains for me to regret that other counsels came between the constitutional commander-in-chief and the general whom he had placed at the head of his armies—counsels which resulted in the failure of great campaigns. . . .

“If the nation possesses no generals in service competent to direct its military affairs without the aid or supervision of politicians, the sooner it finds them and places them in position the better it will be for its fortunes.

“I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign with this brave army was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. I have not accomplished my purpose if, by this report, the Army of the Potomac is not placed high on the roll of the historic armies of the world. Its deeds ennoble the nation to which it belongs. Always ready for battle, always firm, steadfast, and trustworthy, I never called on it in vain; nor will the nation ever have cause to attribute its want of success, under myself, or under other commanders, to any failure of patriotism or bravery in that noble body of American soldiers.”

XXXV

SOME NOTES OF M'CLELLAN'S LIFE AND PERSONALITY

WHILE this work is essentially a military criticism based on official data, much of which is new to the public, and intended for military students and students of strategy, it may be well to append, in the briefest form, some personal data relating to General George B. McClellan himself. Perhaps this can best come from a military man himself, one who knew him at West Point and during the War with Mexico, and who has written important works on kindred subjects; and yet one who was not employed in the military service during the War of the Rebellion, having left the army six years before the war, to engage in literary pursuits which have made his name famous throughout the world. I refer to Professor and President Henry Coppée, whose "Conquest of Spain" is a monumental work which could only have been accomplished by one of high military judgment.

The remarks on the personality and history of General McClellan I select from his biographical notice of McClellan in Appleton's "Cyclopædia of American Biography," published in 1888.

Professor Coppée entered the Military Academy of West Point in 1841, and was graduated in 1845, while McClellan entered the same institution in 1842, and was graduated in 1846, so that they were associated as students for three years.

Coppée's life was fruitful, and gave him every opportunity to measure men, and especially military men, and their qualifications and achievements.

He served as an officer of artillery during the War with Mexico, and was promoted for gallantry at Contreras and Churubusco; he was principal assistant professor of geography, history, and ethics at West Point for five years; he resigned from the army in 1855, to become professor of English literature in the University of Pennsylvania, until 1866; then president of Lehigh University, at Bethlehem, in 1874; and was one of the Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, at Washington. He was twice a member of the United States Mint Assay Commission; he was editor of the *United Service Magazine* in 1864-1866. In addition to many works not military, Professor Coppée was the author of "Manual of Battalion Drill," "Evolutions of the Line," "Manual of Court-Martial," "Life and Services of General U. S. Grant," and "The Conquest of Spain by the Arab-Moors," and translator from the French of "La Guerre Civile en Amérique," by Count Paris.

Says Professor Coppée of McClellan :

"Born in Philadelphia, Pa., December 3, 1826; died in Orange, N. J., October 29, 1885.

"Educated by private tutors, he spent two years at the University of Pennsylvania, where he shared first honors; at the age of fifteen years and six months (while under legal age) he became by special authority a cadet at the Military Academy at West Point July 1, 1842. In his class were General Stonewall Jackson, General Reno, and others who subsequently became distinguished.

"He led his class in mathematics, and was graduated July 1, 1846. He was appointed brevet second lieutenant in the corps of engineers (the highest class), and served during the War with Mexico, in the operations resulting in the capture of the city; was promoted for meritorious conduct, and in 1848 was made assistant and instructor of practical engineering at West Point. He was engaged in the Red River and other Government explorations, and, later, as engineer on the Western frontiers, and in Oregon and Washington. He was sent to Europe during the Crimean War, on a commission to study the organizations, arms, field and siege-works, and operations of the different armies, the results of which were published in his elaborate report, "The Armies of Europe," and which was used in reorganizing our own armies during the War of the Rebellion. He wrote a number of other military works of a practical character, and devised the well-

known McClellan saddle for cavalry, which has come into universal military use.

"In 1857 he resigned from the army, which was then largely unemployed, to accept the position of chief engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad, and became its vice-president in 1858, and in 1859 was elected president of the Eastern Division of the St. Louis, Missouri and Cincinnati Railroad. Immediately on the breaking out of the War of the Rebellion he resigned, to re-enter the army, and April 23 he was appointed major-general of the Ohio Volunteers, and placed in command of the Department of the Ohio, which included the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, with portions of Virginia and Pennsylvania.

"In a month he was in the field, and immediately engaged in a most successful war, which made West Virginia a loyal State ever afterward.

"His subsequent history is a part of the history of his country."

Of his personal qualities and characteristics, Professor Coppée has this to say:

"McClellan was about five feet eight inches in height, firmly built, with broad shoulders; solid and muscular, an excellent horseman. Modest and retiring, he had withal a great self-respect, a gracious dignity. His personal magnetism has no parallel in military history, except in that of the first Napoleon; he was literally the idol of his officers and men. They would obey him when all other control

had failed. His hold upon the people was never relaxed. The army idolized him, and his popularity followed him. In 1864 he was chosen to deliver the oration at West Point on the occasion of the unveiling of the monument erected to the memory of the officers and soldiers of the regular army."

In 1864, when the very crisis of the war was upon us, and when it was perilous "to swap horses when crossing a stream," McClellan was made one of the Presidential candidates. His personality was his only platform, and, even then, he received from the loyal States and the army alone a vote of 1,800,000, against his opponent, the immortal Lincoln, who received but 2,200,000, in an undoubtedly trammelled election. We can feel now that Lincoln's election was necessary then; but how sad the melancholy aftermath, and the loss of Lincoln, the Pacificator, who never lived to be.

In 1877 McClellan was elected Governor of New Jersey, and declined a re-election.

On his return from Europe, in 1868, he received ovations which those who were present will never forget. His procession through the streets of his native city was literally bordered with tears, and no subsequent receptions to others ever equalled or approached that of McClellan in his own home.

We can well understand how Grant, long after the War, said to his confidential friend and companion, John Russell Young: "I saw in him the man who was to pilot us through, and I wanted to be on his

staff. I should have liked to have joined McClellan," and, as McClellan pathetically said, "would have shared my fate."

And how Robert E. Lee, after the War, when asked his opinion of which was the ablest of the Union generals, as narrated by his biographer and military secretary, General A. L. Long, brought his hand down on the table with emphatic energy, and said, "McClellan, by all odds!"



NOTES

ANTIETAM. The battle of South Mountain, September 14-15, prevented Longstreet from closing down in rear of Franklin and Couch, in Pleasant Valley, and forced Longstreet and D. H. Hill to turn south from Boonsborough to Sharpsburg, and abandon invasion of Pennsylvania from Hagerstown. See pp. 100, 101.

CONSCRIPTION. First general Confederate conscription was issued ten days after Stanton's order, in April, 1862, to stop all recruiting, close the offices and sell the furniture to the best advantage. See p. 29; also "Confederate Conscription," in Index.

CULPEPER. Technique of the strategy and tactics used by McClellan to pass by his flank across Jackson's front, and intervene between the two halves of the Confederate army, and strike Longstreet directly, by a frontal attack.

(All of the above only to be found in the Supplemental Volume LI, of the Official War Records, published and issued in 1898-1899, instead of Volume XIX, which had been published in 1887.) The general movement commenced five weeks after the last gun was fired at Antietam.

Impossibility of an earlier advance east of the Blue Ridge, which the President insisted on. Up until the movement commenced, or at least to October 15th, the Army was living from hand to mouth, as practically no quartermaster's stores had been received since spring. The horses had largely decreased since the Antietam campaign commenced. See note "Supplies," below; Lee's statements also of how McClellan's army was without means for a movement. Any advance of McClellan east of the Blue Ridge would also have opened Maryland and Pennsylvania to a fresh invasion, as Lee's whole army was at Winchester, thirty miles from the Potomac, and McClellan's army would have been east of the mountains, near Bull Run, and entirely beyond possibility of reaching and attacking Lee's new invasion except by a long pursuit into Pennsylvania, and an entire abandonment of our

movement to Culpeper or Richmond. Lee proposed, to both Generals Loring and Jackson, this precise movement (see their dispatches received). November was too late for such a general Confederate invasion, and McClellan left one whole corps and nearly half of another on the north bank of the Potomac to prevent even the threat of such a movement. See pp. 176, 177; 182, 183; 182-190; 193.

FRANKLIN AND COUCH at battle of Crampton's Gap and occupation of Pleasant Valley. Franklin held these until the night of September 16, and Couch until September 17; the purpose to prevent a great turning movement by Lee, from Sharpsburg across the Potomac, to Boteler's Ford; thence down Virginia to Harper's Ferry, then across the Potomac and down the north bank, and up east of the South Mountain, to occupy the passes, open Washington and Baltimore to capture, and compel McClellan, by want of supplies, to retire into Pennsylvania. It was all balked by McClellan. See pp. 82-86; 90-92.

GRANT followed the same route in June, 1864, that McClellan did in June-July, 1862, from Cold Harbor (Gaines' Mill), to Harrison's Landing.

Grant crossed there to unite with Butler's army on the south bank of the James River. McClellan crossed the James also in considerable force, and had there been one-half as many Union troops then on the southern bank as Grant found there when he reached there, the heart of the Confederacy would have been inevitably perforated.

But Burnside's Army of North Carolina was sent, not up the James, but up the Rappahannock to Pope; and McClellan was ordered to trail along after Burnside and leave Lee free to move anywhere at will.

If President Lincoln had had the nerve or experience to send to General McClellan, at Harrison's Landing, in July or August, 1862, the dispatch he sent to General Grant at City Point, just opposite, August 17, 1864 (see "War Records," Vol. XLII, Part 2, page 343), and which reads as follows: "I have seen your dispatch [from Grant to Halleck, in reply], expressing your unwillingness to break your hold where you are. Neither am I willing. Hold on with a bulldog grip and chew and choke as much as possible. A. LINCOLN." How different it would have been! In 1862 it was Pope and Halleck and Stanton who held on "with a bulldog

grip," and chewed and choked, while Lincoln broke his hold, and made McClellan, also, break his. And then!

See the protest of Commodore Wilkes, "War Records," Vol. XI, Part 2, pp. 356-358; and see also General Upton, who, says, "Military Policy of the United States," page 371, "The fact should not be overlooked that the misguided advisers of the President and the Confederate Commander were aiming at the same object." See pp. 27, 37, 43.

MCCLELLAN.—Manufactured the Army of the Potomac, and after its disruption under Pope, in August and September, 1862, remanufactured anew, out of three disrupted armies, the new Army of the Potomac, never to be again remade until the war was over. Grant never made an army; they were made for him. Sherman, Thomas, Meade, Buell and McClellan made armies, and they learned it under McClellan, in whose army they were. Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, and, above all others, Napoleon made armies, which faculty, like that of all great architects, is a personal endowment; and they who best made armies also best fought them, and had the qualities which Coppée attributes to McClellan, saying, page 303, "His personal magnetism has no parallel in military history, except in that of the first Napoleon." See pp. 53-54; 284-286; 303-305.

POPE.—A curious commentary on the state of mind of General Pope is to be found in his letter in reply to General Halleck of October 20, 1862, "War Records," Vol XII, Part 3, page 822. Halleck, in reply to General Pope's previous letter says, page 820: "The feeling of many of his officers toward you was such that you could not have commanded them. No one can deny this. . . . *The assignment of General McClellan to this command, or rather his retention in it, was not my act nor that of the War Department; it was the act of the President alone. I did not even know of his decision on the matter till he himself announced it to General McClellan.*"

To this General Pope replied: "Your reason for retaining him in command, 'the feeling of many officers of the Potomac army,' is the very strongest reason, in my view, why he should not be retained." His view was that of the boarding-house keeper who said "she always tried to find out what the boarders didn't like, and then give them plenty of it."

Halleck's letter, above quoted, is a direct and categorical

affirmation, which I have italicized, of what is stated in the text of this book, on pages 47, 48-52, 60-62.

STEINER, DR.—Inspector of the Sanitary Commission, a resident of Frederick, Maryland, where he owned a farm. After second Bull Run he had leave, and went to Frederick on the last train which reached that city, remaining there as an observer during the entire Confederate occupation, and accompanied McClellan's army on its campaign to Antietam. His diary was made at the time. His important statements are those of an expert, an official inspector of troops. See pp. 57, 77-78, 122-124, 133-134.

SUPPLIES.—By a doctored system in the Antietam campaign, after the battle the people of the North were made to believe that the Army of the Potomac was being lavishly supplied, while it was being actually starved and nearly naked; while, in fact, these supplies went to the stay-at-homes in Washington under a fiction that McClellan's army was a part of "the defenses of the Capital," under the official order of September 2, and ignoring the unpublished direct and personal order of the President for McClellan to take command of the army in the field. See pp. 173-177.

WAR RECORDS, United States Official, Supplemental Volume LI. Most of the actual material only is to be found in this supplemental volume, published eleven years after volume XIX, in which these thousands of most important papers should have appeared their suppression. See pp. 11, 12; also "War Records" in Index.

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